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One of the central contentions of “The Art of Reconciliation in Rwanda” is that the 
transition from revenge to reconciliation narratives in Rwanda is relevant to other post-
conflict societies. To elucidate this, I engage a focused study of Rwandan aesthetic forms in 
this dissertation, punctuated by references to canonical Western texts. I do so not to 
universalize my findings, but to study the important similarities and differences among the 
aesthetic productions of nations traditionally set in the antithetical categories of North/South; 
developed/ developing; non-transitional/ transitional; first/third world.  
Rwandan reconciliation has often been discussed in relation to other post-conflict 
regions in the Global South that have undergone reconciliation programs, such as South 
Africa, Uganda, and Chile. And the Rwandan genocide is routinely examined in relation to 
other sites of major genocides, especially the Holocaust and the Cambodian genocide. But 
debates about reconciliation and the legacy of conflict have in recent years become 
increasingly interested in contexts like Canada, Australia, and the United States, stable 
democracies of the Global North that are not typically included in conversations about places 
like Rwanda unless it is to contrast rather than to compare (Radzik and Murphy 2).  
I was led to compare Rwandan and classic Western aesthetic productions about 
revenge and reconciliation by two observations. The first was the startling similarities of 
formal strategies in classic Western texts about the founding of the (European) nation and of 
Rwandan artworks about the (re)founding of the nation after genocide. The second was the 
equally startling yet disturbing similarities between the political divisiveness and revenge 
rhetoric within the United States during the Trump era and within Rwanda during the lead up 




the resonances of political divisionism, the more important it became to produce comparative 
analysis between two archives and geopolitical contexts that some readers might not want to 
recognize as comparable. 
There is no doubt that my subject position—as an American citizen who worked in 
Rwanda over the last decade and is in the process of receiving Rwandan citizenship through 
marriage—has attuned me to the importance of studying reconciliation as a phenomenon of 
great import to both the countries in which I have a civic and personal stake. In the latter years 
of writing this dissertation, from 2016 to 2018, it was difficult not to think of ethnic 
divisionism in Rwanda when inundated by news of American political divisiveness and the 
high rates of racial bias passed on across generations. This was a sobering comparison to face. 
But thinking about Rwanda was also a source of cautious optimism when considering the 
divisive landscape of American politics and social life. If a country like Rwanda could 
transform into one of the most peaceful places in Africa after a genocide that implicated 
nearly every individual as a victim, perpetrator, survivor, bystander, or rescuer, there is reason 
enough to think seriously about the possibilities (and pitfalls) of reconciliation elsewhere.  
This is not to claim that Rwanda’s reconciliation process can or should be applied as a 
model in other sites; as will become clear in the chapters that follow, much of the work 
reconciliation accomplishes or fails at is tied to the specificities of its historical and cultural 
context. But I am making the risky and uncomfortable claim that the divisiveness in Rwanda 
before and during the genocide is perhaps not as distant from the contemporary United States, 
or for that matter the United Kingdom or Europe, than some of us living in those countries 
might like to think. The pressure of that divisiveness is, I contend, an incentive to consider 




That said, “The Art of Reconciliation in Rwanda” is not explicitly about comparing 
Rwanda to the West, although that subject certainly gives fodder for future projects. My 
primary focus is to examine the aesthetic genres of reconciliation in Rwanda as they interact 
with legal and political forms of reconciliation. The accompanying literary analysis of 
Western texts, which punctuates an otherwise Rwanda-centered dissertation, is intended as an 
initial venture into comparative inquiry of a different sort; one that is less interested in 
historicizing the relationship between the art and politics of a specific context, and more 
engaged with a long view of history and of art that sees aesthetic patterns across time and 
space. It is my hope that readers will find in these approaches something of import to sites 







Introduction: The Paradox of Reconciliation 
  
“The Art of Reconciliation in Rwanda” examines the paradox I first confronted when I began 
working in Rwanda in 2007: how could a country that endured an infamously bloody 
genocide transform into one of the most peaceful places in Africa only thirteen years later? 
How is it that Rwandans live together today as though “in the fifties, you had Poland, 
Germany, France and Israel all within the same borders, with no possibility for Jews to leave 
the territory and the same for the people who had attempted to exterminate them?”1  
The term used by both international scholars and the Rwandan government to describe 
Rwanda’s transformation after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi is “reconciliation.” But the 
definition of reconciliation remains a subject of intense debate. What does reconciliation 
entail? Who creates it? How is it qualified and quantified? Is reconciliation judicial, as with 
Rwanda’s transitional justice courts of Gacaca that granted reduced prison sentences in 
exchange for confession and apology to victims’ families? Is it political, as with Rwanda’s 
amended constitution of 2003 that prohibits discrimination by ethnicity? Is it cultural, as with 
the State-funded and private cultural productions that model transitions from revenge to 
reconciliation? 
Scholarship on Rwanda and other post-conflict sites worldwide demonstrates that 
                                                 
1 After filming a documentary of Rwanda’s transitional justice “Gacaca” courts over the course of six 
years, Belgian-American filmmaker Anne Aghion contextualized post-genocide Rwanda in an 
interview in terms of what post-World War II Europe did not do (Aghion 2013, 22). This rhetorical 
move indicates how readily Rwandan history is theorized through Western history; Aghion anticipates 
that it is easier for an international audience to understand what didn’t happen in Europe than what did 
happen in Rwanda. (My use of her analogy reveals that I, too, anticipate its usefulness for readers 
unfamiliar with Rwanda.) Pushed to its logical extreme, this stance suggests that an imagined Europe 
is more accessible than a real Africa. Notably, however, Aghion’s documentaries of the Gacaca courts 
push back against this tendency to route Rwanda through the West; her Kinyarwanda-language films 
do not visually or aurally feature any Western interlocutors or references to Western history. I return to 




reconciliation manifests in and through an overlapping network of judicial, political, and 
cultural phenomena, such that it cannot be readily reduced to any particular process or actor. 
The multivalent nature of reconciliation has led one legal scholar to describe it as an “empty 
universal” whose only “common denominator” across diverse historical contexts is 
“normative authority and semantic vagueness” (Renner 52). This description is a tempting 
one, as it helps to explain why dictators and peacemakers alike have been able to market their 
policies as “reconciliation.” Under this rubric, reconciliation’s “semantic vagueness” helps 
facilitate its “normative authority” precisely because it can mean anything while still being 
associated—by way of the term’s longstanding religious and philosophical history and its 
recent political utility in transitional justice systems—with desirable qualities.2 And yet, 
although reconciliation can be described as so many things, it is not just “anything” as the 
empty universal theory assumes. Reconciliation is, while capacious and contradictory, 
nonetheless constituted by particular patterns that are apparent across time and space.  
Aesthetic productions help make these patterns legible. “The Art of Reconciliation in 
Rwanda” identifies distinct genres that manifest in artistic representations of reconciliation. 
Importantly, this diversity of genres is related but not equivalent to the range of politicized 
opinions about reconciliation among Rwandans. Existing debates about reconciliation within 
Rwanda have been dominated by social science and ethnographic research that reduce 
reconciliation to ethnic and/or political identity, thereby presuming that survivors, bystanders, 
perpetrators, and rescuers only possess conflicting views over the national project to unify.3 
                                                 
2 See Radzik and Murphy for a comprehensive history of the term reconciliation, including its influx 
following the rise of truth and reconciliation commissions across the Global South, especially in South 
Africa.  
3 See for instance the ethnographic findings of Erin Jessee, Phil Clark, Bert Ingelaere, Timothy 
Longman, Rachel Ibreck, and Sue Cook, and the testimonials curated in Jean Hatzfeld and Anne 




For instance, perpetrators tend to prioritize reintegration and forgiveness, while survivors 
privilege contrition and justice, and government officials, national security (Clark 220-8). 
Scholars have concluded from these findings that even as ethnic identification has been de 
facto illegalized in post-genocide Rwanda, Rwandans consistently identify with the political 
category born out of the subject position they took, or were forced to take, during the 
genocide. And if Rwandans view reconciliation in divisive terms, it follows that the 
reconciliation process risks exacerbating the very divisions that it seeks to undo.  
I do not contest the veracity of this canon of ethnographic research, nor do I entirely 
reject its conclusions. But as the artworks I discuss in “The Art of Reconciliation” indicate, 
reconciliation in Rwanda is not only perceived within the formulaic categories determined by 
identity politics. I demonstrate through a reading of theater, film, poetry, and memorial sites 
that Rwandans across the political spectrum experience and represent reconciliation as 
processes of transfiguration, trial, and memorialization. Given that these diverse genres 
manifest across political divides, genre offers a route to both creating and perceiving the 
“commonality within difference” so crucial to successful reconciliation politics. 
However, this “commonality” is not a seamless process, for the genres of 
transfiguration, trial, and memorialization contradict one another’s core characteristics. The 
genre of transfiguration posits reconciliation as a fantasy or miracle, capable of transfiguring 
people through magic or divine intervention into subjects desirous of living with one another. 
Its pace is swift, its tone confident, and its trajectory linear. In contrast, the genre of trial 
shows reconciliation to be a slow, arduous tribulation, both within and outside the boundaries 
of actual court trials. Finally, the memorialization genre presents reconciliation as a 




reconciliatory, but they also contain risks of ethical, political, and aesthetic dimensions. This 
is especially significant because the aesthetic sphere in Rwanda not only represents 
reconciliation, but contributes actively to its processes.  
 
The Politicized Nature of Art in Rwanda 
The title of my dissertation, “The Art of Reconciliation in Rwanda” relies upon the 
multivalent nature of the term “art” to consider art as both statecraft and aesthetic. It is 
difficult in Rwanda to assess where statecraft ends and artwork begins. This is not simply due 
to my interpretive method, grounded in postcolonial studies, that perceives aesthetics and 
politics as operating on “a common plane” (Levine 16). The aesthetic realm in Rwanda 
surpasses Fredric Jameson’s infamous assessment that “all third-world cultural productions” 
are “national allegories” (69). This is because cultural productions in Rwanda not only 
represent political figures and events, but actually features them in their material and/or 
ideological construction. Take for instance the aesthetic productions that I analyze in the 
chapters that follow: the “Hate Radio” broadcasts and songs (1994) whose artists were 
indicted at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for inciting genocide; the national 
theater performance Shadows of Memory (2014) that represented the genocide to a stadium 
filled with survivors, including the president; the documentary film My Neighbor, My Killer 
whose interviews with Rwandan civilians are punctuated by footage of in-person and radio 
announcements by State officials; and the national genocide memorial sites that are built, 
curated, funded, and operated under the auspices of governmental organizations. Even the 
privately produced artworks that I discuss, such as the independent, fictional film 




representation as private art and representation as public performance in an officially political 
space.  
The participation of political actors in Rwandan “cultural productions”—to use 
Jameson’s term—is far more striking than it would be in texts or novels. The embodied forms 
of cultural productions like theater, documentary film, and memorial sites allow political 
actors to literally—rather than allegorically—participate in art. This is yet another reason we 
should heed Brent Hayes Edwards’s cautionary note on Jameson’s “hurried reduction of 
scope to a singular generic category” in “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational 
Capitalism,” which moves from the “sweeping” “‘all third-world cultural productions’” to 
“‘all third-world texts,’” and “later, to the novel alone” (4). Edwards’s critique of Jameson’s 
inattentiveness to genre ultimately arrives at the suggestion that reading shifts in generic 
register can open the possibility of what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak calls “provocation into 
counterfocalization,” in other words, to “push against the constant privileging” of the text’s 
central focalizer (7). But this is a very different process in Rwandan cultural productions than 
in the novels and films Edwards discusses wherein counterfocalization occurs diegetically 
through a shift in mode, for example, from narrative to lyric in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace.  
In Rwanda, the modal shift from written literature like novels and memoirs to cultural 
productions like national theater, radio, and memorial sites, illuminates a different dimension 
to focalization. Because political figures in Rwandan cultural productions are not “figured” 
through aesthetic strategies, but literally participate, the production has to be focalized 
through the eye of the State. This is true in the fundamental sense that the Rwandan State 




served to censor and/or criminalize anything deemed as dissenting from approved narratives. 4 
But focalizing through the State also means something more complex than limited freedom of 
expression. When State actors participate in artworks whose form, genre, and style depart 
from that of political speeches and policy briefs, the “voice” of the State is forced to change 
through the shift in mode. Thus, even as State-funded art seeks to transmit the State’s 
ideological stance, it undergoes a modal translation between that which can be articulated in a 
speech or a law to that which can be represented by theater or poetry or radio or memorial. 
Through this translation process, contradictions, excesses, and alternate possibilities become 
visible. Thus, even as they are consistent with State ideology, aesthetic forms allow multiple 
and contradictory truths to become visible at the same time. Rwandan art reveals not only 
what Jameson calls the inseparability of public and private life, but also the multivalent and at 
times conflicting genres of reconciliation expounded by the State.  
Examining these genres comparatively permits counterfocalization in a context where 
anything counter to official narratives is often assumed by critics of the Rwandan State to be 
impossible unless it routes through political opposition. Significantly, these genres provoke 
counterfocalization not through dissenting speech, but rather through the capaciousness 
afforded by their diverse aesthetics. This is another way of saying that the aesthetic realm, 
even when constructed and surveilled by the State, need not only mean focalizing through the 
narrow purview offered by the State’s typical script. State ideology looks, sounds, and even 
feels and smells differently when manifested in cultural productions. The aesthetic realm 
                                                 
4 Freedom House International has never rated Rwanda better than “partly free” or “not free.” Its 
international rating system gives Rwanda an aggregate score of 23/100, with 0 being the least free. For 
context, some neighboring countries scored much lower—South Sudan 2/100, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 16/100, Ethiopia 12/100—and others much higher—Uganda 37/100, Tanzania 52/100, 
Kenya 48/100. The only countries in Sub-Saharan Africa ranked as “Free” are South Africa, 




therefore allows us to focalize through different versions of the State, opening up the 
possibility that the State may well see itself through more diverse perspectives than suggested 
by its speeches and laws.  
 
Thus far, scholarship on Rwanda has provided a primarily evaluative approach to 
examining the Rwandan State, judging to what extent it is repressive or progressive, freeing 
or constraining, elected or forced. The overall consensus has been emphatically critical. While 
scholars vary in the type and degree of criticism that they levy against the government, they 
are nearly unanimous in positioning their work as a critique. Filip Reyntjens, René 
Lemarchand, Gérard Prunier, Scott Straus, Lars Waldorf, and Judi Rever accuse the current 
Rwandan government, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), of discrimination, political 
repression, and violence. Johan Pottier, Mahmood Mamdani, Timothy Longman, Theoneste 
Rutagengwa, Jens Meierhenrich, and Sara Guyer claim that the RPF wields the memory of 
genocide to legitimize its leadership. Suzanne Buckley-Zistel, Phil Clark, and Rachel Ibreck 
take a more measured approach to critique specific RPF policies and recommend others.  
When the prominent anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani published When Victims 
Become Killers in 2001, he began by noting three “silences” within existing accounts of the 
Rwandan genocide regarding the history, agency, and geography of the genocide. Mamdani 
criticized academic and popular accounts for writing “as if genocide has no history and as if 
the Rwandan genocide had no precedent” (7); for highlighting the elite planners of the 
genocide while failing to explain “the participation—even initiative—from below” (8); and 
for assuming that the processes that led to and occurred during and after the genocide took 




“silences” have been filled with a robust body of scholarship from the fields of anthropology, 
sociology, political science, history, human rights, development studies, and law. Like 
Mamdani’s work, these texts have focused on questioning, destabilizing, and reframing 
master narratives about Rwanda. But whereas When Victims Become Killers historicized the 
fact that many of the genocide’s killers had once been victims, more recent accounts turn their 
attention to reframing a different political identity in Rwanda, that of the RPF army and 
political party that ended the genocide and has ruled the country ever since. This body of 
scholarship could well be called, following Mamdani, “When Saviors Become Villains.” 
Rwanda Studies today is dominated by a master narrative critique of the RPF that, ironically, 
aims to destabilize the RPF’s own master narratives.  
Meanwhile, outside the academic context, many media reports, political leaders, and 
development practitioners have commended the RPF with enthusiasm. Notable journalists 
such as Philip Gourevitch, Fareed Zakaria, and Stephen Kinzer have praised post-genocide 
Rwanda’s developments. The Clinton Foundation awarded current President Paul Kagame a 
Global Citizen Award in 2009. The African Union elected him president in 2018. Will Jones’s 
exhaustive analysis of reports on Rwanda’s economic and political reconstruction process 
concludes that “the overwhelming consensus today is that the Rwandan state has been 
reconstructed to a degree beyond the most optimistic hopes of those observing the aftermath 
of the genocide” (229). At the same time, however, as Jones emphasizes, in academic circles, 
“Kagame-bashing appears to be in vogue” (239). His assessment of the current state of 
Rwanda scholarship is persuasive in its unusually long historical overview. He writes 
Rwanda has long suffered from outsiders’ projections. Whether as the 




recent reincarnation of the RPF as the African ruling party everybody loves to 
hate, polemical castings of Rwandan politics saturate the discourse. They are 
ideology dressed as scholarship, and tell more about the authors of these 
discourses than about Rwanda itself. A more temperate analysis of the 
prospects for the current Rwandan political dispensation requires us to proceed 
unencumbered by assumptions about how Rwanda ‘should’ work, or 
judgments based on its failure to imitate Washington-consensus platitudes 
about what constitutes ‘good governance’ (228).  
While I agree with the heart of Jones’s argument—that the “polemical castings” of much 
Rwanda scholarship tells us “more about the authors of these discourses than about Rwanda 
itself”—I depart from his objective and methodology. Jones’s stated purpose is to study 
Rwanda in order to predict its future. His methodology, like that of most academic and 
organizational research on Rwanda, analyzes processes and materials that are empirically 
quantifiable, such as GDP, crime rates, court proceedings, election results, civilian response 
surveys, and data-generative ethnographic observation. Such metrics have provided 
invaluable theories of how national rebuilding operates in Rwanda. However, their depictions 
remain affectively anemic in reducing the tumultuous experience of reconstruction to 
evaluation and prescription.  
Contrastingly, artistic productions showcase the multifarious nature of recovery 
without providing facile conclusions about what an individual or a government should or 
should not do. My position as a literary scholar led me to an emphatically non-evaluative and 
non-prescriptive stance on Rwandan reconciliation. I do not enter the debate about the merits 




polemical tone of many voices in that debate; second, the fact that my literary approach would 
have little to add to empirical analysis; and third, my belief that there is more to be generated 
from studying Rwanda than judgment and recommendation. “The Art of Reconciliation” thus 
departs from the robust canon of scholarship on Rwanda that is grounded in the social 
sciences.  
 
My work also deviates from the small canon of scholarship on Rwanda from the 
humanities. Rwandan art has generated relatively little interest in the humanities, a fact that 
cannot simply be attributed to a lack of curiosity about the country’s context. After all, South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission—a historically similar post-conflict site—
garnered explosive scholarly attention in the arts and humanities. The scarce attention to 
Rwanda has more to do, I suspect, with issues of aesthetic form and circulation.  
Rwanda has not produced many art works that circulate internationally. The literature 
by Rwandans available overseas is primarily survivor memoirs that have either had limited 
circulation—Scholastique Mukasonga’s work, for example, is published by the small, 
independent press Archipelago Books—or have sold well as companion pieces to the authors’ 
humanitarian work, as with Immaculée Ilibagiza’s Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan 
Holocaust (co-authored with The Canadian Press journalist Steve Erwin) and Clementine 
Wamariya’s The Girl Who Smiled Beads (co-authored with New York Times Magazine writer 
Elizabeth Weil). Significantly, the literature on Rwanda that receives the most attention in 
literary studies is not written by Rwandans. The smattering of academic articles and 
monographs devoted to writing on Rwanda, notably Nicki Hitchcott’s Rwanda Genocide 




the Tutsis in Rwanda, focus mostly on the canon of literature and film about Rwanda 
produced by non-Rwandans.  
This canon of writing by non-Rwandans is comprised of texts from two groups: first, a 
cluster of Francophone African works about the immediate aftermath of the genocide, and 
second, a series of Western memoirs and novels about the genocide. The Francophone works 
were published through a project entitled “Rwanda: écrire par devoir de mémoire” that 
brought African writers to Rwanda in 1998 to write about the genocide and its aftermath. The 
most famous of these texts, Boubacar Diop’s Murambi: livre des ossements, Koulsy Lamko’s 
La phalène des collines, and Veronique Tadjo’s L’ombre d’Imana, are all set at major killing 
sites either during the massacres or in their aftermath, and have generated literary analyses 
primarily routed through trauma studies.  
The second cluster of texts include the bestselling memoirs Shake Hands with the 
Devil by United Nations Peacekeeping commander Romeo Dallaire and We Wish to Inform 
You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families by Frontline and New Yorker 
journalist Philip Gourevitch, as well as Canadian journalist Gil Courtemanche’s novel A 
Sunday at the Pool in Kigali. Like the blockbuster film Hotel Rwanda, these texts exported 
the story of the Rwandan genocide to the West along with a critique of the failure of Western 
powers to intervene in the genocide. Unsurprisingly, literary criticism on these texts has 
focused on the aesthetics and politics of witnessing and complicity.  
Taken together, the Rwandan survivor memoirs, the devoir de mémoire texts, the 
Western novels and memoirs, and their attendant secondary criticism, have created a 
discourse of literature on Rwanda as a literature of trauma, witnessing, and complicity—all of 




in the social sciences has moved beyond its earlier concentration on genocide to analyses of 
rebuilding. In consequence, an interdisciplinary project like my own that seeks to examine the 
literature of reconciliation is faced with a plethora of material on reconciliation from the 
social sciences, and a small but noteworthy corpus of material on trauma and witnessing from 
literary study, but very little on the aesthetics of reconciliation. The latter lacuna is likely 
attributable to the paucity of primary literature—whether fiction, memoir, drama, or poetry—
on reconciliation in Rwanda. This dearth of literature is surprising when one considers the 
omnipresence of reconciliation as practice and ideal in contemporary Rwanda. But it is not 
surprising if one takes into consideration the factors of timing, publishing culture, and 
freedom of speech.  
The flurry of Rwandan, African, and Western texts about the genocide were written 
before reconciliation became a key framework for understanding Rwanda, and it is thus 
logical that they focused on trauma rather than recovery. But the reason literature on 
reconciliation has not flourished in recent years can perhaps be explained by the material and 
ideological constraints facing Rwandan writers. As Professor Jean-Chrysostome Nkejabahizi 
at the National University of Rwanda elucidates, there is not a singe literary journal based in 
Rwanda, there are few literary events hosted in the country, and there is almost no publishing 
industry beyond that catering to educational and religious materials (61). Furthermore, many 
Rwandan writers and literary critics were killed during the genocide, while others still live in 
exile (Hitchcott 30). The absence of a reading and writing culture is starkly evident when 
visiting Rwanda; the only bookstores in the country are housed in wealthy enclaves of the 
capital city, and their materials primarily cater to tourists, while the one public library is 




literacy rates in Rwanda are high for Sub-Saharan Africa—at approximately 68% of the adult 
population5—there is still little culture in Rwanda for reading fiction.6 
While the temporal proximity to the genocide and the historically limited publishing 
culture are changing in ways that might encourage more literary writings, there remains the 
major constraint of limited freedom of speech in contemporary Rwanda. The resulting self-
censorship is presumably responsible for determining the forms that much “literature” takes in 
Rwanda today. It is safer to articulate dissenting opinions in collective and anonymizing 
projects—such as the testimonies provided to ethnographers like Jean Hatzfeld—than it is to 
pen a novel or memoir under one’s own name. Over time it is possible that if freedom of 
speech improves in Rwanda, literature by Rwandans may increase. Nonetheless, it would be 
difficult to disaggregate changes within freedom of speech from developments in the 
publishing industry, not to mention the effects of globalization, Anglicization, and improved 
education. 
 
For now, cultural productions other than written literature have wide circulation, 
affordability, and accessibility to both urban and rural Rwandans. These forms include radio, 
theater, and memorial sites, none of which require literacy or knowledge of a language other 
than the native Kinyarwanda. The national theater and memorial sites are free, while radios 
are cheap to purchase and free to listen to. Ironically, however, the forms that are accessible 
and popular within Rwanda are the most difficult to reach from outside the country, including 
                                                 
5 Based on statistics from the 2012 Census. The 68% literacy in 2012 marked an increase from 64.4% 
in 2002. Literacy rates have presumably continued to rise since 2012 as access to secondary education 
is increasing (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda).  
6 Nicki Hitchcott offers an extensive examination of reading and writing cultures in Rwanda, including 





by scholars working from a distance. Oral and embodied theater performances are bound to a 
local audience except when transmitted by the rarely available written transcription or audio 
or video recording. Radio recordings, if archived, are often unsystematized and are seldom 
translated from Kinyarwanda, a language that is scarcely taught outside Rwanda. The 
memorials are place-dependent: it would be physically and legally complicated to transport 
their displays of bodily remains, not to mention that the memorials’ symbolic importance 
depends upon their location at former killing sites. Meanwhile, photographs of the bodily 
remains are prohibited except by special permit. This has resulted in a ghastly mishmash of 
illegally taken photographs that circulate online, giving only a truncated and disturbing 
perspective of a space that is intended to be structured by the guide’s testimony. In sum, the 
works of art that are most impactful to the most number of people within Rwanda are the least 
accessible to those outside the country.  
I have been fortunate to spend enough time in Rwanda over the last decade to 
experience some of these material spaces firsthand, and to learn sufficient Kinyarwanda to 
understand cultural forms that circulate online or in print without English translation. I chose 
to concentrate in this dissertation on the cultural forms that I deemed highly impactful in 
Rwandan society. While I did not undertake empirical research to quantify or qualify the 
impact of specific aesthetic forms, I have inferred their impactfulness from their wide 
circulation, their linguistic and material accessibility, and their cultural prominence. Although 
wide reaching impactfulness is not often a major factor in literary study, it is important in the 
Rwandan context to conceptualize how art forms have normalized a national project.  
One of the many reasons Rwanda is of great interest to social scientists is the 




the genocide. This has been theorized in a number of ways, from a linguistic perspective of 
Rwandans’ one national language, from a historical perspective of the clan structures, 
kingdoms, and political configurations that rewarded obedience, from a political perspective 
of repressive governments, to an anthropological perspective of cultural values. However, 
other than the academic work on “hate media” that incited genocide, there has been almost no 
research on the role played by cultural productions in Rwandan collective movements.7 “The 
Art of Reconciliation” aims to fill that gap. 
My impetus to consider the art of reconciliation initially arose from what I saw as a 
disconnect between how Rwanda is narrated in the West—both in popular culture and 
academic scholarship—and how it narrates itself. Thanks in part to the mass circulation of the 
film Hotel Rwanda, many Westerners have only a narrow, sensationalized view of Rwanda as 
a land of tribal violence weaponized by machetes and hate radio. Scholarship on Rwanda, 
particularly the early works on the genocide and its immediate aftermath, similarly focused on 
the “senseless” violence, even if their objective was to make sense out of it. My early years of 
working in Rwanda at a rural orphanage and later at an urban public school introduced me to 
a very different culture than the one I saw reflected in conversations and research in the 
United States. At the same time, however, my visits to genocide memorials and my 
ethnographic interviews with genocide survivors and bystanders also contradicted my daily 
observations of a peaceful society. In sum, nothing seemed to match up—neither the 
discourse in the West and the actual situation in Rwanda, nor Rwanda’s peaceful condition 
and its recent, horrific past. In the course of my own research, I began to wonder if there 
might be an alternative way of studying Rwanda’s reconstruction process, one that could take 
                                                 
7 A notable exception is Amanda Breed’s scholarship on, and participation in, theater projects 




a “reparative” view of reparation rather than the “paranoid” perspective that dominates 
Rwanda scholarship.  
 
Legal Reparations and Reparative Reading 
During the American AIDS crisis of the 1980s, gender and queer studies theorist Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick wrote an influential essay that defined a method of “reparative reading” 
in contradistinction to the prevalent method of “suspicious” or “paranoid reading.” Sedgwick 
defines reparative reading as what Foucault calls “care of the self,” the process by which 
people find sustenance even in inhospitable environments (137). She criticizes paranoid 
reading for anticipating negativity and demanding an endless “faith in exposure” through 
which to demystify objects and social practices to reveal their most painful attributes (139). 
There are, after all, she writes, good surprises ahead as well as bad; why not then seek out 
pleasure instead of forestalling pain? (137). Following Sedgwick, Rita Felski argues that 
literary critics should “de-essentialize” suspicious reading to engage what Paul Ricoeur called 
the “hermeneutics of trust, of restoration, of recollection” in addition to the hermeneutics of 
suspicion that came to be seen as Ricoeur’s maxim (9). But what Sedgwick and Felski both 
assume in these definitions of reparative reading is that the reparative is a stable, known 
entity. The Rwandan case destabilizes that notion.  
In the wake of a publically enacted genocide like Rwanda’s, nearly every citizen has 
wounds that must be redressed—be they physical, psychological, economic, social, or 
cultural. Part of what makes the reparations process so difficult is that the needs of 
perpetrators, bystanders, and victims vary widely: one survivor may desire a public apology 




family whose cow was stolen may demand economic compensation, but the thief may have 
been compelled to join the genocidal forces out of poverty. Justice may demand punitive 
sentencing for killers, but the State’s reconstruction process depends upon economic 
resources that are solely taxed by the cost of mass incarceration. In short, what is reparative 
for one party may be useless or even damaging to another.  
This situation is not unique to Rwanda; the multivalent and contradictory nature of 
reparation for human rights violations was codified in international law in 2005 with the 
United Nations’ Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles). Basic Principles declares that the State 
should either provide reparations to victims directly in cases where the State is responsible for 
the violations, or provide enforcement measures to compel the responsible persons and/or 
legal entities to provide the reparations. The document outlines five types of reparation: 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition, and satisfaction. 
Restitution aims to restore the victim to his original situation before the violence occurred. 
Compensation provides economic payment for violations. Rehabilitation offers psychological 
and physical services to the wounded. Guarantees of non-repetition refers to the restructuring 
of the State to eradicate conditions that led to the previous violence.  
Satisfaction is the most multivalent form of reparation. It includes the cessation of 
violence; public disclosure of the truth; search for and reburial of the bodies of the killed; 
public apology; judicial sanctions against liable persons; commemorations for the victims; 
and accurate accounting of the violations in educational material. Its rhetorical nebulousness 




is “turashaka impomazarira,” which means, “we want something to wipe away our tears.” 
What that “something” entails may not be possible for the State to deliver, nor may it even be 
articulable for victims for whom the violation is too great to ever be repaired. As if 
anticipating that reparations are too problematic to fulfill, Basic Principles is not actually 
legally binding; it merely recommends what States “should” do. 8 In a sense, then, Basic 
Principles functions more like fiction than law: it narrates an ideal state of response to human 
rights and/or humanitarian violations.  
Because reparations in Rwanda, as in many post-conflict States, are difficult if not 
unreasonable to fully deliver, it is no surprise that artworks register a continuing desire for 
reparation. All of the cultural productions that I consider in the chapters that follow articulate 
the desire for one or more types of reparation, be it for the impossible form of restitution 
through the resurrection of genocide victims in Shadows of Memory; economic compensation 
for the theft of a cow but not the murder of a husband in My Neighbor, My Killer; and the 
reburial and commemoration of the dead at genocide memorials. All of these aesthetic forms 
demonstrate that for reconciliation to be achieved, the attendant reparations must be as 
satisfying as revenge.   
As remote as Rwandan art may be from the rest of the world, it is relevant to other 
post-conflict sites for what it reveals about the different genres through which cultural 
                                                 
8 The right to reparation has been “‘inferred’ from the right to a remedy laid down in conventions like 
ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR,” but no provision in international law for right to reparation for individual 
rights exists (Bornkamm 120-1; emphasis mine). This is due to the distinction between “reparation” 
and “remedy.” “Remedy” refers to the “procedural guarantee” that “states must provide victims with 
access to courts;” whether the remedy results in reparation is irrelevant. In sum, the right to actual 
reparation is only established if one resorts to customary law (121-2). The Rwandan law expert 
Christopher Paul Bornkamm concludes that Rwandan genocide victims “have a right to reparation 






productions normalize reconciliation over revenge. The first step to understanding how 
reconciliation operates aesthetically is to look at what it must compete against: the revenge 
genre that dominated Rwandan media and politics from the mid-century to the genocide. The 
dissertation thus begins with a chapter on “The Revenge Cycle in Rwanda: History and 
Genre,” and thereafter progresses to a discussion of three genres of reconciliation in the 
following chapters, “Reconciliation as Transfiguration,” “Reconciliation as Trial,” and 
“Reconciliation as Memorialization.” 
 
From Revenge to Reconciliation: A Study of Genre 
The aesthetic genres of reconciliation must compete with those of revenge that were 
historically mobilized to normalize the ideology of ethnic divisionism and in some cases to 
incite acts of genocide. Chapter One studies how revenge operated as a cycle of violence 
throughout twentieth-century Rwandan politics, and how that cycle was articulated and 
incited by the “hate radio” whose creators were eventually indicted on charges of genocide. I 
furthermore relate key characteristics of the revenge genre in Rwanda’s Radio Télévision des 
Milles Collines (RTLM) hate radio to the Iliad and the Aeneid to demonstrate how their 
confident tone, linear structure, and swift temporality that promise honor for avenging the 
dead are what reconciliation genres actively compete against. 
In contrast to revenge, reconciliation does not in the real world function so swiftly or 
completely; reconciliation is not fulfilled with a single action—a handshake, a confession, a 
signing of law—the way that revenge can be with a single killing or rape. But some narratives 
endow reconciliation with the qualities associated with revenge: they imagine it occurring in a 




Lianja Epic of the Mongo People of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Shadows of 
Memory, a theater production performed at the twentieth anniversary ceremony for the 
Rwandan genocide. Each of these texts represents reconciliation as an instantaneous process 
enabled by magic or divine intervention. In The Eumenides, the goddess Athena 
instantaneously transforms the Furies—the gods of revenge—into the “Kindly Ones”—gods 
of kindness, peace, and justice. In The Lianja Epic, the victors of ethnic warfare resurrect their 
fallen victims with a magic powder, after which the victims and perpetrators reconcile with 
one another as though the killings never occurred. In Shadows of Memory, genocide is 
performed as an action without perpetrators and ultimately without victims—the victims fall 
to the ground at the sound of a voiceover describing the killings, but are then resurrected by 
government soldiers who bring them to life through verbal incantation.  
These acts are all transfigurations, a term I use to convey a transformation that 
elevates, glorifies, idealizes, or spiritualizes. The religious connotation of the transfiguration 
of Christ is fitting for the aesthetic productions I discuss that invoke the supernatural and/or 
divine. In representing the transition between revenge and reconciliation as transfiguration, 
Shadows of Memory, The Lianja Epic, and the Eumenides frame their communities’ official 
reconciliation processes as swift, complete, and miraculous. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the artists and States behind the productions believe that reconciliation 
does or even should function that way. I interpret Shadows of Memory alongside the 
concomitant spectacles of audience trauma and President Paul Kagame’s stadium speech to 
demonstrate that when read on the same plane, aesthetic and political representations nuance 




 While Chapter Two takes up narratives of reconciliation enabled by magic, Chapter 
Three examines aesthetic forms that showcase the trials and tribulations of living with the 
competing desires for revenge and reconciliation. The film Munyurangabo, an independent, 
Kinyarwanda-language production from Korean-American director Lee Isaac Chung who 
worked with nonprofessional Rwandan actors, many of them former street children, to script 
and produce the story of a young man who goes on a journey to find and kill the man who 
killed his father. But in Munyurangabo the moral code of society is on the side of 
reconciliation. Munyurangabo charts how the moral impetus to reconcile seeps into his 
individual quest, destabilizing the revenge imperative, even though the reparations “owed” the 
protagonist as a genocide orphan remain woefully incomplete. As such, Munyurangabo 
illuminates what reconciliation looks like when society’s reparations fall short: a cluster of 
individuals who in the midst of extreme poverty must grapple together with the competing 
desires to avenge and to reconcile. The site of this grappling takes place not at the transitional 
justice courts—the official space of talking through reconciliation—but at rural homes, hills, 
and roads, where individual citizens encounter one another outside the boundaries of the 
courts. But Munyurangabo reveals that the boundaries of the court system are permeable 
through the disseminating influence of art forms; it is an oral poetry performance that for the 
protagonist Munyurangabo most powerfully rationalizes the transition between revenge and 
reconciliation.  
The social relations depicted in Munyurangabo echo what ethnographic research in 
Rwanda has confirmed: that while the State describes reconciliation as a process that occurs 
between groups, citizens experience reconciliation as a process between individuals. I look to 




reconciliation looks like for citizens rather than for the State. As with Munyurangabo, My 
Neighbor, My Killer shows that every mode of reparation for genocide survivors remains 
woefully incomplete. The documentary covers one of Rwanda’s transitional justice courts and 
the surrounding community over the course of seven years. It shows the gritty, haunted world 
of rural survivors and perpetrators who cannot afford to move away from one another and 
who live in a country too poor to deliver many of the reparations the State acknowledges are 
needed. In their context, neither justice nor any form of reparation is sufficient to repair the 
wounds of genocide. But over the course of seven years, My Neighbor, My Killer shows the 
humble efforts at reparation that enable the slow, tenuous progress of reconciliation: the 
survivor who invites the perpetrator over to speak with her, the perpetrator who offers to till 
his neighbor survivor’s field, the court sessions that inspire brief moments of catharsis. As 
with Munyurangabo’s tenuous progress, these slow, small actions are a far cry from the 
instantaneous, collective reparation and reconciliation imagined by The Eumenides, Lianja 
Epic, and Shadows of Memory. Put simply, My Neighbor, My Killer and Munyurangabo show 
the lengthy temporality and arduous labor required to understand and attempt reconciliation, 
much less achieve it. Because reconciliation takes so long, and because its process is filled 
with fits and starts, reconciliation’s heroes operate with a slow pace, an indirect course, and 
an uncertain or faltering mood. In the vast majority of Rwandan narratives, this process is 
described not as emasculation but as a refashioning of heroism as that which restores instead 
of avenges.  
 However, as Chapter Four notes, restoring wholeness and integrity to a wounded 
population is not the only task that Rwandan cultural forms set themselves. They also seek to 




human rights and trauma studies since their inception: how can a cultural form do justice to 
the dehumanizing cataclysm of genocide while also reconciling victims and perpetrators? 
This paradox is nowhere more apparent than at the national genocide memorials in Rwanda, 
all of which are former killing sites. These memorials display the physical materials left over 
at the end of the genocide: bodily remains, weapons, blood-stained clothing, bullet-ridden 
walls, the mounds of mass graves. They evidence the horror of genocide while at the same 
time advocating the value of reconciliation; the memorial spokesperson who guides visitors 
through lauds the virtue of forgiveness for those that committed that horror. 
 The memorials attempt to provide multiple forms of “satisfaction,” each of which is 
stymied by the inherent contradictions of that category of reparation. First, the government-
run memorials have been the primary actor in finding, identifying, burying, and 
commemorating bodies found all over Rwanda. But they have struggled to do so in a way that 
is satisfactory to all parties, in part because of the fiscal and technological restraints involved 
in processing so many dead bodies, and in part because different groups and individuals have 
different opinions on how the dead should be buried and commemorated. As is the case with 
the classic tragedy of Antigone, the desire to bury the dead with dignity is universal and 
profound, often enough to drive a survivor mad if it is not fulfilled satisfactorily. But as the 
case of Rwandan memorials makes clear in contradistinction with Antigone, the mass nature 
of genocide means that burying the dead with dignity is challenged by far more than the 
desires of the living. Burial in Rwanda is complicated by the sheer masses of the dead, by the 
difficulty of finding and identifying all of them, and by the challenge of granting dignity to 




Displaying the dead and showcasing their dehumanization is part of the Rwandan 
government’s effort to provide “satisfaction” in the form of “verification of the facts and full 
and public disclosure of the truth” and “commemorations and tributes to the victims” (Basic 
Principles). But survivor groups and scholars alike complain that these two motivations 
contradict one another. For how can the dead be simultaneously used to evidence the horror of 
genocide, and be commemorated in their own right?  
 The prevalent position of scholarship on Rwandan memorials says that the memorials’ 
contradictions are traumatizing, that a site of education and tribute should not traumatize 
visitors through the displays of bodily remains. Many argue that the traumatizing nature of the 
memorials serves to shock visitors into a silence that replicates and perpetuates the repression 
of free speech in Rwanda. I contest this theory by noting that the memorials afford multiple 
effects for visitors, especially for those who interact with the Rwandan memorial guides as 
agents of discussion and debate, rather than as toadies for the State as many Western scholars 
assume them to be. Through an analysis of the multiple sensory effects of the memorials—of 
their sight, sound, smell, and touch—I demonstrate that the memorials’ viscerally embodied 
formations prompt visitors to experience the “unspeakability” of genocide as an encounter 
that blends the semantic and non-semantic, and in doing so, brings visitors into a productive 
embodied contact with both the living guides and the displayed dead.  
 
 In highlighting the diverse genres of reconciliation that are experienced by Rwandan 
subjects of all ethnic and political identities, “The Art of Reconciliation” moves beyond the 
impasse of existing scholarship that treats reconciliation as a phenomenon to be perceived and 




identity politics, I argue, genres reveal the “commonality within difference” so crucial to 
national reconciliation. Far from collapsing differences of experience or perspective, the 
genres of transfiguration, trial, and memorialization indicate that reconciliation can function 
in many different ways at the same time, in the same society, across political divides. 





Chapter One: The Revenge Cycle as History and Genre 
 
Before I discuss in detail the genres of reconciliation in Rwanda, it is necessary to define the 
revenge genre that they must compete against. Rwandan history from colonization to the 1994 
genocide was dominated by a revenge cycle in which politicized “ethnic” groups used 
violence against each other to avenge the violence previously done to them. This violence was 
eventually normalized and even incited by newsprint and radio media in the 1990s that 
framed the killing of the Tutsi as a historically natural point of the revenge cycle that would 
end that cycle for perpetuity. These newsprint and radio stations were deemed so influential in 
the 1994 genocide that several of their leaders were indicted by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda for inciting genocide; the first of such indictments in international law 
since the Nuremberg Trials.    
In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of twentieth and twenty-first century 
Rwandan history that underscores the historical pattern of revenge as a ceaseless cycle until 
the post-genocide government took power. I then analyze revenge as an aesthetic genre in the 
Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), Rwanda’s most notorious hate media. 
But before I do so, I identify key characteristics of revenge as historical pattern and aesthetic 
genre in the classical Western texts of the Iliad and the Aeneid. These Western classics are 
useful intertexts to Rwandan history and hate media because they illustrate the lure of revenge 
as both practice and aesthetic within the very nations against which post-conflict sites like 
Rwanda are often measured. As they evoke the founding of European nations through acts of 
revenge, the Iliad and the Aeneid assert the centrality of revenge to democracy. This is a 
familiar pattern to political scientists, some of whom have claimed that strong States can only 




African States that emerged at Independence through peaceful international agreements.9 This 
argument could also be used to explain Rwanda’s relative national strength following the 
genocide: that the nation was (re)born through civil war and genocide that created the 
necessary conditions for building the country from scratch. 
But why is revenge, with its attendant brutality, danger, paranoia, and violence, so 
appealing as to animate national foundations as disparate as Ancient Greece and 
contemporary Rwanda? In this chapter, I argue through a reading of literature and history that 
revenge “satisfies” in two, interrelated ways. While the United Nations’ Basic Principles 
juggles a myriad of definitions for legal “satisfaction” as reparation, revenge satisfies by 
honoring the dead and promising a sure ending that shores up the linear progress of history.  
 
Revenge: For the Satisfaction of Honor and Ending 
Revenge, as Michael Ignatieff eloquently writes, “keeps faith between generations; the 
violence it engenders is a ritual form of respect for the community’s dead—therein lies its 
legitimacy” (188). Ignatieff, a human rights scholar and politician, is writing about how 
revenge functions in politics, including in Rwanda. But his assessment is equally true of the 
aesthetic sphere, wherein the “classic reciprocity of the blood feud” permeates most Western 
epics of the founding of the European nation (Miller 339), as well as numerous cultural 
productions from contemporary transitional democracies.  
The lure of revenge is particularly strong in contexts where the law cannot provide 
“satisfaction” on behalf of the dead. Theresa Godwin Phelps explains that the revenge genre is 
prevalent in narratives set before the rise of the nation state because its generic conventions 
                                                 
9 See for example Jeffrey Herbst’s application to the African context of Charles Tilly and Samuel 




motivate citizens who are not served by systems of law that can provide judicial satisfaction 
in lieu of revenge. This pattern is, she elucidates, evident in both early modern Europe and 
twentieth and twenty-first century transitional democracies. Phelps postulates that the 
transition from revenge to justice in a society is scripted around the creation of the nation state 
and its attendant judicial structures. She suggests that before the rise of the nation state in 
Europe, citizens found it natural and indeed righteous to both desire and enact revenge, not 
only upon one’s own offender, but also on behalf of a family or clan member. Literary 
production followed suit, with revenge epics and tragedies founding the canon of Western 
literature (26-7).  
The capacity of revenge to honor the dead empowers and expands literature’s long-
acknowledged thanatopic power to “speak” with the dead. Revenge is especially poised for 
storytelling because it, more than many other actions, is inspired by the desire to speak on 
behalf of those who in their death, shame, or injury, cannot speak. In the absence of the dead’s 
voices, the survivor looks to stories for guidance, and the stories of revenge promise that 
vengeance will speak for the victims, to become their tongue or their tombstone. Consider, for 
instance, this classic call to vengeance by one of the most famous heroes of Western 
literature, the warrior Achilles of Homer’s Iliad. 
Would you have men eat while the bodies of those whom Hector son of Priam 
slew are still lying mangled upon the plain? Let the sons of the Achaeans, say 
I, fight fasting and without food, till we have avenged them; afterwards at the 
going down of the sun let them eat their fill. As for me, Patroclus is lying dead 




mourning round him. Therefore I can take thought of nothing save only 
slaughter and blood and the rattle in the throat of the dying (Iliad Book XIX). 
Achilles cannot think of anything but revenge until it is accomplished. He loves his fallen 
friend and lover enough to die for him; he hates his foe enough to kill him. The action’s stakes 
are of the highest national and personal proportions; the tone reflects the loftiest commitments 
and the basest desires. The story excites, and it will continue to do so by progressing in linear 
fashion, with haste and confidence, until Achilles achieves his goal. As the action of revenge 
satisfies the character, so too does its narration satisfy the reader. The Iliad exhibits a direct 
link between the action of revenge and its narration: the satisfaction that originates from 
honoring the dead through vengeance, and the satisfaction that is afforded by the style and 
structure of revenge’s emplottment.  
In taking a long historical view, revenge is not always actually complete because it 
may incite another cycle of retaliatory violence that must in turn be avenged. But the time 
between cycles is often long enough for revenge to be narrated as final and full. In textual 
terms, the book ends before the next cycle of revenge begins. Even though the Iliad ends with 
the foreknowledge that Achilles will die, the story nonetheless cements his victory for 
avenging Patroculs’s death twelvefold. Similarly, the Aeneid, another classic that set the 
foundation for European revenge narratives, 10 concludes with a strike of revenge that cements 
the hero Aeneas’s victory completely, with no further revenge cycle in sight. In order to close 
the revenge cycle forever, the conclusion indicates, vengeance must be complete. Importantly, 
that completeness eradicates the possibility of mercy. In the ending to Virgil’s epic, Aeneas 
                                                 
10 The Aeneid has been turned to for centuries as a model for imperialist victory. As David Quint 
writes, “Virgil’s epic is tied to a specific national history, to the idea of world domination, to a 
monarchical system, even to a particular dynasty. From now on…future imperial dynasts would turn 





considers taking mercy upon his foe Turnus for only a few lines before returning to the 
revenge impulse: 
In deep suspense the Trojan seem’d to stand, 
And, just prepar’d to strike, repress’d his hand. 
He roll’d his eyes, and ev’ry moment felt 
His manly soul with more compassion melt; 
When, casting down a casual glance, he spied 
The golden belt that glitter’d on his side, 
The fatal spoils which haughty Turnus tore 
From dying Pallas, and in triumph wore. 
Then, rous’d anew to wrath, he loudly cries 
…‘T is Pallas, Pallas gives this deadly blow.” 
He rais’d his arm aloft, and, at the word, 
Deep in his bosom drove the shining sword. 
The streaming blood distain’d his arms around, 
And the disdainful soul came rushing thro’ the wound (540-1).  
 
Aeneas’s move from vengeance to mercy and back again is significant for the hastiness that 
shows how little time the revenge epic grants to qualities like mercy. As David Quint 
elucidates through a reading of the Aeneid, victors have the epic, with its “end-directed story 
told by their own power,” while losers have the romance or adventure, with its “random or 
circular wandering” reflecting “contingency that they are powerless to shape to their own 
ends” (9). Reconciliation is nonlinear, circuitous, tenuous, and slow; revenge is linear, direct, 
confident, and swift. In consequence, revenge is able to construct a narrative climax that is 
easy to anticipate. The quest will reach its apex in a purposeful deed against the enemy that 
will satisfy the impetus that instigated the quest. As Turnus’s soul rushes through his bloody 
wound, this final death solidifies the founding of the Trojan nation, free now of any 
challenger. The swift revenge fulfills the promise that Aeneas gave to avenge the dead. It 
solves the problem that started the story, fulfilling not only the demands placed upon the hero, 
but also those placed upon the narrative. As the hero completes his task, the narrative 




 These narrative strategies are similarly evident in the Rwandan hate radio that 
promised honor to the dead and an end to violence if Hutu civilians took revenge upon their 
Tutsi brethren. The RTLM hate radio incited fear by narrating Rwandan history in ways that 
collapsed the past into the present, “removing the element of progress” so that modern Hutu 
were faced with specters of an oppressive past that they thought they had overcome (Li 94). 
As with the Iliad and the Aeneid, vengeance was framed as a vehicle through which to avenge 
the past and restore the linear progress of history. RTLM promised revenge as a means to end 
the revenge cycle, presenting genocide as the swiftest route to peace. In order to comprehend 
how RTLM functioned to such disastrous effect, it is essential to contextualize its place in 
Rwandan political and social life. To that end, I offer here a brief summary of contemporary 
Rwandan history.  
 
Revenge in Rwanda: A History 
The history of twentieth and twenty-first century Rwanda can be characterized first and 
foremost as a cycle of revenge politics. My short overview of this history cannot do justice to 
the subject’s complexity, but it should provide an adequate picture of what Rwanda is still 
recovering from: a century of institutionalized ethnic divisions and a genocide that 
slaughtered approximately one million victims in one hundred days in the spring and summer 
of 1994. Most importantly, this overview should give readers a sense of the political 
divisiveness in Rwandan history that makes any narration of that history politically fraught. 
There is no neutral reporting of facts and figures about Rwanda. That said, there are some 
accounts that are more rigorously researched and empirically factual than others. I have relied 





I. The Colonial Encounter 
Rwanda was historically comprised of three groups, the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Whether these 
groups are distinguished by ethnicity or race has been the subject of intense debates 
throughout Rwandan history that continue to permeate scholarship to this day. Both rubrics of 
difference proved ultimately divisive with catastrophic consequences, leading the post-
genocide government to essentially abolish the concept of ethnic and/or racial identification. 
But the history of divisiveness is still regularly discussed in Rwanda as education and 
warning.  
The theory of ethnic difference posits that the Hutu and Tutsi have the same racial 
origins, and that it was social, economic, political, and cultural circumstances that 
distinguished the groups, initially through complex clan systems that organized into kingdoms 
ruled by a Tutsi monarchy. Under the precolonial monarchical structure, kings and clan 
leaders originated from the Tutsi minority (approximately 14% of the population) that was 
primarily made up of cattle herders, while the Hutu majority (85% of the population) worked 
as agriculturalists under the jurisdiction of the monarchy, and the Twa (less than 1%) lived 
autonomously in the forests or as servants in the kings’ courts.11 
Ethnographic research indicates that contemporary Rwandans hold disparate views on 
the precolonial era. Genocide survivors and their families—who tend to claim Tutsi 
heritage—describe precolonial Rwanda in utopic terms, as a peaceful society devoid of ethnic 
or racial divisions, unified by a benevolent monarchy. In sharp contrast, genocide perpetrators 
                                                 
11 Scientists almost unanimously agree that the Twa were the first inhabitants of Rwanda. However, 
their claims to indigeneity conflict with the post-genocide government’s emphasis on shared racial 
origins to construct national unity. See Susan Thompson, “Ethnic Twa and Rwandan National Unity” 





and some Hutu civilians recall precolonial Rwanda as an oppressive era in which the Hutu 
were exploited for the sole benefit of the Tutsi monarchy (Jessee 238).  
In contrast to the theory of ethnic difference, the theory of racial difference was 
propagated by Belgian colonists in the early twentieth century, and hypothesized that the 
Tutsi minority had migrated to Rwanda from Ethiopia, and were thus closer in origin, 
appearance, and sensibility to the Europeans. This “Hamitic Hypothesis” functioned as a 
convenient justification for the Belgians to grant the Tutsi minority power as a puppet 
government that controlled the Hutu majority and the Twa (Bornkamm 10). The Belgians 
institutionalized these racial differences through quota systems that privileged the Tutsi in 
schools, government, and employment. One component of the racial classification process 
that was later to be used to devastating effect during the genocide was the identity cards that 
the Belgians issued in 1935 to mark an individual as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. The Belgians 
employed three main factors to classify an individual’s race: physical measurements, 
especially of height and nose length; enumeration of property, especially cows; and oral 
testimony, supplied primarily by the church (Mamdani 99). These methods resulted in 
numerous faulty classifications, wherein one Rwandan with a long nose and a dozen cattle 
would likely be marked as Tutsi; his brother with a short nose and five cows as Hutu. The 
most significant implication of this racial metric was that while the theory of Tutsi as “alien 
race” promoted the Tutsi during the period of Belgian control, in the anticolonial and 
postcolonial eras, their alienness was turned against them as the Hutu gained political power 
through claims to indigeneity, authenticity, and majority status as Rubanda Nyamwinshi 




As with Rwanda’s precolonial history, Rwandans today also express conflicting 
perspectives on the history of the colonial period. Ethnographic research demonstrates that 
survivors generally blame the colonizers for introducing racial and ethnic divisions, while 
perpetrators had few negative things to say about the Belgians (Jessee 239). Erin Jessee 
speculates that the perpetrators’ stance likely results from the Belgians’ eventual switch in 
allegiance to the Hutu majority that helped usher in a Hutu dominant leadership (240).  
 
II. Independence and the First and Second Republics  
In 1959, a group of Hutu, including the future president Grégoire Kayibanda, published the 
“Hutu Manifesto” that framed decolonization as a fight to throw off the yoke of two 
oppressors: the “Hamitic” Tutsi who held a “political, economic and social monopoly,” and 
the white colonizers (Manifesto). Kayibanda founded the PARMEHUTU (Parti du 
Mouvement d’Émancipation Hutu) political party that adopted the demands of the Hutu 
Manifesto (Bornkmann 11). The Tutsi-dominated opposition party UNAR (Union Nationale 
Rwandaise) advocated decolonization while still under Tutsi rule (Mamdani 120). When the 
incumbent Tutsi king died under mysterious circumstances in July 1959, the Tutsi elite 
accused the Belgians and the Hutu of assassination (Bornkmann 11). UNAR activists attacked 
a PARMEHUTU politician, and anti-Tutsi violence ensued in retaliation (11). Notably, this 
was the first violence in the history of Rwanda that strictly demarcated Hutu from Tutsi 
(Mamdani 105). More than 100,000 Tutsis fled to the neighboring countries of Uganda, 
Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire, where they would live for the next forty years. Under a 
“climate of intimidation,” communal and national elections were held, with the 




destabilization of their influence in Central Africa, switched allegiance to the Hutu majority. 
On July 1, 1962, Belgium granted a Hutu-led Rwanda independence. Thus began The First 
Republic, led by PARMEHUTU president Grégoire Kayibanda (Bornkmann 11).  
Although Kayibanda espoused racist views of the Tutsi minority, his government was 
faulted for not securing total Hutu dominance. Economic woes within Rwanda, and political 
upheaval in neighboring Burundi, gradually destabilized the country until the Rwandan army 
chief Major General Juvénal Habyarimana ousted Kayibanda in 1973, and declared himself 
president of the Second Republic (Bornkmann 12). Habyarimana was a totalitarian ruler who 
nonetheless stabilized the region and brought economic development to Rwanda, due in large 
part to high coffee prices on the global market (13). But in the mid-1980s, coffee prices 
plummeted and the International Monetary Fund imposed a devastating Structural Adjustment 
Programme. Together, these economic setbacks exacerbated the conditions that led to further 
social unrest (Mamdani 148).  
Unsurprisingly, the First and Second Republics are also remembered in accordance 
with contemporary Rwandans’ political and/or ethnic subject positions. Perpetrators recalled 
the First and Second Republics as having liberated the Hutu from the Tutsi monarchy. While 
acknowledging that ethnic quotas of the time favored the Hutu, they suggested that this was 
only fair to redress the centuries of oppression by the Tutsi monarchy. Interestingly, 
perpetrators assigned to Kayibanda’s government the same qualities that survivors and their 
families attributed to the Tutsi monarchy: that their leadership “promoted good relations 
among neighbors regardless of ethnicity” (Jessee 241). What is significant about this parallel 
is that both groups recognized “good relations” across ethnic difference to be a social good. In 




ruling party brought social harmony and which divisionism, they were united in favoring 
harmony over divisionism. This is important to remember when reviewing the most violent 
and divisive era of Rwandan history, the early 1990’s. Without this historical context, it is far 
too easy to dismiss the Rwandan civil war and genocide simply as “tribal violence,” as was 
done by numerous journalists at the time (Newbury 12).  
 
III. The Rwandan Patriotic Front and the 1990 Civil War 
During the First and Second Republics, the Tutsis who had fled to neighboring countries 
following the political violence in 1959 were stuck in their new host countries as refugees and 
migrants with undesirable living conditions and civil status. Nowhere was the plight of the 
Tutsi refugee more defined than in Uganda, where they were blamed “for any situation 
difficult to explain, from poverty to sabotage,” and where even the children of refugees were 
considered refugees (Mamdani 165). In response to the anti-refugee prejudice of the Ugandan 
State and society, a strong refugee identity emerged that eventually developed into the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that sought repatriation of refugees to Rwanda (184). Many of 
the soldiers in the RPF, including its first leader, Fred Rwigyema, had fought with the 
Ugandan rebel Yoweri Museveni to overthrow the Idi Amin and Milton Obote regimes (168). 
Their training in the Ugandan rebel armies, and their subsequent support from President 
Museveni, strengthened the RPF. Nonetheless, their first incursion into Rwanda was a failure. 
Not only did infighting, disorder, and counterassault by the Rwandan army—supported by 
French troops12—lead to the death of General Rwigyema and the scattering of thousands of 
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RPF soldiers, it also enabled the Habyarimana regime to fashion itself as the defender of 
Rwanda against a Tutsi threat, thereby raising its legitimacy at home overnight (186).  
Following General Rwigymea’s death, Major Paul Kagame, another Tutsi refugee 
from Uganda, left his military training course in the United States to take charge of the RPF 
with just two thousand men. In under a year, he had rebuilt the RPF to a force of fifteen 
thousand soldiers and taken control of a line of territory along the Uganda border that 
extended thirty-two kilometers into Rwanda (Mamdani 186). Where the RPF established 
military control, Hutu civilians ran away, fed by an increasingly militant anti-Tutsi rhetoric by 
the Habyarimana government that accused the RPF “of seeking ‘a reversal of history’ which 
could only mean a return to ‘forced labour and feudal servitude’” (Foreign Minister Casimir 
Bizimungu, qtd. in Mamdani 189).  
These sentiments fed the rise of “Hutu Power,” a political ideology that returned to the 
colonial era vocabulary of the Tutsi as a foreign race (190).  Government run radio and 
newsprint promulgated anti-Tutsi ideology and policy, including the “Hutu Ten 
Commandments” that forbade Hutu from working with, befriending, or engaging intimate 
relations with the Tutsi. The Commandments sowed the seeds of the genocide that was to 
follow. Commandment Eight, for instance, declared that, “The Hutu should stop having 
mercy on the Tutsi” (Commandments). But even as the Hutu Power movement espoused 
violence against the Tutsi and massacred an estimated 3,000 Tutsi citizens between 1990 and 
1993, it accused the RPF of perpetuating and inciting violence (Mamdani 192). This 
information strategy led many Hutu citizens, particularly the vast numbers of illiterate 
agriculturalists, to believe that “they have only the choice to kill or be killed” (Benedicte 




It is important to understand that Hutu Power was related to, but not synonymous 
with, the Habyarimana government. Hutu Power “linked some in the central government with 
others in local officialdom in different parts of the country” (Mamdani 193; emphasis added). 
Initially, Habyarimana’s government sent troops to stop the massacres of Tutsi civilians. But 
Hutu Power had decentralized and spread across the country already, relying on local leaders 
to organize local militants who then identified and targeted local Tutsi. Using local officials 
was not simply pragmatic, but a “deliberate effort to use the “customary” as opposed to the 
“civic” apparatus of the state” (193). For Mamdani, “customary” power recognized the rights 
and responsibilities of the indigenous, i.e., in their estimation, the Hutu, while “civic” power 
acknowledged those of anyone resident on the land, i.e., Rwandans of any ethnicity (194). 
Significantly, “customary” rights were attended by customary obligations that had 
longstanding roots in Rwandan precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial custom. The 
terminology of customary communal work was reprised to refer to killing Tutsis, such that 
chopping up people was likened to pulling up and destroying weeds (194). Thus, the mandate 
for ordinary Hutus to commit genocide was rendered persuasive by two compelling factors: 
first, the fear that they must either kill or be killed, and second, that they must obey customary 
duty in order to receive their customary rights as the truly indigenous people of Rwanda.  
 
IV. The 1994 Genocide 
On the night of April 6, 1994, as President Habyarimana was flying home after signing the 
Arusha Peace Accords with the RPF to institute a “broad-based transitional government,” his 
plane was shot down (Des Forges 181). The plane crash served as a signal to ignite a genocide 




Power had distributed arms and trained Hutu youth in military camps through their “self-
defense” program, mobilizing two thousand militia in Kigali alone (180).   
While there is widespread consensus that the assassination of President Habyarimana 
sparked a planed genocide against the Tutsi, competing theories exist as to who shot down the 
plane. The first, and most controversial theory, implicates the RPF, suggesting that either the 
RPF did not believe that Habyarimana would commit to the Arusha Accords, or that they 
preferred control of the government rather than the power sharing laid out by the Arusha 
Accord (Des Forges 182). The second theory, espoused by many scholars, including myself, 
indicates that members of Habyarimana’s own party assassinated him so as to void the Arusha 
power sharing agreement (182). It was well known that Hutu power advocates, notably 
Colonel Bagosora, feared that should the Accords be implemented, the RPF would take over 
key ministerial posts, thereby diminishing the existing party’s power. Evidence to further 
support this theory includes eye witness reports that members of the Presidential Guard and 
the Paracommando battalion had been deployed either before or shortly after the president’s 
plane was brought down in the areas where ministers and other high ranking officials resided 
(183). The fact that the Hutu Power newspaper, Kangura, had warned in January of 1994 that 
President Habyarimana would be killed in March, after which would follow a bloodbath, 
additionally suggests that the assassination was planned for within the Hutu Power ranks 
(Melvern 124). It is also difficult to believe that the RPF would intentionally undertake an 
assassination that was all but guaranteed to spark widespread revenge against Tutsi civilians 
many of whom were members of their own families. 
For it is indisputable who instigated the genocide. Shortly after the plane crash, 




should move under the military control. His proposition was refuted by General Dallaire, head 
of the UN Peacekeeping forces, who suggested instead that Prime Minister Uwiringiyimana 
should take charge of the transition government. Bagosora refused to put Uwirungiyimana in 
power; later that day he sent his Presidential Guards to murder the Prime Minister and her 
husband. That same day, the army and the police murdered two candidates for the presidency 
of the transitional assembly, while the Presidential Guard together with other security forces 
rounded up and executed top opposition politicians who could have provided civilian 
leadership (Des Forges 191). Under pressure from Dallaire and other senior military figures, 
Bagosora appointed Dr Théodore Sindikubwabo as interim president, but it was Bagosora 
who maintained true control of the country (194).  
Although the targeting of individual Tutsis and high-ranking opposition Hutu marked 
the early days in the aftermath of Habyarimana’s assassination, by the second week the 
masterminds of the genocide changed strategy to begin exterminating all Tutsis (Des Forges 
201). From April 11th onwards, mass killings were carried out in churches, schools, and 
government offices countrywide. One strategy was for local officials to promise Tutsis shelter 
in a designated place; once they were gathered there, the killers—many of them the 
neighbors, friends, and even relatives of the Tutsis—would descend to rape, torture, and 
massacre them all (210). One of the many factors that helps to explain a genocide that set 
neighbor upon neighbor is the “hate radio” that relentlessly defined the Tutsi as the one 
common enemy (203). 
 




More than any other Rwandan cultural production, the “hate radio” that dominated Rwanda’s 
airways during the genocide has seen the most attention from scholars, primarily social 
scientists. This is likely due to the radio’s socially impactful role in inciting genocide to such 
an empirically verifiable degree as to be deemed indictable at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda. Two RTLM employees, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza, were charged with multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit genocide, 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and 
crimes against humanity (persecution, extermination and murder) (ICTR 2). The court ruled 
that the distance between the broadcasters and their purported “victims” was irrelevant. Its 
finding declared that: “The nature of media is such that causation of killing and other acts of 
genocide will necessarily be effected by an immediately proximate cause in addition to the 
communication itself. In the Chamber’s view, this does not diminish the causation to be 
attributed to the media, or the criminal accountability of those responsible for the 
communication” (Par. 952, p. 319). 
RTLM was the most popular station in Rwanda during the genocide, reaching both the 
urban elite and the rural peasants. Its exact reach remains disputed. Alison Des Forges claims 
that it could be heard everywhere in Rwanda except Butare and Gisenyi; UNAMIR similarly 
attests that it was widely heard across the country; and Keith Somerville’s interviews with 
human rights groups and journalists working in Rwanda during the genocide indicate that the 
RTLM was widely, if not universally, accessible. Scott Straus counters that the RTLM’s reach 
was not so wide, although he acknowledges that he does not hold definitive data.13 According 
to Darryl Li, widespread radio listenership helps to explain why the killings were “highly 
                                                 




diffuse,” leaving “no region untouched,” with massacres enacted “in spaces both public and 
private” (91).  
The radio’s popularity was due not simply to the “informal atmosphere, lively style, 
good music, off-color jokes and the introduction of ‘western-style interactive broadcasting’” 
that appealed to many listeners (Li 97). It was also attributable to the poor competition. The 
previous State radio station, Radio Rwanda, was “paralyzed by internal power struggles” in 
the early weeks of the genocide, and as such did not report fully on the events. An accused 
perpetrator remembered tuning in to the radio the morning of April 7th to find that “while 
Radio Rwanda played classical music, RTLM gave news about the situation” (96). 
Meanwhile, the RPF’s station, Radio Muhabura, had such a “dull and propagandistic style” 
that even RPF soldiers preferred listening to RTLM (96-7). This is an extraordinary instance 
of how politically significant aesthetic quality can be: that RPF soldiers preferred listening the 
“lively” RTLM over the “boring” Muhabura, even as the RTLM denigrated them and incited 
the killing of their families. RTLM was thus “satisfying” in many senses of the term. It lured 
audience members of all political and ethnic identities through satisfying, as in compelling, 
narrative strategies, and it promised political and personal satisfaction through revenge 
against Tutsi oppression and violence. 
Part of the RTLM’s appeal stemmed from its self-fashioning as an all seeing eye that 
was in touch with the rural masses. Several of its broadcasters, especially Noheli Hitimana, 
were known for visiting rural areas and “calling out” on the radio with personal greetings to 
the “ordinary citizens” they had met (Mironko 126). They furthermore glorified this tactic 
through self-reflection on air, for instance with broadcaster Gaspard Gahigi’s musings that  
We have a radio here, even a peasant who wants to say something can come, 




peasants think. Personally, I think what complicates things is that ordinary 
citizens have no forum where they can speak. Normally, for ordinary citizens 
to speak, they speak through elections and elections are impossible. So, in fact, 
ordinary citizens have been deprived of a say but RTLM is there, we will give 
them the floor (qtd. In Mironko 126). 
 
This sense of being “in touch” with the rural masses was then deployed during the genocide to 
organize and direct the killings. Hitamana reprised his habit of calling out to particular people 
and locales to implicitly articulate a hit list. When he named places during the genocide, this 
was interpreted by many as a command to rush to that place to find Tutsi. In this way, RTLM 
“exploited a quotidian familiarity established over a decades worth of performative 
participation in the lives of listeners, casting the genocide in the mould of a daily routine” 
(Mironko 103).  
This was one of a number of tactics used to frame the genocide as a quotidian 
experience. Other tactics, for instance, included the renaming of killings as umuganda, or 
communal work, which was then taken up with more elaborate metaphors, to “clear the 
bushes,” to “separate the grass from the millet,” or “to pull out the poison ivy together with its 
roots” (accused perpetrator testimonies qtd. in Kimani 132). That these metaphors were 
routed through agrarian imagery is a sophisticated form of the classic “dehumanizing” 
strategy that reduces intended victims to non-humans. Here, the agrarian metaphors 
specifically draw upon the Hutu majority’s status as agriculturalists accustomed to working 
“below” the customarily herder Tutsi. Perhaps these metaphors consciously or unconsciously 
insinuated that “clearing the bushes” would allow the Hutu not only to rid the Tutsi from the 
land, but to rid themselves of the burden of being the “people of the hoe” who were 
traditionally relegated to agricultural labor. In any case, acts of genocide were linguistically 




Former perpetrators have attested that listening to the radio was part of that work. 
During the genocide, many people would listen to the radio in “groups as large as one 
hundred, closely following the information relayed to plan the next day’s activities” (Li 100). 
One man explained the regularity of their listening practice as such: “It was work. It was to 
know what to do” (100). This perception of radio listenership as work, rather than recreation, 
testifies to the impactful nature of the RTLM in determining the genocide’s “rhythm”14 (Li 
90).  
To comprehend how the RTLM managed to frame genocide as honorable work, it is 
necessary to examine the radio messages’ historical context, not only the immediate 
background of genocidal violence, but also the longstanding revenge politics that had first 
emerged in the Hutu majority’s fight for independence from the Belgian colony and the Tutsi 
puppet government in 1959. In brilliant and dangerous rhetorical coups, the RTLM reframed 
Rwandan history to legitimize genocide. The RTLM “portrayed the progress achieved since 
the [1959 Hutu] revolutions under threat from the RPF, collapsing past into present and 
calling on Rwandans to re-enact the do-or-die moment of 1959” (Li 94). The broadcasters 
were actually instructed by the station’s management to do so. But alluding to the past does 
not in and of itself explain the radio’s effects on its listeners. What is significant is how they 
alluded to that history “by removing the element of progress” (94). As Li describes:  
The linear shape of history, implying inevitable teleological progress, had long 
been used to legitimize the regime through implicit comparison with the 
colonial era. By disrupting linearity and folding 1959 into 1994, not only did 
RTLM evoke negative historical memories of colonial rule but it also 
contributed to a deep sense of crisis, in which the nation was suddenly and 
violently derailed from the path it had been on. While the state had earlier 
evoked a fear of the past based on comparison to produce assent, RTLM 
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brought the past into the present, producing a more profound horror intended to 
prompt action (94).  
 
Essentially, the RTLM disrupted the linearity of history in order to frame revenge as the only 
way to restore linear teleology, progress, and security for the Hutu majority.  
 As with the vengeance scenes of the Iliad and the Aeneid that posit revenge as linear 
progress from a past wrong to an immediately honorable and “satisfied” future, the RTLM 
framed revenge against Tutsis as the only way to restore the linear progress of Hutu history. 
Far from advocating random violence or mass chaos—as the massacres were often reported in 
the international media—RTLM articulated the killings as a rational and measured response 
to Tutsi’s actions both past and present. In order to do so, they deployed a variety of rhetorical 
strategies to amplify, reframe, and concoct stories of Tutsi violence and depravity, while 
simultaneously sowing a sense of chaos and impending violence, all of which was padded by 
apolitical entertainment, including bawdy humor and the latest African and Western popular 
music.  
 
RTLM’s Accusations in a Mirror 
The RTLM framed murder as a measured response by accusing Tutsis of either doing or 
planning the same thing. Although the RTLM drew upon factual histories of the Tutsi’s 
oppressive role as a puppet government during the colonial era, as well as the RPF’s 
threatening incursion in the 1990 Civil War, the radio also fabricated narratives of immediate 
Tutsi violence. Mary Kimani’s content analysis of available RTLM transcripts finds that one-
third of the RTLM’s calls to rouse the Hutu to fight and/or defend themselves were 
accompanied by allegations of RPF atrocities. This tactic, which Des Forges describes as 




that they were conducting against them (qtd. in Chrétien 55). This included accusations of 
both political assassinations and violence against civilians. The RTLM blamed the RPF or the 
Tutsi writ large not only for the assassination of President Habyarimana, but also for a group 
of UN soldiers that the Hutu militia had killed to compel the UN to leave Rwanda. These lies 
were compelling because they took an alarming situation and made sense of it by identifying a 
perpetrator. But perhaps the most egregious accusations in a mirror are those in which the 
RTLM blamed the Tutsi for the type of violence that Hutu extremists were committing 
against Tutsi civilians: 
These people hide inside houses, like real bandits, and will rather die without 
food. Anyway, they are bandits. So they stay with their hostages, some of 
whom died. I heard about one Thaddée, I still hear about…other persons whom 
they found inside the houses…the occupant was a Hutu, he would be cut into 
pieces with a machete or burnt alive (April 12th).  
 
The gruesomely visceral details provoke fear and horror, but they are not simply a form of 
fear mongering. They are an exact mirror of the methods of murder the Hutu militia employed 
against the Tutsi: cuttings by machete, and burnings within houses.  
 One of the reasons that the accusation in a mirror technique persuades is that it calls 
upon the ancient, honor-bound duty to punish like with like. This ancient principle is present 
in Rwandan culture as in Western culture and scripture. In the West, it is known as the talion 
principle: an early Babylonian law that posited that a builder who constructs a faulty house 
that collapses upon and kills the owner, shall be put to death (qtd. in French 9). Exodus 
declares that “If…hurt is done, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, 




French 9). These principles punish like with like in quantity as well as quality; “one eye” is to 
be avenged with “one eye,” but only one, a provision that was intended to minimize the scale 
of revenge.  
Given the overwhelming predominance of Catholicism among Rwandans, and the 
cooperation of the Rwandan Catholic Church in the genocide, the talion principle may well 
have been familiar to the Hutu carrying out the massacres. Regardless, the talion principle is 
not the only foundational influence to propose revenge in kind. As Ignatieff writes of revenge 
as a historical and political phenomenon in communities worldwide, it “keeps faith between 
generations; the violence it engenders is a ritual form of respect for the community’s dead” 
(188). The RTLM drew upon these ancient and universal impetuses, but couched them in 
culturally and historically specific tropes. In a May 17, 1994 broadcast, for instance, the 
RTLM framed President Habyarimana’s assassination as a personal, familial injury, narrating 
the event as though the President were the citizens’ literal, rather than metaphorical father, 
and activating Rwandan cultural respect for, and duty on behalf of, elders.   
The Inkotanyi, they plotted to kill the President of the Republic, His 
Excellency Major General Habyarimana Juvenal. They did so. They killed him 
on the 6 April 1994 on his way back from a summit in Dar es Salaam where he 
had gone to represent our country. 
…He goes out on a trip and when he comes back in the evening, he finds 
killers waiting for him at the gate. They kill him while he has got eight young 
men in his house. What will those young men do? They will hasten to come to 
defend their father. That is obvious. Nobody should dwell on this because it is 
obvious… It was the Inyenzi Inkotanyi who shot down that aircraft and killed 
our father… if that father was killed while we were present as his children, we 
had to defend him. We said that we still needed him because the sorrow he 
leaves us with will last forever. So, we must understand this and we Rwandans, 
must behave as his worthy heirs. 
 
The broadcast moves between the specific and verifiable (that Habyarimana was killed on 




him), to metaphor (the father is killed, and the children must avenge him). These leaps aren’t 
seamless, but the broadcast encourages the listener to treat them as though they are: the 
transition between the father’s death and the command to defend his memory is described as 
“obvious,” so obvious that “nobody should dwell on it.” Such language actively advocates for 
listeners not to think. More specifically, it instructs listeners to find obvious the RTLM’s own 
reasoning and the directives that follow. 
 
RTLM’s Fake News 
The RTLM’s fabricated descriptions of Tutsi civilians and/or RPF soldiers engaging in 
demonic massacres helped to present the genocide as a response “in kind.” But, the RTLM 
also had to contend with the obvious and undeniable reality that there were relatively few 
Tutsi in Rwanda, a fact that could destabilize the notion that the Tutsi represented a 
formidable force. It spun this fact on its head to blame the Tutsi for their own destruction, 
claiming that for a minority to fight back against the majority was a form of suicidal 
recklessness. On May 12th, for instance, a broadcaster asked, “Will those people truly 
continue to commit suicide against the majority? Will they not be exterminated?” (Li 95). The 
inconsistencies of these dueling arguments—that on the one hand the Tutsi were a legitimate 
threat, on the other that they were so weak that their resistance constituted suicide—are 
indicative of the radio’s deft manipulation of reality. 
Genocidal directives and obvious representations of the Tutsi as the enemy to be 
avenged were not the only objectives of the RTLM. The radio also relied upon disorienting 
narratives that obfuscated reality with occasional references to actual, verifiable events. The 




fiction. One of the first broadcasts of the genocide, for instance, obscures what or whom the 
pronouns, subjects, and objects are referring to:  
It is 7:35 a.m. here in Kigali. They will be struck by misfortune, they will be 
struck by misfortune, they will indeed be struck by misfortune. And you have 
clearly heard that those who desired it, those who desired and provoked it, are 
themselves being struck by misfortune, they themselves are being struck by 
misfortune, Kanyarengwe, the Hutu, has just died, Pastor Bizimungu, the Hutu, 
has just died. Whatever made them go and sign a blood pact with those who 
will exterminate us? What prompted them to do so? Whatever prompted them 
to do that? Aren’t they the ones who have just killed them? Aren’t they 
responsible for killing them? However, they themselves are being struck by 
misfortune at this moment, at this very minute, at this hour, at this moment I 
am talking to you! You the people living in Rugunga, those living over there in 
Kanogo, those living in Kanogo, in fact, those living in Mburabuturo, look in 
the woods of Mburabuturo, look carefully, see whether there are no Inyenzis 
inside. Look carefully, check, see whether there are no Inyenzis inside…(6-8 
April 1994)1516  
 
It is nearly impossible to discern whom the proliferation of “they” pronouns refers to. In the 
second sentence, the refrain “they will be struck by misfortune” has no clear referent. Does it 
refer to the Tutsi? Or does it refer to the Hutu “traitors” referenced in the third and fourth 
sentences, those who signed “a blood pact with those who will exterminate us?” It is difficult 
to determine who is being referred to because it is difficult to determine what actions are 
occurring. What is the “it” that the radio keeps referring to, as with “those who desired it?” Is 
“it” the blood pact—the Arusha peace accords? Is “it” the plane crash? Is “it” the genocide? 
When the identity of a pronoun or an object or subject becomes clear, it lasts only briefly. 
Thus, while the question “whatever prompted them to do that?” likely refers to the Hutu 
                                                 
15 While the ICTR document cites the document with the unusual notation of “6-8 April” instead of the 
court’s typical notation of a specific date, the reference to 7:35a.m. in conjunction with allusion to 
Habyarimana’s plane crash suggests that the broadcast was aired on the morning of April 7th, a few 
hours after the assassination. 
16 This broadcast transcript is, to the best of my knowledge, only available online in English. A copy 
of the original Kinyarwanda would surely shed further insight on the confusing syntax. However, my 
comparisons of the English, French, and Kinyarwanda versions of other broadcasts indicate that the 




leadership signing the Arusha Peace Accords, the following sentence changes whom “they” 
refers to. In “Aren’t they the ones who have just killed them?,” “they” alludes to the RPF or 
the Tutsi more generally, who has allegedly killed “them,” the Hutu leadership—although the 
claim that Pasteur Bizimungu was killed was an outright lie; he went on to serve as the 
Rwandan President from the end of the genocide until 2000. As the paragraph continues, 
“they” serving as reference to the Tutsi is further amplified, as with the statement, “they 
themselves are being struck by misfortune at this moment.” And as soon as the “they” arrives 
at this stable referent, the remainder of the broadcast is able to distinguish a clear “you” and 
“them” that enables a genocidal directive: “You the people…look in the woods of 
Mburabuturo, look carefully, see whether there are no Inyenzis inside.” At last, the murky 
pronoun of “they” is replaced by the proper noun “Inyenzi,” or “cockroach,” an epithet for the 
Tutsi and the RPF. In the midst of the broadcast’s syntactic chaos, the only clarity offered is 
that “you the people” should “look carefully” for the “Inyenzi.” Consequently, the 
disorienting experience of the text affords much-desired clarity only in the form of a 
genocidal directive.  
The bewildering language of the broadcast, evident on the page, would have been 
compounded by the experience of listening in real time, without the option to rewind or fast-
forward, or to read and re-read a transcript; or, for those Rwandans who did not own a radio 
themselves, to rely solely upon their friend or neighbor’s retelling of the news. Furthermore, 
the timing of this particular broadcast, at 7:35 am the morning after President Habyarimana’s 
assassination, meant that the news was being delivered in a chaotic context in which civilians 
understood that violence was a very real threat, but did not know who would be inflicting it, 




palpably conveyed by the RTLM’s frantic temporal movement: at the beginning of the 
broadcast, it declares that “they will be struck by misfortune; by the end, “they themselves are 
being struck by misfortune at this moment, at this very minute, at this hour, at this moment I 
am talking to you!” The cascading swiftness of violence leaves no time for listeners to think 
carefully. In the chaos of the broadcast’s context and grammar, all that is clear is that 
“they”—whoever “they” may be—are being struck by misfortune “now.” With the pronoun 
referents so confused throughout the broadcast, listeners are left unsure whether “they” 
themselves will be befalling misfortune, or if their enemies will. This blurring of identities, 
within the context of terrifying violence and political upheaval, contributes to a sense of 
narrowed options: to either suffer misfortune or inflict it upon others. In other words, the 
presence of “misfortune,” “now,” intensifies the meaning of “you, the people” and “they, the 
Inyenzi.”  
But the delineating of ethnic divisions along the lines of “us” and “them” did not 
always result in consistent directives. On April 14th, for instance, the broadcast tells its 
listeners to merely scare the Tutsi, not to kill them or loot their properties. The very next day, 
the RTLM recommends that all Hutu should kill the Tutsi. Why then did the RTLM employ 
imprecise grammar and inconsistent directives? Why not simply give kill orders and be done 
with it? One answer is that although RTLM had decades, if not centuries, of ethnic resentment 
to draw upon, it had to contend with the many existing bonds of Hutu and Tutsi as family, 
friends, and neighbors. Charles Mironko’s interviews with former perpetrators conclude that 
for many RTLM listeners, “the rhetoric of the radio implicitly acknowledged the lack of 
ethnic division among rural peasants. The messages recalled by the perpetrators seem 




other words, hatred, fear, and violence had to be cultivated; a direct call to genocide could not 
independently incite the masses to kill.   
RTLM broadcasts reveal that inciting revenge did not rely solely on references to 
history of Hutu revolution or Tutsi oppression. Some broadcasts sensationalized the Tutsi, 
dehumanizing them until they lacked common features with the rest of the Rwandan people. 
Such depictions verged on the ridiculous, as with reports that the RPF, like actual 
cockroaches, ate through clothes, or that Tutsi women suckled at their own breasts. According 
to Kimani’s content analysis, seven percent of all calls to action on the Hutu “were 
accompanied by descriptions of Tutsi civilians and RPA as social deviants. This included 
claims of cannibalism, drinking victims’ blood, sorcery, and unredeemable evil natures” 
(122). The RTLM’s approach thus presented the Tutsi as a group to be feared and annihilated 
either for committing the acts that the Hutu were (accusations in a mirror), or for behaving as 
inhuman social deviants (sensationalized fearmongering).  
There is, however, a third option that existing scholarship on the RTLM has not 
commented upon. The recent influx in scholarship on “fake” news, propaganda, and the rise 
of neo-fascism in the West, has provided an abundance of theories for why preposterous 
stories are effective at mobilizing political support. One of the most fascinating theories to 
come out of this scholarship is that the appeal of fake news like that propagated by President 
Trump of the United States or President Putin of Russia, is that by so obviously manipulating 
and degrading the truth, they become “master of the truth” (Gessen 1). As the journalist 
Masha Gessen writes, “Lying is the message. It’s not just that both Putin and Trump lie, it is 
that they lie in the same way and for the same purpose: blatantly, to assert power over truth 




political leaders like Trump or Putin, or influential social figures like the broadcasters at 
RTLM. To the contrary, it solidifies their power to “clai[m] control over reality itself” (1).  
Finally, to those who did not believe or adhere to the RTLM’s directives, the radio 
posed threats. Broadcasts regularly decried other media sources, going so far as to state that 
the way to tell if a Hutu is loyal to the cause is to ask what radio station he listens to. RTLM 
magnified its social omnipresence by airing interviews with listeners that implicated them in 
the genocide. In one such interview, a listener boasted that he and his colleagues had killed 
five Tutsis. The broadcaster told them to “keep it up” (99). 
 Unlike the revenge narratives of the Iliad and the Aeneid that have a certain 
conclusion at the end of the bounded book, the RTLM was an ongoing, sequential, and 
constantly changing narrative that was invested in projecting a successful, satisfying end to 
the genocide, an end that did not yet exist, and a certainty that they could not yet possess. 
Unlike books whose beginnings or middles can be written and edited after the end is known, 
the RTLM had to compensate for the uncertain end to their story by promising a satisfactory 
conclusion. This perhaps explains some of the uncertainty, confusion, and contradiction in the 
broadcasts: they were fumbling to present a violent, confusing situation in a manner that 
would provide security and surety to a listenership on the condition that that listenership kept 
listening and behaved as directed.  
 Notably, the tone of the RTLM broadcasts shifts at the end of the genocide. It drops 
the manipulative confusion, and embraces the tone of confident, joyful victory celebrated in 
the climactic vengeance scenes of the Iliad and the Aeneid. On July 2nd, two days before the 
RPF took control of Kigali and effectively ended the genocide, the RTLM broadcast literally 




So, where did all the Inkotanyi who used to telephone me go, eh? They must 
have been exterminated…Let us sing: “Come, let us rejoice: the Inkotanyi have 
been exterminated!” 
 
The Good Lord is really just. These evil doers, these terrorists, these people 
with suicidal tendencies will end up being exterminated. When I remember the 
number of corpses that I saw lying around in Nyamirambo yesterday alone… 
 
However, the Inkotanyi are so wicked that even after one of them has been 
burnt and looks like a charred body, he will still try to take position behind his 
gun and shoot in all directions and afterwards he will treat himself, I don’t 
know with what medicine. 
 
Many of them had been burnt, but they still managed to pull on the trigger with 
their feet and shoot. I do not know how they are created. I do not know. When 
you look at them, you wonder what kind of people they are. In any case, let us 
simply stand firm and exterminate them, so that our children and grandchildren 
do not hear that word “Inkotanyi” ever again. 
 
Here, the repugnant and sensationalized language to describe the Tutsi is reminiscent of 
earlier broadcasts, but the language reaches a tone of gladness and success. The fact that the 
RPF soldiers were closing in on Kigali, where the RTLM was based, seems to have no effect 
on this apocalyptic rejoicing that the RTLM achieved what it set out to do: to “stand firm, and 
exterminate them.” 
These various rhetorical strategies show that the RTLM took a five-pronged approach: 
it delivered real news (e.g. President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down); it reframed real 
circumstances (e.g. the RPF’s military incursion in 1990 was a plot to undo the Hutu’s 
historical progress since 1959); it fabricated a new, implausible reality (the minority Tutsi 
were committing a genocide against the majority Hutu, and eating their victims in the 
process); it promised a satisfactory conclusion to the genocide, and it threatened those 
listeners who did not believe the reality it had created. Whether listeners believed or did not 




because they seemed real, because listeners wanted it to be real, or because the RTLM seemed 
to control and master reality itself.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the RTLM did not simply transmit existing animosities across the airwaves. It 
actively eroded the social bonds that did exist among Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa; amplified 
historical divisions; fabricated accusations of Tutsi violence; implicated listeners countrywide 
as valued members of a Hutu society; threatened non-listeners as traitors; and finally, posited 
the extermination of the Tutsi as the only way to restore the linear progress of history. Seen in 
this light, the cooperation of thousands of Hutu civilians in the genocide starts to make sense: 
the Hutu Power elite, in collaboration with the RTLM, artfully crafted the genocide so that 
participation in killings became the safest and clearest option for Hutu civilians facing the 
threat—both real and imagined—of their own annihilation.  
 The unenviable task facing the RPF government in the wake of the genocide was to 
present reconciliation, rather than revenge, as the safest, clearest, and most satisfying response 
to previous violence. It did so by both reprising and rejecting the narrative strictures of 
revenge. The genre of transfiguration adapts the revenge genre’s reliance on a promised, 
certain, and swift conclusion. In contrast, the genres of trial and memorialization reject the 
linear trajectory and speed of revenge, opting instead to valorize the slow, arduous work of 
reconciliation. In the chapters that follow, I show that the contradictions among these 
disparate genres provide crucial pluralism and difference in the Rwandan society’s experience 












Chapter Two: Reconciliation as Transfiguration 
 
Two scenes in Kigali, Rwanda, one in 1998 and the other in 2014, illustrate the country’s 
dramatic transition from revenge to reconciliation politics. Both take place in the rainy month 
of April, during genocide memorial month, at the largest sports stadiums in the country.  
In the first scene, on April 25th, 1998, policemen lead four prisoners convicted of 
genocide to wooden posts sunk into Nyambirambo Regional Stadium training ground’s 
muddy field. They put black hoods over the prisoners’ faces and hang bibs with rectangular 
targets across their chests. They wait. The audience—tens of thousands of Rwandans—jeers. 
Two police cars speed into the stadium, and a captain and four policemen bearing assault 
rifles leap out. They fire at the prisoners, trade places, and fire again. The captain shoots each 
prisoner several times more in the head. The crowd cheers and rushes forward. On the 
sidelines, a young man tells a New York Times journalist, “This is justice. They killed and 
they have to be killed.” Presidential aide Cabo Ninyetegeka says of the government’s decision 
to execute twenty-two leaders of the genocide, “We are not sadists. But there is a legacy of 
political ruthlessness and now justice must be done” (McKinley). 
In that era of Rwandan history, just four years after the genocide, the government 
figured “justice” as capital punishment. As such, they embraced a late stage of the revenge 
plot. They did not condone the first stage, in which private communities take revenge “in 
kind”—for crimes of genocide, that would consist of a reverse genocide, or at least targeted 
killings of genocide perpetrators. The government instead adopted the subsequent stage of the 
revenge plot, wherein the State enacts capital punishment in public so as to shore up a sense 
of justice being delivered and, importantly, of the State maintaining autonomy over that 




that the execution is “justice,” this particular version of justice metonymically and historically 
links to revenge. The public execution preserved the link between private revenge and State 
justice.  
The 1998 execution’s version of justice as State-produced capital punishment stands in 
astounding contrast with the 2014 stadium ceremony to commemorate the twentieth 
anniversary of the genocide. Held in Amahoro stadium, whose name means “peace,” the 
commemoration ceremony stages a very different spectacle than the executions that took 
place in a different Kigali stadium sixteen years earlier. On April 7, 2014, tens of thousands of 
audience members—including Rwandans, tourists, foreign diplomats, UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, and other African and Western leaders—
gather to watch speeches and theater, song, and dance performances on a stage at the center of 
the green stadium field. It is the capstone event of Kwibuka 20, the twentieth anniversary 
ceremony to commemorate the 1994 genocide.  
Kwibuka in Kinyarwanda means to remember, but the concept of Kwibuka 20 is more 
accurately conveyed by the popular refrain of “kwibuka, kwiyunga, kubaka” that is repeated in 
Kinyarwanda and English on billboards across Kigali during genocide memorial month: 
“Remember, Unite, Renew.” “Kwibuka, kwiyunga, kubaka” reflects the causal chronology 
assumed by the contemporary Rwandan State: that remembering the genocide will lead to 
uniting victims and perpetrators, and that uniting the population will lead to renewing the 
country.  
But how did a government and a society that in 1998 legitimized public executions as 
justice become a champion of unity and reconciliation? The transition manifested in a decade 




ideology “boot camps” for former perpetrators, countless social protection programmes, and a 
wide range of cultural productions that stage the vices of genocide and the virtues of 
reconciliation. And yet, the central event at Kwibuka 20, the song and dance theater 
performance Shadows of Memory, does not represent the slow, multi-layered, arduous work of 
transition. Instead, it stages an instantaneous and literally miraculous transfiguration of 
society.  
Shadows of Memory represents genocide without perpetrators and ultimately without 
victims, magically restoring a divided society to a unified, healed collective. In the beginning 
of the performance, eight hundred actors process in a long line onto a stage at the center of the 
stadium field. They are dressed in flowing white and grey clothes that represent the colors of 
mourning in Rwanda. On stage, three singers chant and hum a mournful, guttural tune. Then 
the singers begin to narrate Rwandan history, moving from English to Kinyarwanda and back 
again. At first, the eight hundred Rwandan actors cluster together, standing proud and strong 
on the center stage in a representation of precolonial unity. This is in keeping with a 
simplified account of Rwandan history: that before colonialism, the three groups in Rwanda—
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa—lived side by side, speaking the same language, practicing the same 
customs, and intermarrying; their divisions marked solely and imperfectly by type of 
livelihood.  
When a range rover pulls up to the stage and seven white actors leap out, the narrator 
cries in Kinyarwanda, “Every time I look back at what the history of our country is made of, I 
remember there came the colonizer, how he found us, and gave us ethnicities without 
foundation.” Significantly, the narrator does not repeat these lines in English, as he does with 




immediately legible to a non-Kinyarwanda speaking audience. Instead, he uses the 
Kinyarwanda term for ethnicity or “tribes,” amoko. This one word, totally illegible to a non-
Kinyarwanda speaking audience—for it has no cognate in English, French, or Kiswahili, the 
other official languages in Rwanda—is the performance’s sole linguistic mention of ethnicity. 
The word “ethnicity” here is thus legible only to Kinyarwanda-speakers, primarily Rwandans.  
It is as though the performance is seeking to condense the very concept of ethnicity 
into one word that is hidden from outsiders. This condensed, insular naming reverses the 
colonial operation in which outsiders inflicted the names of ethnicity onto Rwandans. As the 
narrator declares, colonizers did so “without foundation,” [atagirisoko], a phrase that can also 
translate to “without an origin, source, or wellspring.” His wording insinuates that the 
ethnicities imposed by colonizers were new constructions, without origin in Rwanda. And 
although this sentiment is not historically accurate in the sense that the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa 
groups did exist in Rwanda prior to colonization, Shadows of Memory depicts the rupture 
amongst ethnic groups as a sudden and terrifying consequence of colonial intrusion.  
When the colonizers first appear, the Rwandans onstage grip each other’s shoulders 
and tremble in fear, their bodies quivering in one long, cowering line, joined now not by 
pride, as during their performance of precolonial unity, but by fear. The colonizers stomp 
noisily onto the stage, arms swinging, forcing the majority of Rwandans to run onto the grass 
below where they cower, running around like frightened children, heads bowed. Meanwhile, a 
small group of Rwandan actors is left on the stage. These the colonists approach and perform 
grand, choreographed gestures as though knighting them. They direct the Rwandans onstage 
to switch places with them so that the white actors are standing on the outside of the stage, 




inner circle of the stage where they bow and dance to the directions of the white actors. 
Again, this is narrated in Kinyarwanda as a process of naming. The narrator describes,  
Then Rwanda was divided. The colonizers gave us names. We became “Cleo,” 
“Aphrodite,” “Patrick.” We didn’t know the origins of these names, but we 
were forced to use them. When we got tired, they forced us to continue. They 
taught us to work the colonial way, to live the colonial way, to be like the 
colonizers, to dress like the colonizers. And then, instead of being 
extraordinary, we became self-haters. We hated ourselves. Hated ourselves.  
Significantly, the narrator does not use the word amoko, or ethnicity, again. The names the 
Rwandans are given here are not ethnic labels, but European names like Cleo and Patrick that 
signify the forced acculturation and Christianization of Rwandans to European mores. But 
because the naming and “inauguration” ceremony involves only the small group of Rwandans 
onstage, excluding the masses left on the grass, it is obvious to anyone familiar with the 
basics of Rwandan history that the colonizers are dividing Rwandans into minority (Tutsi and 
Twa) and majority (Hutu) groups.  
Up through this point in the performance, Shadows of Memory depicts Rwandan 
history with a one to one equivalence between the historical groups and the groups on stage—
a minority (the Tutsi and Twa) at center court directed by a small group of white actors (the 
Belgians), together overseeing the masses (Hutu) on the ground. But as soon as the colonizers 
march off stage, the one to one equivalences cease. This is because the narrator does not 
specify whether the colonizers’ departure symbolizes the moment the Tutsi took leadership as 
a puppet government, during which time the Tutsi oppressed the Hutu from 1914-1959, or if it 




the cycle of oppression. In other words, just at the historical moment when ethnic identity 
became most divisive, the performance blurs ethnic identity.  
Without distinguishing the time period and without labeling the groups, the narrator 
announces in English, “[d]ehumanization started and human beings became objects. Bad 
governments ruled with injustice. Some had the right to leave; others didn’t have the right to 
leave. Denying human dignity, life or death, became the order of the day.” Everyone—the 
minority group on stage and the majority group on the grass—cringe and contort at these 
words, freezing in a tableau of pained bodies. There is no difference between the two groups. 
In consequence, it remains unclear through both the narrative and the bodily enactment, which 
group of Rwandans is responsible for the “dehumanization,” and which group has been 
dehumanized. But the plural form of “bad governments” indicates that there was more than 
one bad Rwandan government after colonization, meaning that both the Tutsi and Hutu-led 
governments are culpable for the dehumanization that started.  
This strikingly vague, universalizing wording of dehumanization, human dignity, and 
rights continues. The line “some had the right to leave; others didn’t have the right to leave” 
generalizes an event that was all about distinguishing which group in particular had rights. 
Shadows of Memory distinguishes no difference between what is happening to the actors on 
the stage (presumably the Tutsi and Twa) and off (presumably the Hutu). All of them cower 
and quake as if in fear and pain. Their simultaneous and unanimous fear represents Rwanda 
after the arrival and departure of colonizers as unified in negative affect. They figure Rwanda 
as one, cohesive victim of colonization. As such, the performance collapses the historical 
specificity of different cycles of violence. Rather than representing distinct cycles of violence 




Hutu extremism—everything is subsumed into one, unified experience of suffering following 
colonization.  
Shadows of Memory avoids depicting any Rwandans as perpetrators, while 
representing all Rwandans as victims. This means that as the performance leads up to the 
event of genocide, no actor or group except for the white colonists and the disembodied voice 
over the loudspeaker appears responsible for the violence. Nor is any allusion made to the 
flashbulb events that sparked the genocide into action, not even the shocking spectacle of 
President Habyarimana’s plane being shot down in his own backyard.  
Perhaps most astoundingly, Shadows of Memory represents the genocide without 
actors or objects representing killers and weapons. A narrator simply describes the killings, as 
though his language were powerful enough to orchestrate genocide. At his words, all eight 
hundred actors run, stumble, quake, and fall to the ground in an appallingly evocative 
representation of mass death. The narrator cries in Kinyarwanda, “[k]illings and massacre 
began. One person said, ‘I’ll bring about your last day on earth.’ And then another said the 
same. The next day, they said, ‘go and work! Work! Work!’ And then they worked.”  
The “work” being described here is killing; indeed, the genocide was marketed to 
perpetrators as a form of work to improve the country, with leaders of the genocide describing 
the killings as a form of “umuganda,” or community service. This confluence of work and 
killing is so persuasive that the word for the genocide perpetrators, “interahamwe,” is often 
mistranslated as “those that work together.” However, the meaning of interahamwe is more 
complex. “Hamwe” means “together,” but -tera is one of the most multifarious verbs in 
Kinyarwanda. Its thirteen dictionary definitions include: “to discard,” “to throw or project at,” 




evict,” “to force or cause,” “to mount,” “to arrange,” “to beat (a heart),” and “to be shaped” 
(Kinyarwanda). The multiplicity of these meanings indicates how many different meanings 
the killers attributed to their actions, and how dexterous the planners were at framing and 
normalizing the many reasons for genocide. But in the performance, there are no interahamwe 
present; the narrator’s words alone are enough.  
 The narrator’s language is not simply a stand in for the genocide’s killings. It also 
refers to the language of genocide, particularly the hate speech disseminated over radio and 
pamphlets. When the narrator decries the “Hate speeches, discrimination preached on radio,” 
he refers explicitly to the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines that incited violence. But 
rather than dwelling on the hate media or seeking out who was responsible for it, the 
performance progresses on to a series of representations that suggest that if language is 
enough to start genocidal ideology and action, language should also be enough to combat it.  
Importantly, this registers in the archetypal process of re-personifying victims by 
counting them as individuals instead of as collective masses. This familiar narrative device 
occurs only in English, signaling perhaps that the representational strategy is considered more 
universal than the historically specific narratives described earlier in Kinyarwanda. As the 
narrator laments the numbers of genocide—“over one million just in one hundred days. Only 
one hundred days,”—he is interrupted by another narrator who cries out against the reductive 
nature of metonymizing the genocide as “one million.”  
It was not just a million people who were murdered in Rwanda. It started with 
one. Then another. And another. Ten thousand each day, four hundred each 




hundred days, ordinary people hacked by machetes until the killing has 
stopped. 
The second narrator’s clichéd complaint that we should focus on the one instead of the million 
is quickly contradicted when he begins enumerating the other statistics, of ten-thousand each 
day, four-hundred each hour, seven each minute. It is evident that simply counting the dead 
through literal numbers is insufficient for commemoration, no matter how they are calculated. 
Instead, the count that is actually important to the performance is that everybody dies. All of 
the actors are left lying on the grass.  
 
“Fig. 1”: Shadows of Memory massacre scene Ben Curtis/Associated Press 
 
The visuals of this absolute, unsparing death echo the archival photographs of Rwanda’s hills 
during the genocide. In those photos, too, perpetrators are rarely present; instead, it is only the 
dead who are documented. This was of course for perpetrators to avoid culpability, but it also 
allows the perpetrators who took photos to claim their success in annihilating everyone within 
the frame, and for journalists who took photos to convey the cataclysmic nature of the event. 
Following an event that looks like eight-hundred actors or one million dead bodies on the 





In Shadows of Memory, the move from remembering to uniting and renewing happens 
through transfiguration. As all the actors lie on the grass, government land rovers roar into the 
stadium, this time—unlike in 1998—carrying not police executioners but Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) soldiers, the force that ended the genocide through military intervention. As the 
RPF soldiers come jogging into the stadium, the live audience erupts in applause and joins the 
narrators in singing a popular song that honors the soldiers, calling them “our warriors, our 
heroes.” But the performance that follows deviates from the typical hero narrative that 
celebrates the RPF’s military prowess to instead concentrate on their supernatural powers. 
The soldiers run towards the bodies on the ground while incanting the word “humura,” 
meaning to “be calm,” or “fear not.” They lift the victims slowly to their feet, bringing them 
upright as though they had never been killed. Restored to full height and movement, the 
victims walk without any sign of injury or trauma. In the magical act of resurrection, the body 
count of genocide is brought to zero, down from the previous count of everyone. It no longer 
matters how many people were killed per day, per hour, per minute, per genocide, because 
nobody remains dead. They are all brought back to life; genocide’s count has been annulled. 
Furthermore, it is as though their resurrection has restored them to their state of being before 
any violence occurred: before genocide, before colonization, they are now, finally, walking 
together with the movement and unity the performance depicted of their precolonial state.  
The play thus stages an imagined world in which Rwandans are unified without any of 
the pain and compromise that reconciliation typically entails. The move from genocide to 
reconciliation is not simply a transformation, which can be achieved through earthly means. 
Shadows of Memory deploys transfiguration as its genre of choice: it magically transfigures 




process, while impossible to actualize without supernatural or divine intervention, nonetheless 
articulates a desire that is so universal as to be prescribed in international human rights law: 
the victim’s right to restitution. 
The United Nations Basic Principles posits restitution as the holy grail of reparation in 
that it “should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original situation before the gross 
violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian 
law occurred” (Article 19). However, its initial disclaimer, “whenever possible,” immediately 
suggests that restitution is not always possible. And indeed, in cases of gross human rights 
and/or humanitarian violations, restoring the victim to his or her “original situation” is 
impossible unless that situation is compartmentalized into multiple components. This seems 
to be what Basic Principles implies when it enumerates that, “restitution includes, as 
appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and 
citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and return of 
property.” It is unlikely that all these aspects of a victim’s life can be restored, or that the 
restoration of any one in particular will be “complete.” However, the Basic Principles’ 
description of restitution and the similar descriptions in other human rights laws, including 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, indicate a universal desire for full 
restitution. The universality of this desire is also evident in the depictions of transfiguration 
that animate narratives from other post-conflict sites. Before turning to the political 
problematics of the framing of Shadows of Memory, I discuss the generic characteristics of 
transfiguration as they manifest in two different texts, The Lianja Epic of the Democratic 





Transfigurative Reconciliation Outside Rwanda 
The ancient epic poem of the Mongo people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The 
Lianja Epic, features a series of spectacular, bloody battles between two indigenous clans that 
end with the dead being resurrected to live peacefully with their killers. Reconciliation 
through resurrection thus justifies the vengeance that came before. Resurrection first occurs 
when the Spirits ask the victorious leader Lianja to infuse the nostrils of the dead with a magic 
powder to bring them back to life. Lianja, so pleased to have killed his foes just moments 
before, happily sees his enemies come back to life whereupon he plants “a young tree of 
peace and reconciliation” (Maneniang 107). The poem skips over the difficult emotional work 
of reconciliation; the resurrected express no desire to avenge their own deaths. Resurrection 
enables a reconciliation process that erases the emotion of revenge instead of wrestling with 
it. The epic thus teaches a model of reconciliation in which the victorious need not repent and 
the losers need not avenge. It is an appealing one for the victors to follow: Lianja’s Mongo 
army continues to resurrect all its fallen enemies using the magic powder. They no longer 
require prompting from the Spirits to do so, suggesting that the Spirits successfully trained 
Lianja who in turn normalized the resurrection process to his commanding army until they 
collectively sing, “We shall live in peace/Where our race, now merged as one will perpetuate” 
(Maneniang 113). Conveniently, the winners and losers are merged so seamlessly that the 
losers do not need to tell their separate story. As Quint reiterates, in the traditional epic, 
victors write the story.   
The pedagogic tone of The Lianja Epic is undeniable. Lianja explicitly tells his foes “I 
have come to teach you how to behave/I have come to stop you from committing crimes” 




be the force of love and justice” (123). The pedagogic language within the text reflects the 
pedagogic thrust of its performance for collective audiences and for posterity. But the didactic 
guarantee that the reconciliation plot will work ends abruptly in the final stanza when Lianja 
leaves his people behind to join the Ancestors. The Mongo people attempt to follow him by 
climbing trees towards the sky, but chaos follows. It is this chaos, rather than “the force of 
love and justice,” that founds the modern Mongo nation: 
The trees broke and the Mongo were hurled far and wide 
Wherever they landed, they built big villages and cities 
And never again spoke Lianja’s name 
But Lianja is surely about to come back to Mongoland 
Because disease, murder and all names of evil are rampant again in  
Mongoland (124).  
This conclusion paradoxically laments that the Mongo never again speak of Lianja, even 
though the epic itself is all about him. In this way the epic bards self referentially emphasize 
the importance of their own storytelling to train listeners in the correct actions and attitudes to 
appreciate the return of Lianja. There is no guarantee of when Lianja will return, but it is clear 
that he eventually will for the sole reason that evils are rampant in Mongoland. That The 
Lianja Epic has been performed in Mongoland since the 14th century reflects a long history of 
violence and attempts at reconciliation in the land now called the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. The DRC has in recent decades been facing multiple, brutal civil wars, some of which 
in the Eastern areas bordering Rwanda were sparked or exacerbated by the Rwandan genocide 
and the subsequent Rwandan military invasions.17 These wars are notable for the cruel 
                                                 
17 After the genocide, a million Hutu refugees, many of them members of the genocidal regime, fled to 




treatment of civilians, the widespread use of rape as a weapon of war, and the chaotic reality 
of multiple factions fighting over vast, forested territories that has led the biggest UN 
peacekeeping force in history to fail in its mission to stabilize the region (Human Rights 
Watch). Clearly, The Lianja Epic’s model of reconciliation is an unviable one: armies do not 
get to slake the desire for revenge and then create peace by resurrecting their vanquished 
enemies. The dead remain dead, while the survivors regroup and seek their own revenge. The 
DRC’s history and current civil wars demonstrate that reconciliation cannot realistically 
coexist with revenge killings, for resurrection does not exist outside the realm of magic and 
the divine. 
However, The Lianja Epic need not be read as fanciful and therefore divorced from 
the sobering reality of the DRC. The magic powder is created out of a process of ritual, and 
from many generations of respect for the gods performed through physical and spiritual 
efforts. This magic powder imagines a reality in which generations of human effort and belief 
can be condensed into a tool of supernatural power.18 Magic enables instant transformation, 
but developing the magic takes years, if not lifetimes. The appeal of instant, magical 
reconciliation reflects the appeal of revenge. Revenge can be accomplished in one physical 
blow. Because reconciliation can’t work like that in real world—one physical act doesn’t 
reconcile people—narratives must employ the supernatural to endow a physical act with the 
transfigurative capacity that revenge acts possess. 
                                                                                                                                                        
threat as an excuse to extend its military reach into the Congo. From 1996-97 the RPF marched West 
across the DRC to overthrow Mobutu Sese Seko’s thirty-two-year reign. From 1998-2003 the RPF 
captured nearly one third of Congolese territory. Ever since, Rwandan forces and proxies have been 
fighting in the Congo, along with as many as seven other states profiting from the DRC’s mineral 
resources. See Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf in Remaking Rwanda, 5-6. 
18 This trope recurs in other African contexts as well, such as the Xhosa prophecy of South Africa that 
Jennifer Wenzel theorizes in her work on anticolonial prophecies in which indigenous peoples imagine 




 In the Rwandan and Congolese performances I have discussed, the supernatural is 
attributed to spirits, ancestors, or a magical State. I will now turn to a very different context 
that nonetheless calls upon the same tropes using the figures of gods and goddesses: 
Aeschylus’s The Eumenides of Greek myth. The play is perhaps the most canonical text in the 
Western canon to stage the move from private revenge politics to State-run justice. It 
famously depicts both a trial and a transfiguration, which is why it serves as an apt text to 
transition from this chapter on reconciliation as transfiguration to the following chapter on 
reconciliation as trial. In The Eumenides, the results of a trial that founds the civil judicial 
system can be sustained only because of the divine transfiguration that follows. As such, the 
play suggests that the transition from revenge politics to State justice cannot be achieved 
instantaneously without the influence of the supernatural.  
 The story traced in The Eumenides constitutes the final cycle of a familial revenge plot 
that began with the curse on the House of Atreus whose denouement is narrated throughout 
the trilogy of the Oresteia. In the first play of the trilogy, Agamemnon, Clytaemnestra murders 
her husband Agamemnon in revenge for him having sacrificed their daughter Iphigenia. In the 
second play, The Libation Bearers, their son Orestes kills Clytaemnestra to avenge his 
father’s death. Rather than continuing the familial revenge cycle, however, The Eumenides 
puts Orestes on trial. The goddess Athene arranges a civil court with twelve “jurors” to hear 
testimony from both sides and to cast their vote. On the side advocating punishment are “The 
Furies,” goddesses of revenge, who clamor that Orestes must be killed for having betrayed the 
interdiction against shedding the blood of “kindred,” that of his mother (line 653). They argue 
that Clytaemnestra’s murder of her husband does not betray that interdiction because marriage 




but the father, who is the “begetter” of the child, and who thus counts as the son’s true kin 
(line 659). Notably, neither side applies their legal argument to consider the earlier cycles of 
revenge in the House of Atreus, not even Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia 
that belongs to the same “family” of murders against kin. In this sense, the trial replicates the 
logic of revenge. It looks only to redress the most recent wrong instead of interrogating each 
party’s role in previous cycles of violence.  
However, Athene ultimately does reject the logic of revenge. She does so not through 
legal argument within the trial itself, but by debating with The Furies until they agree to 
transfigure into a new species of goddess, The Kindly Ones, who represent bounty, 
benevolence, and justice. Initially, The Furies resist her entreaties on the grounds of honor. As 
goddesses of revenge, they see vengeance on behalf of the dead as the highest form of honor. 
They decry “Justice”—a metonymy for the State court—as a type of “infection” that “robs” 
them of the “honor” of revenge politics (785-792). But Athene verbally revises the nature of 
“honor” until it no longer represents vengeance, but justice and prosperity. This revision 
process does not actualize through the rhetoric of debate that must wrestle with contradiction 
and rebuttal. Instead, it relies on a transfiguration enabled by divine intervention. Athene 
refers to “the power to charm and soothe that sits upon my tongue” as “Persuasion,” an 
abstraction that often figures in Greek mythology as a minor deity (885-886). As soon as she 
utters Persuasion’s name, the meaning of honor is revised, and The Furies accept it. When 
they ask what “honor” will await them if they transfigure into The Kindly Ones, Athene 
replies, “honor such that no house can prosper without you” (line 895). Once defined as 




“Persuasion,” The Furies accept the new meaning of honor with little argument. Soon they are 
singing its praise: 
But may the voice of faction, who has never had enough of evil, 
never in this city 
resound, I pray; 
and may the dust not drink the black blood of the citizens 
and through passion for revenge 
speed on the ruin to the city 
wrought by murder in return for murder! 
But may each give joy to each, 
in a spirit of love toward the common weal, 
and may they hate with one accord, 
for many are the sorrows among mortals that this can cure (976-987). 
 
Now constituted as The Kindly Ones, they decry their former values with the exact language 
that they previously used to valorize them. Faction, blood, passion, revenge, speed, ruin, and 
murder—all terms and concepts that animated The Furies—are now rejected. In their place 
are left common love and common hate.  
 Common hate seems a curious value for The Kindly Ones to advocate. For is not hate 
the opposite of love? But part of the work of defining common love, The Kindly Ones 
obliquely suggest, is articulating common hate. Putting hate on literal and metaphorical trial is 
long, arduous work that risks fanning the flames of old hatreds. It is perhaps to avoid this risk 
that Athene buries The Furies. After transfiguring them into The Kindly Ones, she escorts 
them to their future permanent residence in the ground below the courthouse. This burial 
suggests that the transfiguration between vengeance and kindliness is not entirely finished, 
that there is some residual element of their original nature as The Furies that impels Athene to 
repress them in the earth. Why else should they not be free to roam the earth? Athene’s 
argument is that The Kindly Ones now have the honor of both literally and metaphorically 




of The Eumenides. It begs the question: is the courthouse built on kindliness or on the 
repression of revenge?  
 
Shadows of Memory’s Shadow Performance  
This question similarly haunts Shadows of Memory, a performance that in certain ways 
represses the past, whitewashing the history of genocide by erasing the presence of the 
perpetrators and thereby absolving them of guilt. But Rwandan art and political rhetoric are 
consistently criticized for over-emphasizing the Tutsi’s victimization at the hands of Hutu 
militia. The performance’s elision of historical fact cannot simply be interpreted as a 
government effort to erase a painful history or to deny the divisions and traumas that endure 
in the present. Nor should the play’s reliance on magic be deemed apolitical. Because the 
performance is State funded, State produced, and performed at an official commemoration 
ceremony, and because the soldiers who resurrect the victims are members of the actual 
government military, this magic becomes a metaphor for the “magical” work of the State. 
And yet, what might appear to be an unabashedly self-aggrandizing performance actually 
stages its own limits quite explicitly if we view the performance in relation to the frame 
within which it is set.  
At the same time that Shadows of Memory plays out on the center stage, a shadow 
performance takes place within the stadium audience. Men and women scattered throughout 
the audience wail at the performance’s evocations of genocide. As some of these audience 
members faint or collapse, they are carried out by government health workers onsite for the 
occasion. New Yorker journalist Philip Gourevitch, in attendance at Kwibuka 20, describes the 




was like a gull’s, a series of wild, high keening cries; the next was lower and slower, strangled 
with ache, but growing steadily louder in a drawn-out crescendo; after that came a frantic, 
full-throated babbling—a cascade of terrible, terrified pleading wails” (Gourevitch 2014, 1). 
He contextualizes this spectacle as a regular occurrence at commemoration ceremonies: 
“[e]very year, at the genocide-commemoration ceremonies during mourning week, scores of 
Rwandans erupt in this way, unstrung by grief, convulsed and thrashing when anyone comes 
near to soothe or subdue them, including, at the stadium, yellow-vested trauma teams who 
carry them out, bucking and still screaming” (2014, 1).  
For those of us not at the event in real time, this secondary spectacle is visually 
apparent in the blurry background of the televised event. If we look carefully into the 
audience at the stadium, we can see the “trauma teams” that Gourevitch mentions, 
government workers in vests of neon yellow-green, carrying people out of the stadium. There 
is a visual symmetry between the RPF soldiers in their own green uniforms carrying genocide 
victims, and the government trauma teams carrying what are likely genocide survivors. Both 
sets of government figures are crouched in the posture of helping their fellow citizens to rise. 
Both wear uniforms distinct from the figures they are assisting. The RPF’s camouflage green 
contrasts with the white costumes of the performers. In parallel, the health workers’ neon 
yellow-green contrasts with the sea of colors in the audience. The distinctness of both the 
health workers and the military figures are simultaneously visible; the camera shows both 






“Fig. 2” Shadows of Memory resurrection scene   Kwibuka Rwanda 
 
This confluence of spectacles would not have been unexpected. Genocide memorial 
week is known in Rwanda for an explosive increase in physical expressions of trauma; health 
clinics prepare in advance, and the government has for many years been sending health 
workers to commemorative events like Kwibuka 20 in anticipation of audience outbursts. Nor 
are the national ceremonies the only ones where trauma is so visibly “performed”; ceremonies 
organized by survivors also elicit dramatic performances of grief (Ibreck 96). Given that 
Shadows of Memory is a State production, it follows that the organizers of Kwibuka 20 would 
know that the theater on stage and the theater in the audience would occur simultaneously. 
And given the presence of President Kagame in attendance, it is clear that the multiple layers 
of performance at Kwibuka 20 are State sanctioned.  
Because of this intentionally simultaneous visibility, we must interpret Shadows of 
Memory alongside the concomitant, responsive performance in the audience. I use 
“performance” here not to suggest that the outbursts are faked but that they are performative 
in the sense of dramatizing grief in a public arena. This is made particularly apparent in the 




meaning that the live audience members were able to watch the performance and each other 
both directly and through the mediated close ups afforded by the video filming onsite. At the 
same time, the event was also broadcast live on television and radio across the country.  
As Diana Taylor writes of the Latin American context, in post-conflict socieites, the 
visibility of theater is important for staging nation-ness, not only through the content of the 
production but through the fact that masses of people are watching each other watch it as a 
collective experience (196). The televised nature of the performance—both in the moment 
with the live camera onsite, and in posterity with the recordings freely available online—
amplify the public quality of Kwibuka 20: this was an event meant to be watched both locally, 
nationally, and internationally.  
The public nature of Kwibuka 20 stands in stark contrast with the “public” executions 
in 1998, where foreign journalists were booed and had stones thrown at them. The executions 
were done for a Rwandan audience in defiance of the international moral and legal gaze, 
while Kwibuka 20 was performed for a Rwandan and international audience to be broadcast 
as widely as possible. But what Kwibuka 20 broadcasts is, essentially, a contradiction. 
 The theater and audience performances at Kwibuka 20 showcase the paradox at the 
heart of kwibuka, kwiyunga, kubaka: that to remember, unite, and renew means reckoning 
with the idea and ontology of a divided past and an undivided present at the same time. 
Gourevitch describes how this reckoning manifests in the scene’s embodied performance:  
Cheers mixed with the cries as the show continued, with several dozen R.P.F. 
soldiers jogging onto the field and tenderly lifting the bodies up, restoring them 
to life. As the resurrected Rwandans regrouped center stage, flocks of children 




screams did not let up. So there is memory that we manage, and there is 
memory that manages us. At the stadium, you had both, and, at times, two 
decades of aftermath felt equal to the moment between two heartbeats. 
In Gourevitch’s narration, the two types of memory map onto the two types of performance at 
Kwibuka 20. The “memory that we manage” is the choreographed production of Shadows of 
Memory in which, through a dance of resurrection, “the nation [i]s made whole” to the cheers 
of the crowd. The “memory that manages us” is that articulated by the “keening cries,” the 
“full-throated babbling,” the “terrible, terrified pleading wails” that emerge from individuals 
scattered throughout the audience. Not only are both present at the performance, they are 
present at the same time. Their simultaneity collapses the time between the genocide and the 
present, those “two decades of aftermath,” into the brief, intimate “moment between two 
heartbeats.”  
 What becomes visible in that moment is the irreconcilability of the multiple 
imperatives involved in reconciliation. Even the scene of restitution through resurrection—
restoring the victims to their original situation before the violence occurred—produces for 
some viewers a pitch of agony so piercing as to be expressed in public screams. Kwibuka 20 
thus demonstrates that the genre of reconciliation as transfiguration is not entirely fulfilling or 
convincing. This is a stance that some theorists of reconciliation, including the Arendtian 
political scientist Andrew Schaap, take to an extreme. 
 
Against Reparation: A Theory of Antagonistic Reconciliation 
Taking an unusual stance on theories of reconciliation, Schaap contends that “restorative 




and economic” means (16). While Schaap does not explicitly categorize the theological, 
therapeutic, and economic as forms of reparation, they operate in his discussion like the 
reparations outlined within the United Nations’ Basic Principles, with the theological and 
therapeutic serving as “restitution,” “satisfaction,” and “rehabilitation,” and the economic as 
“compensation.” The problem with this reparative, or restorative, theory of reconciliation, 
Schaap argues, is that it presupposes a single constituency in which antagonistic parties may 
be restored to harmony, when in fact community can only be achieved through the risky 
practice of “political interaction” (4). In Schaap’s assessment, [political] reconciliation would 
not be about transcending the conflicts of the past by striving for social harmony. Rather, 
reconciliation would condition the possibility of politics by framing a potentially agonistic 
clash of world views within the context of a community that is ‘not yet’ (4).  
Eschewing the existing emphasis in reconciliation theory on harmony, Schaap 
proposes a “potentially agonistic clash of world views” as the source of community building. 
The benefit of this “clash” is that it creates the space for political discourse necessary to foster 
“civic friendship” among former antagonists (9). But its risk, he acknowledges, is great: in 
“opening up” conversation, “community is not inevitable [and] conflict may turn out to be 
irreconcilable” (19). This is why post-conflict societies so often seek to solidify a moral 
community with stable values like forgiveness, contrition, and reparation that are not easily 
contested. According to Schaap, the sense of resolution and closure enabled by restorative 
models of reconciliation are to be resisted in favor of “an agonistic politics in terms of which 
the commonness of the world that lies between former enemies might be disclosed” (21). 
This, Schaap writes, is at the heart of Hannah Arendt’s ethic of “worldliness,” a world that is 




seek to delimit the commonness of the world that lies between them while affirming each 
other’s freedom to call this world into question” (53-4, emphasis added). The goal of political 
reconciliation, then, is “to transform a relation of enmity into one of civic friendship” 
characterized by ongoing, free debate (8-9).  
 Schaap’s eloquently argued claims are persuasive insofar as they elucidate the values 
of what he calls political reconciliation, chief among which is open, agonistic, discourse. But 
he does not provide historical examples of where this agonistic politics has been effective. 
Instead, he offers critiques of many post-conflict systems that do not fit his example, for 
example South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that, for his taste, too 
unambiguously defined the terms of their community’s common worldliness (18). His critique 
of the TRC, like many, focuses on the Christian rhetoric and practice of the Commission’s 
leader, Desmond Tutu. He laments the fact that for leaders like Tutu, “a dissenting politics 
that challenges the terms in which a consensus would be realised must ‘be avoided like the 
plague’ (18).  
However, an alternative method of interpreting the TRC is to listen for the voices of 
dissent that took place beyond the official and widely circulated rhetoric of leaders like Tutu. 
For even if Tutu and others in positions of power rigorously framed the hearings as spaces of 
“social healing,” many of the individual testimonies in the TRC reject the very notion of 
healing. Some demand justice, others reparation, and still others the right to vent their grief 
and anger.19  
In order to evaluate a site of public interaction as “political” in the terms set by 
Schaap’s own rubric, it is thus imperative to look beyond the leaders’ framing rhetoric to the 
                                                 
19 For a literary depiction of the cacophony of diverse voices at the TRC, see Antjie Krog’s narrative 




myriad of narratives promulgated by individual citizens. What Schaap seems to be saying—
although he does not do so explicitly—is that the political nature of a community is defined 
by the official rhetoric that frames it and the official policies that spring from and/or govern it. 
However, it is possible for a community to be “political” in the important ways that Schaap 
delineates, even if the community members are operating within a national framework that 
depoliticizes through an emphasis on consensus and harmony. Local sites and individual 
voices like those articulated at the TRC can manifest the type of agonistic discourse that 
Schaap recommends. 
It is also the case that the narratives promoted by political or religious leaders like 
Tutu or Kagame are not limited to their public speeches. The aesthetic productions that take 
place alongside leaders’ speeches, or with leaders in attendance, or with leaders’ funding, can 
nuance their official stance. Thus, although the genre of official speech-making is typically 
constructed to shore up moral authority and to minimize agonistic discourse, those generic 
characteristics may be mitigated by the presence of aesthetic representations that open up 
possibilities for debate. By reading political speech or law in relation to aesthetic productions, 
it is possible to discern leaders’ underlying awareness of the productivity of political agonism 
beneath the veneer of their paeans to consensus.  
While the majority of current scholarship on Rwanda has criticized the RPF’s 
repression of dissenting voices, I show that Rwandan State discourse and policy cannot be so 
easily read as monolithic or inimical to contesting ideas. The ethnographer Erin Jessee’s 
perspective is helpful here. She suggests that “both Rwanda’s official histories and the private 
narratives of its citizens are perhaps best approached as “mythico-histories”—a term coined 




even merely an evaluation of the past, but a subversive recasting and reinterpretation of it in 
fundamentally moral terms” (14-15). While Jessee’s book overall critiques the RPF’s 
repression of speech, she also includes information that destabilizes this critique, offering up 
an alternative view of the State narrative as being not so rigid after all. A particularly 
compelling contribution comes in her lengthy quotation of an email from Rose-Marie 
Mukarutabana, a professor of history at the National University of Rwanda. Their email 
correspondence concerns the ongoing debate within Rwanda about what history to teach in 
State school textbooks, a debate that resulted in the textbook not actually being written for a 
protracted period of time. Mukarutabana writes: 
As you can see, it is therefore not a simple matter of the government wanting 
to impose the official narrative, and preventing people from analyzing it 
publicly. It is that positions are right now still rigid, and no solution has yet 
been found. 
 
Actually, this protracted process rather leads one to suspect there is really no 
official narrative, no “party line,” for if one sufficiently coherent line had been 
available, it would have been a simple matter to impose it: just write the 
textbooks and get everyone to use them. 
 
What we see instead is a painstaking soul-searching, a long-drawn effort to 
reconcile rather divergent views on what is perhaps the key to achieving a 
normal life as a nation. 
 
Meanwhile, the country survives on what you view as “simplified 
propaganda,” but is really a meager diet of temporary expedients, hoping for a 
proper diet—“soon” (qtd. in Jessee, 209).  
 
Mukarutabana’s position is confirmed when we turn our gaze from State education to State-
funded aesthetic productions. Art in Rwanda, ranging from theater to film to literature to 
memorial sites, expresses “divergent views on what is perhaps the key to achieving a normal 
life as a nation.” The nature of aesthetic production allows more ambiguity than political 




multiple possibilities for interpretation.  
One might assume that any artworks depicting nuanced versions of reconciliation are 
produced outside and against the auspices of the State. But in fact, numerous State-funded 
aesthetic productions portray reconciliation in ways that diverge from the master narrative 
that is attributed to the State based on analyses of political speech and policy. Thus, State-
funded art affirms Rose-Marie’s contention that “there is really no official narrative, no “party 
line,” for if one sufficiently coherent line had been available, it would have been a simple 
matter to impose it.”  
Nonetheless, there is one party line that is indisputably present in Rwanda today, and 
that is the RPF’s narrative that because it was the force that ended the genocide and 
institutionalized reconciliation as a priority, it is the only political party that can keep Rwanda 
stable and secure. But even if the government sticks to a self-legitimizing narrative, it does 
not necessarily follow that the State disseminates a “coherent line” about national unity and 
reconciliation. Divergences and contradictions emerge when we consider State speech 
alongside State-funded artworks, revealing that the RPF’s narrative may be more diffuse, 
porous, and diverse than assumed by scholars who focus primarily on political speech and 
policy.20 It is not only the case that Shadows of Memory complicates notions of the RPF’s 
master narrative and of Kagame’s subsequent speech, but that Kagame’s speech itself also 
demonstrates more nuanced depictions of national unity than are often attributed to him.  
 
                                                 
20 It is important to note that some scholarship has showcased divergences and diversity of opinion and 
practice within RPF policy and rhetoric, both at the levels of centralized, elite Kigali leadership and 
decentralized politics at the district, cell, and umudugudu levels. See for instance Rachel Ibreck, 
especially her chapter on the construction of genocide memorials, and Phil Clark, especially his 





Kagame’s Narrative of Seamless Contradiction 
Kagame’s speech at Kwibuka 20 begins by specifying the groups he seeks to address: “[t]o 
our parents, children, brothers and sisters who survived, to the Rwandans who defied the call 
to genocide, and to those who give voice to their remorse, it is you who bear the burden of our 
history.” The order in which he lists these groups reflects the typical priorities of 
commemorative discourse: survivors come first, those who refused to kill come second, and 
perpetrators who demonstrate contrition come third. The RPF heroes, or rescuers, are not 
mentioned at all, perhaps because Kagame himself is so deeply associated with the RPF as 
their former military leader and current political leader that by his very presence they are 
interpolated into the conversation. But Kagame does not endow either himself or the RPF 
with the kind of messianic qualities that the soldiers perform in Shadows of Memory. Instead, 
he narrates reconciliation as a long, difficult, imperfect, and incomplete process. He declares, 
“We have pursued justice and reconciliation as best we could. But it does not restore what we 
lost” (emphasis mine.) With these statements, Kagame explicitly denies the image of 
restoration provided by Shadows of Memory. As such, his words affirm Schaap’s contention 
that reparation or restoration is an inadequate method of reconciliation.  
However, the political community that Kagame advocates is composed on the type of 
insider identity that Schaap cautions against because it defines community based on a sense of 
shared suffering, which “replaces the sensation of a world shared in common” (3). The center 
of Kagame’s speech is a critique of European intervention and lack thereof: colonization, its 
legacy of ethnic divisionism, the failure of the international community to intervene in the 
genocide, the refusal of France and Belgium to extradite Rwandans accused of helping to plan 




with evenly matched antagonists. Without naming particular European powers, Kagame calls 
out Belgium and France using associations that are obvious to anyone familiar with the 
Rwandan context. Judging by the roars of applause in the audience, they are well known to 
Rwandans. With a steady tone and straightforward, eloquent language, Kagame declares: 
Historical clarity is a duty of memory that we cannot escape. Behind the words 
“never again” there is a story whose truth must be told in full, no matter who 
you are and how uncomfortable. The people who planned and carried out the 
genocide were Rwandans. But the history and root causes go beyond this 
beautiful country. This is why Rwandans continue to seek the most complete 
explanation possible for what happened. We do so with humility as a nation 
that nearly destroyed itself but we are nevertheless determined to recover our 
dignity as a people. Twenty years is short or long depending on where you 
stand. But there is no justification for false moral equivalence. The passage of 
time should not obscure the facts, lessen the responsibility, or turn victims into 
villains. People cannot be bribed or forced into changing their history, and no 
country is powerful enough, even when they think they are, to change the facts. 
After all, les faits sont tetués [the facts are stubborn.] 
 
The final line is the only use of French in Kagame’s speech, much as the only French 
employed in Shadows of Memory is in the narrator’s complaint that “those in other countries 
said, “dans certains pays, un génocide n’est pas très important, meaning, that in some 
countries, a genocide is not very important.” Her words refer directly to French President 
Mitterand’s alleged, callous dismissal of the Rwandan genocide, while Kagame’s refer to the 
French government’s denial of the alleged facts that the French “Operation Turquoise” that 
was sent to stabilize the country actually aided the interahamwe. Their select use of French 
parallels Rwanda’s transition from French to English as the second official language as part of 
the breaking of diplomatic ties with France. And yet Kagame and the narrator’s use of French 
and the corresponding cries of approval in the audience make clear that this is an audience 
that has not left French behind, because they understand what those French phrases mean. 




mark what is wrong with it. While Shadows of Memory moves seamlessly between English 
and Kinyarwanda as seemingly neutral languages of narration, French punctuates the 
performance and speech only to criticize the French-speaking colonial and neo-colonial 
powers.  
Kagame goes on to explain in detail how colonization institutionalized the ethnicities 
that created cycles of division throughout the twentieth century: 
All genocides begin with an ideology, a system of ideas that says “this group 
of people here, they are less than human, and they deserve to be exterminated.” 
The most devastating legacy of European control of Rwaanda and the wider 
context of Africa, was the transformation of social distinctions into so called 
races. We were classified and dissected and whatever differences existed were 
magnified according to a framework invented elsewhere. The purpose was 
neither scientific nor benign, but ideological, to justify colonial claims to rule 
over and civilize supposedly lesser peoples. We are not. This ideology was 
already in place in the nineteenth century, and was then used by the French 
missionaries who settled here. Rwanda’s two thousand years of history were 
reduced to a series of caricatures based on bible passages and on myths, on 
myths told to explorers. The colonial theories, the colonial theory of Rwandan 
society, claimed that hostility between something called Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa 
was permanent and necessary.  
 
Here, Kagame’s deliberately vague wording of “so called races” and “something called Hutu, 
Tutsi, and Twa,” evacuates a stable meaning from racial and ethnic markers, emphasizing that 
they came into being through a naming so socially constructed and historically contingent that 
they are reduced to the bare, vacuous word, “something.” But in this same speech, Kagame 
refers effortlessly to “the genocide against the Tutsi,” which has since 2014 been the official 
label in Rwanda for what was previously called the Rwandan genocide. This renaming has 
been criticized for eliding the suffering of the Twa and especially of Hutus who suffered in 
the genocide as well, and for perpetuating an alleged blanket guilt against the Hutu ethnicity.  
But a literary reading can offer something new to this analysis. In the performance, the 




nation (the Tutsi were victims of the nation). For the whole nation to be a victim, this requires 
a narrative in which the Tutsi’s suffering is subsumed into that of the nation, and the 
perpetrators become victims. This can only be done by figuring genocide not as a composite 
of individual actions but as an ideology that exists outside and above the citizens, controlling 
the perpetrators like puppets, as with the disembodied voice of the narrator in Shadows of 
Memory.  
But the other, and ultimately competing priority is what Kagame calls “historical 
clarity.” The clarity is deemed important not only for the sake of “the truth” and for the 
respect of victims, but also to legitimize the RPF leadership. In the narratives that prioritize 
historical clarity, the Tutsi is not an allegory for the nation but separate from it, a victim of the 
nation. Indeed, the separateness of the Tutsi from the nation is what defines the Tutsi, the 
nation, and the genocide itself. In this version, the nation is made up of a complicated, 
antagonistic network of historical actors in which the Tutsis are, since 1959, the victims, and 
the villains are the fanatical Hutu leadership that instigated the genocide against the Tutsi. 
This narrative requires delineating ethnicity so as to distinguish the historic moral and 
political right and wrong.  
Because these two narratives coincide and overlap, the definition of nation as victim 
and the definition of nation as perpetrator and victim run seamlessly together even though 
they are in contradiction. This has resulted in a State wherein citizens must accept this 
seamlessness without questions that could be characterized as dissenting speech. But it has 
also enabled a dexterity of moving between ethnic and national identity that was in the years 
leading up to the genocide impossible. Before the genocide, the Hutu government framed the 




did the same on their side, framing the Hutu ethnicity and the Rwandan nation as victims of 
the Hutu. There was no option in official discourse for either group to see the other as also 
being victims.  
National unity in Rwanda is now predicated on a sense of mutual vulnerability, an 
official stance that everyone—victim, perpetrator, and bystander—suffered from the 
genocide, even though those who perpetrated the killings are guilty at the same time as having 
suffered. Those who are guilty of perpetrating the suffering of others are punished by the 
judicial system and, to varying degrees, in society, but the consensus for reconciliation must 
be that everyone lost something because of the killings, that the genocide was bad for 
everyone, even the ones who made it happen. This is true not only for the practical reasons 
that perpetrators suffer the consequences—prison, guilt, AIDS, poverty—but also for the 
moral reason that genocide is a crime against humanity, the very concept of humanity, and for 
anyone to continue living within the human family and to have experienced genocide means 
to have suffered from the crime. As Schaap writes, following Hannah Arendt, “what 
distinguishes a crime against humanity from other violence is not the barbarity of the violence 
itself. Rather, it is that it involves ‘an attack upon human diversity of such’, an attempt to 
eliminate the plurality that inevitably emerges whenever human beings come together to act 
and speak about the world they share in common” (1). 
But it is important to note that the vast majority of Rwandans at Kwibuka 20 likely 
belong to neither group of survivors or perpetrators. The demographic composition of 
Rwandan society today suggests that there are far fewer genocide perpetrators and survivors 
than there are bystanders and outsiders to the genocide—meaning those who were there but 




elsewhere or were not yet born. While the perpetrators and survivors receive the most 
attention in political rhetoric and aesthetic productions, in population terms the bystanders are 
the real future. But the bystanders are “taught” to view the history of survivors and 
perpetrators as the history of the country, and their future as the country’s future. The dialectic 
between survivor and perpetrator is that which defines the country. This continues to efface 
those Hutu bystanders who did not participate in the genocide, even though they constitute the 
majority of the Rwandan population. Because the discourse and practice surrounding 
reconciliation focuses on contrition, reparation, and forgiveness—all actions that are carried 
out by perpetrators and survivors—the bystanders are left with an unspecified role. They are 
expected simply to incorporate into the society that is created by the force of reconciling 
perpetrators and survivors.  
However, the bystanders are also considered victims in those circumstances when the 
nation, not the Tutsi, is represented as the victim of genocide. Some aesthetic productions and 
political speeches alternately collapse and construct the distinction between these differing 
definitions of victimhood. At one point in Shadows of Memory there is a division of 
ethnicities; at another, everyone dies, and the entire nation thus becomes the victim. At other 
moments the nation becomes an allegory for the Tutsi or the Tutsi an allegory for the nation; 
in still others, the identities are disaggregated, with the Tutsi marked as the distinct victims, 
and the nation as both the perpetrator and the victim of historical atrocity. As a result, 
historical clarity in the performance comes into conflict with the State’s present commitment 
to reconciliation. But this conflict is overridden seamlessly, without comment, in Shadows of 
Memory and Kagame’s speech. The genocide is both the genocide against the Tutsi and the 




productions to state historical fact—that many Hutu murdered many Tutsi, Twa, and resistant 
Hutu—and in the next breath to narrate the aspirational idea that the nation was a victim of its 
former self, and now the nation—which includes Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa so seamlessly that 
their ethnic identities no longer “exist”—is collectively committed to peace and unity.  
However, in this type of national narrative it is difficult for anyone other than a 
surviving Tutsi or a penitent Hutu to publicly discuss their personal experience, because all 
other identities have been subsumed into the dialectic of reconciling perpetrator and survivor. 
Only the Tutsi survivor truly embodies both identities—the self as victim and the nation as 
victim—in a way that allows them to share their personal experience as a seamless part of the 
collective experience. Of course, the limits on free speech in Rwanda extend to Tutsi 
survivors as well: they are not welcome to discuss emotions of revenge, wrath, resentment, or 
dissatisfaction. It is only the stories of forgiveness, resilience, courage, reconciliation, or 
mourning that are given airtime at national ceremonies and state-funded cultural productions. 
What then happens to the array of negative emotions that in the revenge genre 
motivate the hero? Cultural forms answer the question of the condition of reconciliation in 
Rwanda very differently when they do not rely on the intervention of the supernatural or 
divine. For without the necromancy of the soldiers in Shadows of Memory and the magic 
powder in The Lianja Epic, without the rhetoric of the deity Persuasion or the transformative 
magic of the goddess Athene in The Eumenides, the move from revenge to reconciliation is 






Chapter Three: Reconciliation as Trial 
 
In My Neighbor, My Killer, Anne Aghion’s filmic documentary of life in and around 
Rwanda’s village court system of Gacaca, a State representative visits a prison yard crowded 
with genocide suspects squinting into the sun. He tells them, “The State is concerned with 
what happened in this country. Your lawyer will be your neighbor. Your prosecutor will be 
your neighbor, your judge will be your neighbor. We must build a new Rwanda.” His words 
were not figural. Under the Gacaca system there were no professional lawyers, prosecutors, or 
judges; only neighbors. The courts were built on the premise that the community must try 
defendants who committed crimes in their area, thereby granting neighborhoods responsibility 
for their own reconciliation.  
Whereas Shadows of Memory figures reconciliation as a mass phenomenon 
experienced by all parties in the nation, the two films I discuss in this chapter—the 
documentary My Neighbor, My Killer and the fictional film Munyurangabo—depict 
reconciliation as a trial among small, intimate groups. Importantly, this provides a corrective 
to the government’s focus on mass collectives. As the sociologist Phil Clark discovered over 
seven years of observing Gacaca, the Rwandan government interprets reconciliation as a 
group-to-group phenomenon, but virtually all groups within the population perceive 
reconciliation as an individual-to-individual encounter (313). Clark’s ethnographic findings, 
once applied to My Neighbor, My Killer and Munyurangabo, do more than affirm the 
longstanding status of art as a vehicle to voice an individual’s story that may otherwise be 
overwhelmed by the cacophony of the collective. His observations also reveal that “viewing 
reconciliation as an individual to individual dynamic ensures that the process towards 




discourse—appears abstract and detached from the personal lives of everyday Rwandans” 
(319; emphasis mine). In other words, an important component of the lived experience of 
reconciliation is its arduousness. And the arduous character of reconciliation is compounded 
by its lengthy temporality. Clark notes that the general population perceives reconciliation as 
“an ongoing process” in which Gacaca serves as only “the first steps in a long series towards 
reconciliation” (319).  
The arduous, ongoing quality of reconciliation represented in My Neighbor, My Killer 
and Munyurangabo may look like a failure of reconciliation, especially when held in contrast 
to Shadows of Memory. But as the two films elucidate, the trials and tribulations of 
reconciliation are vital components of the national reconciliation process as experienced by 
individuals. As such, they help to foreground the widespread significance in Rwanda of 
reconciliation as a genre of trial. Importantly, this genre honors individual heroism even as it 
demands heroism of each and every citizen. That is why the Rwandan government mandated 
that all adults attend the Gacaca court sessions: to incorporate each individual in a process that 
would require everyone’s participation. It is also why in The Eumenides Athene calls upon all 
citizens to respect the Kindly Ones and the democratic courts that they now promote. Even 
though these post-conflict governments publicly stage reconciliation as a magically swift and 
satisfying transformation, they simultaneously institutionalize legal structures that facilitate 
reconciliation over the long durée. These structures depend upon the stability of the 
government and the court system, but also upon the courage and integrity of the individual 
citizens that participate. 
 




Both My Neighbor, My Killer and Munyurangabo showcase how the structures of 
reconciliation permeating life inside and outside the Gacaca courts rendered the heroism of 
Rwandan citizens paradoxically quotidian. In My Neighbor, My Killer, this is shown to be a 
product of Gacaca’s literally quotidian structure. From 2001 to 2009, 12,000 Gacaca courts 
countrywide tried over two million genocide crimes, with a budget of just sixty million 
USD.21 Businesses closed for one afternoon each week so that everyone could attend the court 
sessions; a trial was not considered “legitimate” unless at least one-hundred people were in 
attendance (Bornkamm 175). “Gacaca” means “grass” in Kinyarwanda, and the courts took 
place on grassy hillsides all over Rwanda, with only a few chairs and a table where the locally 
elected judges sat and recorded their handwritten notes. Audience members, witnesses, and 
the accused simply sat on the grass. The court thus employed only the most local and ordinary 
of material and human resources to enact an extra-ordinary judicial system whose form was 
unprecedented, both in Rwanda and worldwide.  
In the wake of the genocide, the Rwandan government first attempted to deliver 
justice through mass incarceration of accused perpetrators, public execution of twenty of the 
genocide’s chief architects, and trials held in the national courts. But it soon became clear that 
this system was unsustainable; most of the country’s lawyers and judges had been killed in the 
genocide, and the national courts would take over one-hundred years to try all of the genocide 
cases. Meanwhile, prisons intended to house only forty-five-thousand were crowded with over 
120,000 accused men and women, many of whom were the primary breadwinners for families 
                                                 
21 This stands in stark contrast with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda that was instituted 
by the United Nations Security Council and indicted only ninety-three individuals over the course of 
fifteen years at the cost of more than two billion USD. On November 8th, 1994, the UN Security 
Council authorized the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute 
the top genocide criminals; all other genocide criminals were under the jurisdiction of Gacaca. See 




now left in abject poverty (Clark 51). After protracted discussions with Rwandan and 
international politicians and legal experts, including representatives from South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, the Rwandan State decided to adapt the country’s 
precolonial conflict resolution mechanism of Gacaca into a hybrid system of restorative and 
retributive justice.  
Unlike truth commissions such as South Africa’s that granted amnesty and sought 
reconciliation primarily through a truth-telling forum, Gacaca rejected amnesty, favoring 
instead a version of retributive justice that allotted punishments in accordance with the 
severity of the crime.22 The restorative component of Gacaca was intended to arise from a 
sentencing rubric that granted substantial reduction in prison time for perpetrators who 
confessed and expressed contrition, and from a dialogic, truth-telling forum. But the hybrid 
nature of Gacaca that attempted to achieve both restorative and retributive justice has been 
met with criticism from all sides. It is faulted for the unethical treatment of suspects and for 
                                                 
22 Gacaca delineates three categories of crimes. The first category covered planners of genocide, 
leaders at a national level or that of political parties, army, gendarmerie, religious denominations, or 
militia groups who participated or encouraged others to participate in crimes of genocide or crimes 
against humanity, as well as any person who committed rape or sexual torture. In the early years of 
Gacaca, category one crimes were tried at the international tribunal or in national courts, but in 2004 
all trials except for those of the top planners of genocide were transferred to the Gacaca courts. First 
category criminals who refused to plead guilty, repent, and ask forgiveness or whose pleas were 
rejected were liable to life imprisonment. Those whose pleas were accepted were liable to terms 
ranging from twenty-five to thirty years. Second category crimes covered notorious murderers 
distinguished by the zeal and cruelty of their crimes, torturers, dehumanizers of dead bodies, killers, 
and those who attacked with an intent to kill even if the attack did not lead to death. Those who 
refused to confess, plead guilty, repent, and apologize were sentenced thirty years to life 
imprisonment, while those whose pleas were accepted incurred sentences from twelve to twenty-nine 
years, depending on the severity of the crime, but served only one third of the sentence in custody 
while one half was spent in community service, and the remaining one sixth was suspended. The third 
category of crimes covered those who committed an offense against property, and could be settled 
outside of court if the offender and victim come to a settlement by themselves. Otherwise the offender 
was sentenced to the civil reparation for what they damaged. All trials were held in public except for 
rape trials which were held in-camera to respect the sensitivity of the crime and, more controversially, 
because rape was viewed as such a heinous offense that it was considered a hindrance to the 
reconciliation process to discuss openly. See Bornkamm’s Appendices for an overview of Gacaca 




failing to issue justly punitive sentences; for failing to offer sufficient reparations to survivors 
and for prioritizing survivors too much.23 Its failures in every category, however, are also 
indicative of its ambitious construction, as Gacaca attempted to appease all wounds and to 
ensure a sustainable future for all parties.  
Through his extensive observations of Gacaca trials, Clark identified three 
“pragmatic” and six “profound” objectives of the courts. The pragmatic objectives are 
“processing the backlog of genocide cases, improving the living conditions in the prisons, and 
fostering economic development” (185). Gacaca did manage to process the backlog of 
genocide cases and, more remarkably, processed the hundreds of thousands of new cases that 
arose when defendants or witnesses named other suspects at the backlogged trials. Reducing 
prison population and integrating prisoners into community service work camps inherently 
improved prison conditions. As for fostering economic development, some argue that Gacaca 
did succeed in this regard through the community service programs, while others such as 
Clark posit that Gacaca had little effect or potential to promote economic growth. 
Unsurprisingly, the six “profound” objectives of Gacaca are more difficult to qualify. Clark 
identifies them as “truth, peace, justice (not only retributive or deterrent, but also restorative), 
healing, forgiveness and reconciliation” (83). Peace, healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation 
readily reinforce each other, while truth and healing or justice and reconciliation prove more 
difficult to accomplish at once, given that truth can be traumatizing, and a sentence that seeks 
reconciliation may not serve justice.  
Whether or not Gacaca achieved its “profound” objectives remains unclear in My 
Neighbor, My Killer. Survivors and perpetrators live side by side; some survivors offer 
                                                 




forgiveness and some perpetrators contrition, but by the end of the film, pain continues to 
ripple through both sides. My Neighbor, My Killer focuses on two surviving women, Félicité 
Nyirasangwa and Euphrasie Mukarwemera, and one perpetrator, Rwamfizi, throughout the 
entire seven-year course of the documentary, charting their evolving perspectives of Gacaca 
and each other. We see their homes, their paltry crops, their faces as they weather and age. 
Through the patient camera lens we witness their silences that mark deep thought of things so 
painful they require much time to articulate. Such filmic concentration grants access to the 
enduring temporality of reconciliation that doesn’t finish for individuals at the end of Gacaca, 
even though it did officially for the nation.  
The documentary recognizes the slow pace of reconciliation in the form of its own 
construction as a project that was filmed over the course of seven years. The film begins in 
2001, when post-genocide Gacaca was announced but not yet put in place nationwide, and 
follows a select group of survivors and perpetrators involved with a single court in the 
Gitarama province for seven years. This long-term time frame and sustained, close focus on a 
small group of subjects allows the documentary to provide what the Gacaca courts attempted 
to offer but ultimately could not: a dialogic space capacious enough for all parties to make 
their voices heard. The focused documentary form is uniquely poised to illuminate these 
subtleties as it follows the subjects not only over the years but also through the passing 
minutes of a single day.  
In one sequence that evidences the importance of this long-term focus, the accused 
perpetrator Rwamfizi hums a tune as he leads the way to the place where his group killed 
Tutsis. His humming seems incongruously cheerful in that moment, painting him as callous 




him singing the same tune that before he had only hummed. The lyrics: “Forgive us, Lord…” 
Much as it takes a long time for Rwandans’ relationship to reconciliation to develop and 
evolve, so to does it take time to see and hear their perspectives.  
Survivors’ and perpetrators’ evolving views on reconciliation emerge in two temporal 
patterns: one over the time span of a single interview, the other over the course of years. In 
both sets of time their attitudes oscillate, for perpetrators between contrition and denial, and 
for survivors between resentment and forgiveness. But over the course of years the oscillation 
shifts towards greater contrition and greater forgiveness. Capturing both types of time lends 
insight to the arduous internal process of reconciliation that a film shot over a shorter length 
of time could not, while its long-term investment in individuals affords a different perspective 
than the Gacaca courts could.  
 My Neighbor, My Killer reveals the ways that the haste of Gacaca trials—compounded 
by the pressure to try millions of cases countrywide—runs counter to the allegedly healing 
process of testimony. At one of the early trials, for example, before rape cases were held in 
camera, the court leader asks a witness whether she was raped. “What?” she asks him. She is 
an elderly woman, and it is hard to tell whether she cannot hear his question or if she is 
simply shocked. “Did he rape you?” He asks again. “No,” she answers, shaking her head. 
“But the others, they took sticks this big to rape the Tutsi women.” She holds her hands far 
apart. The leader shakes his head and moves on to another line of questioning. In cases such 
as these, the haste of Gacaca to try the massive backlog of cases overrides its commitment to 
testimony and dialogue intended to be healing.  
 Indeed, the space that emerges in My Neighbor, My Killer for small groups to discuss 




documentarians at the urging of survivors so that they can “talk with our killers.” In the first 
of such scenes, survivors and perpetrators arrive in a small, dark hut, where they sit next to 
each other, talk awkwardly of the weather, and sip at their separate drinks. Then the 
perpetrator Rwamfizi offers his bottle of beer to the survivor Euphrasie next to him. “I don’t 
mix,” she says, gesturing toward the homemade brew she’s been drinking. They both laugh, 
and the shared sound links them momentarily in a flash of reconciliatory affect. “Mustn’t mix 
everything,” she concludes, and the prospect of sharing—whether of drink or of laughter—
disappears. They continue drinking their separate drinks in silence. Several years later, 
however, in a similar setting, Euphrasie suggests that Rwamfizi is nonetheless “a brother” 
who should not be outcast.  
 Significantly, however, the evolving contrition and forgiveness—Rwamfizi’s hymn to 
“forgive us, Lord;” Euphrasie’s renaming of Rwamfizi as a brother—are accompanied by 
competing emotions of sorrow and resentment, especially for survivors. These testimonies are 
almost unbearably brutal to listen to, as they refer not to the present or future, but back to the 
event that they are reconciling from: the intimate killings of family and neighbors. The 
documentary requires no flashbacks, no dark music or startling cuts between scenes to 
produce a searing effect in these moments. “The war began here, like a game hard to follow,” 
Rwamfizi says, pointing to a cluster of homes. “They’d toss their cut off arms and legs to the 
dogs and pigs,” Félicité describes in front of her small plot of land. “We’ll end up dying in 
sorrow and solitude.” “Yes,” Euphrasie agrees, “we will wander alone and fade away.” It is 
obvious in scenes such as these that the method of reparation imagined in Shadows of 
Memory—that of restitution, restoring the victim to his or her original condition before the 




proceedings documented in My Neighbor, My Killer and in Clark’s ethnographic reports that 
many of the courts’ forms of “satisfaction” were felt to be insufficient.  
 Despite the fact that Gacaca provided several modes of satisfaction as outlined by the 
Basic Principles, including “verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the 
truth; an official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and the 
rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim; judicial and 
administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations; public apology, including 
acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility; and commemorations and 
tributes to the victims” (Article 22), many survivors found economic compensation to be the 
most meaningful form of reparation (Clark 85). As the Basic Principles outlines it, 
compensation, “should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate 
and proportional to the gravity of the violation” (Article 20).  
 In Rwanda, where the lowest levels of crimes—those against property and livestock—
were the only ones for which economic compensation was delivered, 24 compensation often 
turned conversation away from the most serious violations (murder, torture, and rape) to the 
lesser crimes against property and livestock. In one such scene of My Neighbor, My Killer, a 
woman stands to accuse the suspect of killing her husband and stealing her cows.  “Is it true?” 
the court leader asks. “A cow can’t vanish into thin air.” The accused replies, “She’s lying, I 
just picked up a stray.” Neighbors stand to add their own testimony, tracking the movements 
of that cow across the hillsides as their family members were hacked to death. The locally 
elected court leader and judges are so focused on recording the precise crimes to determine a 
                                                 
24 The government set up compensation funds for survivors to apply for outside of court. See 
Bornkamm’s summary of the assistance fund (FARG/FSARG) and compensation fund (FIND), which 





sentence that their voices do not change tenor as they switch between discussing a stolen cow 
and a murdered husband.   
 The significance of economic compensation at Gacaca was not simply due to the fact 
that the cases were often easier and more amicable to adjudicate. Forty percent of the trials for 
crimes against property and livestock were settled out of court with perpetrators providing 
restitution (a return of the original goods) or compensation (payment or labor to compensate 
for the original goods) (Clark 86). That so many amicable settlements were reached outside of 
the courts demonstrates that both sides understood the material and symbolic importance of 
property restitution or compensation. This is reflective of the extreme poverty facing 
perpetrators and survivors in rural Rwanda, where the return of a cow is not simply a token of 
apology or a symbol of restored identity—Tutsis still being associated with cattle—but also 
and moreover as a condition of survival for survivors. Severe poverty renders economic 
compensation absolutely vital. And because perpetrators were able to provide compensation 
through labor or return of goods in ways that they could not restore victims to their original 
condition, poverty by necessity catalyzed direct reparations between neighbors and “their 
killers.” Thus, while poverty created enormous challenges for Gacaca’s operations writ large, 
poverty also fostered the conditions through which survivors and perpetrators reconciled 
individual-to-individual, both through economic compensation and through the forced 
neighborliness of neither party being able to afford to move away. This aspect of Gacaca 
reiterates the extent to which reconciliation, even when routed through the sentencing rubrics 
provided by the State, occurs between individuals and small groups, on a local scale even as 





 My Neighbor, My Killer skillfully toggles between the local and national experience of 
Gacaca through its synecdochal figuration of one court for all the courts in Rwanda. Excerpts 
of radio casts and the announcements of State representatives inform that such courts are 
taking place all over the country. The individual concerns of Aghion’s chosen subjects are 
thus synecdochally related to many Rwandans; presumably, survivors and perpetrators 
nationwide have similar perspectives and expectations. As such, the film’s evocation of 
profound individual need foregrounds the extent to which it would be impossible to process 
them on a national scale if each were given ample time to speak and to heal. In other words, 
My Neighbor, My Killer reveals what it can do that the law cannot—grant time and focus to 
individual testimonies—and what the law can do that the documentary cannot—pass 
judgment on millions of cases.  
 However, at the same time as the documentary enabled testimony, the Gacaca process 
normalized the type of dialogic space that My Neighbor, My Killer relies upon. Clark’s 
ethnographic research indicates that Gacaca was valuable not simply for providing a dialogic 
space, but for modeling dialogue as a reconciliatory mechanism to be taken up in other 
settings, and over time. Both the courts and the documentary reaffirm the value of open 
dialogue that Andrew Schaap determines is the foundation of political reconciliation. But they 
also emphasize how much time is required for such dialogue to develop and evolve. As such, 
they illuminate a central faultline in Schaap’s argument: how can a post-conflict society take 
the time required to foster agonistic discourse and civic friendship when the clock is also 
ticking on overburdened prisons and hundreds of thousands of untried crimes?  
One answer is that a society cannot try over two million crimes both swiftly and 




Rwanda is a far cry from the transfiguring resurrection performed in Shadows of Memory. It 
leaves individual citizens to accomplish the difficult work of reconciliation when the courts 
cannot carry the burden alone. Hence, while the State gives Rwamfizi and Euphrasie no 
choice but to reconcile, the State also has no choice but to set its faith in individuals to face 
the trial of reconciliation. My Neighbor, My Killer documents this interplay between the 
Gacaca courts as State institutions and as local forums utterly reliant on the cooperation of 
neighbors with antagonistic pasts. But the nature of reconciliation that takes place entirely 
outside the auspices of State institutions is another matter entirely. That is the subject of the 
fictional film Munyurangabo whose protagonist exemplifies the individual and highly 
precarious condition of heroism in post-genocide Rwanda.  
 
Munyurangabo and Rwanda’s Redefining of Heroism 
While My Neighbor, My Killer relies on synecdoche—documenting one Gacaca court as a 
synecdoche for all the courts in Rwanda—Munyurangabo utilizes allegory. The film 
allegorizes Rwanda’s transition from revenge to reconciliation through the story of a young 
genocide orphan who journeys to kill the man who killed his father, and yet ends up helping 
the killer, now an AIDS victim, instead. Unlike Shadows of Memory and My Neighbor, My 
Killer, Munyurangabo stages the transition from revenge to reconciliation without any State 
actors. There are no RPF soldiers to resurrect the dead or local officials to convene the Gacaca 
courts; there is not even a radio broadcasting Rwandan news. Without the material presence 
of the State, the young protagonist’s journey foregrounds the individual responsibility, 
courage, and heroism required of Rwandan citizens for reconciliation. And yet, the film 




the medium of cultural production; in particular, the longstanding cultural form of oral poetry 
that reaches even the most rural settings of Rwanda.   
The prologue scene of Munyurangabo harkens back to the intimate violence of the 
genocide. A fight breaks out in an outdoor market between two men, one falls to the ground, 
and the other stoops over to beat him in a posture reminiscent of images of genocide 
slaughter. Swiftly the camera pans away to the film’s namesake, the young man Ngabo, who 
spies a machete left unattended during the fight and slides it into his backpack. Ngabo then 
sits with the machete across his lap where it drips with blood. In the Rwandan context, where 
many perpetrators wielded the machete as the weapon of choice during the genocide, the 
machete is symbolically linked to murder. It thus appears that Ngabo has killed someone. But 
within seconds the blood disappears, revealing that Ngabo has only imagined it.  
The film proper begins with Ngabo’s friend Sangwa asking if he is ready for their 
journey; we find out later that they are on their way to find and kill the man who killed 
Ngabo’s father, that they indeed plan to cover Ngabo’s machete in blood. The boys are best 
friends whose violent mission is at odds with their affectionate, innocent affect. There is no 
mention of ethnicity between them, despite the fact that Ngabo is Tutsi and Sangwa is Hutu. 
But when the two boys pause their revenge quest to greet Sangwa’s family in the rural village 
he left three years before, Sangwa’s father is suspicious of Ngabo and later turns violent 
against his son for befriending a Tutsi. Angered by Sangwa’s father, and resentful of Sangwa 
for staying with him, Ngabo departs independently to find his father’s killer. On his solo 
journey across rural Rwanda, Ngabo encounters a poet who performs a poem intended for the 
annual National Liberation Day ceremony. The poet, a Hutu, chants persuasively about his 




His language offers the film’s only references to Gacaca and Rwandan politics. Seemingly 
undeterred by the poem, Ngabo continues on to the killer’s house where he finds him dying of 
AIDS. The man begs Ngabo for water. Instead of killing him, Ngabo returns the next day to 
gather water from the river. In the final scene as Ngabo stoops over in the river to fill up the 
killer’s water cans, his pose replicates yet transforms the meaning of the crouched pose of 
violence that began the film.  
Unlike Shadows of Memory, which stages transformation as instantaneous, 
miraculous, and spectacular transfiguration, Munyurangabo showcases the long, arduous 
journey that moves from the beginning images of crouched violence and a bloody machete to 
the ending image of Ngabo carefully gathering water at the river for his father’s killer. This is 
a journey filled with fits and starts, with set backs and false leads. As with My Neighbor, My 
Killer, Munyurangabo does not pinpoint a particular moment that marks the transition from 
revenge to reconciliation. Nor does it conclude with a guarantee of permanent success; there 
is no epilogue to reveal the future for Ngabo or Sangwa or the killer. Reconciliation, as 
Munyurangabo presents it, is an extraordinarily difficult, indeed heroic task, that is not 
granted the trappings or accolades traditionally awarded heroism. Like My Neighbor, My 
Killer, Munyurangabo shows that Rwanda’s reconciliation process demanded heroic behavior 
as a quotidian practice. But while the massive scale and unprecedented system of the twelve 
thousand Gacaca courts institutionalized reconciliation at a national, collective level, 
Munyurangabo reveals the even starker heroism required of individuals facing reconciliatory 
relations without the direct support of the State.  
The material challenges facing Ngabo were similarly present in the extra-diegetic 




to Rwanda in 2006 to teach a six-week video production class to Rwandan students. Realizing 
that the best way to teach was to make a film together, he and his class formed a production 
team. One of his students worked at an outreach center for street children, and Chung began 
accompanying him to work. It was through the outreach center that Chung met two young 
men whose own stories mirrored the film’s plotline. Chung cast Jeff Rutagengwa as Ngabo, 
the orphan, and Eric Ndorunkundiye as Sangwa, his friend, and filmed for just two weeks, due 
to budgetary constraints. 
The film’s small cast and budget—they produced with just $40,000—embodies the 
storyline’s interest in making do with restricted materials. They filmed mostly on a tripod 
with no sweeping overhead shots to capture scenes of people or landscapes from afar. Chung 
shot on film with an old mechanical camera for the aesthetic purpose of capturing Rwanda’s 
naturally bright exteriors without the use of artificial light and to avoid depending on 
electricity in rural areas with frequent power outages. Much as the poverty of the characters 
influences their actions, so too did the material constraints of the production process impact 
the outcome of the film. The close up shots with natural light grant prolonged and visceral 
access to the characters’ emotional and physical toils. Concomitantly, the close up shots 
aesthetically reproduce the limited spatial, economic, and social structures of the characters. 
Not being able to see beyond the immediate surroundings of a hut or a plot of farmland 
produces a sense of the limits constraining the characters to their particular spaces, 
livelihoods, and social relations. As in My Neighbor, My Killer, community members, 
regardless of ethnicity, are stuck living as neighbors even if they are each other’s former 




The intimate, local spaces of the two films are amplified by their use of Kinyarwanda 
as the sole language of production; a language that is native only to Rwanda. Chung explained 
their decision to film entirely in Kinyarwanda as “one of our desires to empower the people 
there by allowing them to have a voice, and to express it. And we didn’t think it would be 
possible to do that if they weren’t speaking in their own language” (BBC News). This enabled 
Chung to hire actors who were not fluent in English, and to produce a storyline in which the 
gestures, pauses, and dialogue are performed as though to a Rwandan audience. Like My 
Neighbor, My Killer, the film provides no Western proxy to translate the Rwandan experience 
to the Western viewer. Leaving out a Western character was “partially a test,” according to 
Chung, “to see if we could bridge gaps between cultures” (Lim). Whether or not the film 
succeeds at bridging gaps between Rwandan culture and the culture of any given viewer, it 
sets faith in the ability of Rwandan actors to articulate what they perceive to be the experience 
of post-genocide Rwanda in their own words, in their own language. 
  The only English that appears in the film is a scriptural epigraph that stamps across an 
otherwise black screen as Sangwa and Ngabo first set out on their journey. It reads:   
These double calamities have come upon you, 
Who can comfort you? 
Ruin and destruction, famine and sword; 
Who can console you?  
Your sons have fainted; 
They lie at the head of every street, 
Like antelope caught in a net. 
They are filled with the wrath of the LORD 
And the rebuke of your God (Isaiah 51). 
 
The verse’s images of destruction evoke the public, roadside slaughter of genocide with 
bodies lying “at the head of every street,” dehumanized by death into helpless animals “[l]ike 




“rebuke.” As an epigraph to a film set in Rwanda, the verse foreshadows revenge for 
genocide, something that is later confirmed when Ngabo and Sangwa discuss killing Ngabo’s 
father’s murderer. But their quest is interrupted at two junctures. 
When the two boys stop on their journey to visit Sangwa’s parents, they meet 
Sangwa’s friend Gwiza. Gwiza uses jokes to cheer Ngabo up; after asking Ngabo about his 
parents and inferring that they both died during the genocide, Gwiza tells Ngabo a joke about 
a chicken he saw who was looking for a bride, dressed up, and accompanied by a best man in 
tight trousers. The joke brings Ngabo to laughter, but more importantly, it enfolds Ngabo into 
the joke-telling process through its reciprocal construction. As Gwiza continuously asks the 
joke in a rhetorical-question form to ask if Ngabo knows what he saw, Ngabo is prompted to 
join in with his own questions, asking where the chicken was from. Their collaborative joke-
telling process continues in the background as the camera shifts away; tonally, grief has been 
averted through the interruption of a joke.  
But the joke is not a method to continuously avoid confrontation with Ngabo’s 
suffering. Later, Gwiza listens attentively to the most painful monologue of the film as Ngabo 
narrates how his mother burned their photos of his father after he was killed, and how Ngabo 
now can hardly remember his face. The camera captures the unspeakable tenor of such grief 
by panning up above Ngabo’s head so that we slowly lose sight of Ngabo’s mouth, nose, eyes, 
and finally forehead to gaze instead upon the banana tree leaves that waver in the wind above 
him against a cloudy, grey sky. Like Ngabo himself, the viewer is left encountering a 
narrative of traumatic memory without sight of the human face. The loss of view of Ngabo’s 
face is painful to watch, as it conveys the sense that he is drifting beyond our reach, but the 




cow—an unfathomably generous gift for such a poor boy—on the condition that Ngabo will 
stay in the community. The promised gift indicates that Gwiza intuits where Ngabo is off to 
next and is trying to protect him from that fate. He attempts to save Ngabo from the revenge 
quest with the joke, the act of listening, and finally the gift, but ultimately these are no match 
for the anti-Tutsi vice and fear dispelled by Sangwa’s father that confirms Ngabo’s one-track 
mind and propels him on his revenge plot.  
Ngabo overhears Sangwa’s father whispering to Sangwa that Tutsis brought trouble to 
Hutus and unjustly accused him of killing during the genocide. Ngabo in turn tells Sangwa 
that he can see from the way Sangwa’s father looks at him that he was involved in the 
killings. Infuriated, Sangwa repudiates the charge and tells Ngabo to leave. When Sangwa’s 
father finds Ngabo’s machete and realizes what Ngabo is planning to do, he beats his son for 
collaborating. Sangwa leaves the house screaming, streaming blood, and begs Ngabo to let 
him come with him on his journey. It is too late. A history of politicized ethnic division has 
for Ngabo caused an irreparable rift between them. He refuses Sangwa’s company despite his 
cries of agony. We never find out if Sangwa’s father committed acts of genocide or not, an 
uncertainty that aptly conveys the sense of collective guilt blanketed upon Hutus whether 
innocent or guilty, as well as the impossibly complex terrain of competing memories in 
determining who did what in those three months in 1994 of annihilating chaos. We leave 
Sangwa’s community with more questions than when we arrived, but the film does not linger 
there or backtrack to check in on Sangwa and his family; the story is now solely devoted to 
Ngabo’s own journey.  
The character that Ngabo next encounters is a perfect example of a character through 




home, Ngabo stops along his journey to buy food at a roadside café. A man in tattered clothes 
seated across from him spies the machete in Ngabo’s bag and asks if he would like to hear a 
poem that he will perform at tomorrow’s National Liberation Day. Without waiting for a 
reply, he takes a swig of his beer and launches into the poem that the actor, Uwayo B. 
Edouard, wrote himself. Barefoot and dressed in tattered clothing, Edouard’s character is 
clearly a member of the rural poor, but his poem portrays a cosmopolitan worldview that 
looks beyond his rural setting. He tells of his own conversion narrative as someone who was 
raised to hate the RPF and now sees them as saviors “like the Pope” who “liberated” Rwanda 
from genocide practice and ideology. Edouard’s poem, “Liberation is a Journey,” almost 
uncannily echoes the aspirational narrative of Rwandan history as narrated by the Preamble to 
the Amended Constitution of 2003.  
President Kagame and his administration amended the Rwandan constitution shortly 
after he took office in 2001. The Preamble synthesizes the administration’s priorities as 
articulated in the Constitution: ending genocide ideology, promoting democracy, 
strengthening unity, building a common law and culture, ensuring gender equality, adhering 
to the principles of human rights enshrined in international declarations, fighting ignorance, 
and transitioning to governance comprised by the ideas of Rwandans themselves. It reads: 
PREAMBLE We, the People of Rwanda,  
 1° In the wake of the genocide that was organised and supervised by 
unworthy leaders and other perpetrators and that decimated more than a 
million sons and daughters of Rwanda;  
 2° Resolved to fight the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations 
and to eradicate ethnic, regional and any other form of divisions;  
 3° Determined to fight dictatorship by putting in place democratic 
institutions and leaders freely elected by ourselves;  
 4° Emphasizing the necessity to strengthen and promote national unity 
and reconciliation which were seriously shaken by the genocide and its 
consequences;  




basis for national economic development and social progress;  
 6° Resolved to build a State governed by the rule of law, based on 
respect for fundamental human rights, pluralistic democracy, equitable power 
sharing, tolerance and resolution of issues through dialogue;  
 7° Considering that we enjoy the privilege of having one country, a 
common language, a common culture and a long shared history which ought to 
lead to a common vision of our destiny;  
 8° Considering that it is necessary to draw from our centuries-old 
history the positive values which characterized our ancestors that must be the 
basis for the existence and flourishing of our Nation;  
 9° Reaffirming our adherence to the principles of human rights 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter of 26 June 1945, the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination of 21 December 1965, the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights of 19 December 1966, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 19 December 1966, the Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1 May 
1980, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981 and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 ;  
 10° Committed to ensuring equal rights between Rwandans and 
between women and men without prejudice to the principles of gender equality 
and complementarity in national development;  
 11° Determined to develop human resources, to fight ignorance, to 
promote technological advancement and the social welfare of the people of 
Rwanda;  
 12° Considering that after the Transition period, Rwanda shall be 
governed by a Constitution comprising ideas expressed by Rwandans 
themselves; Now hereby adopt, by referendum, this Constitution as the 
supreme law of the Republic of Rwanda. 
 
Although the Preamble begins by identifying the past violence of genocide, it does not declare 
war or other policies of revenge. Instead, it immediately resolves to “fight the ideology of 
genocide…and to eradicate ethnic, regional and any other form of divisions.” Referencing 
“the privilege of having one country, a common language, a common culture and a long 
shared history which ought to lead to a common vision of our destiny” (emphasis mine), the 
Preamble posits national commonalities, rather than ethnic divisions, as securing a shared 




subjunctive auxiliary of “ought” iterates the government’s attitude that a shared history does 
not automatically lead to a common vision—after all, Rwanda’s shared history of the 20th 
century was incredibly divisive and painful—but that it should. In other words, the 
Constitution seeks to shape Rwandans’ desires and their vision of how to fulfill those desires. 
The Preamble states in legal terms what in literary terms we might call the initiation, but not 
the fulfillment, of the reconciliation plot.  
 Similarly, Edouard’s poem, titled “Liberation is a Journey” follows the progression of 
the Preamble, from descriptions of precolonial unity, to the birth of genocide ideology that 
sparked the genocide, to the role of international forces in the genocide, to the heroism of the 
RPF forces in ending the genocide and initiating further liberation through the inauguration of 
an RPF government. Yet while the poem mimics the Preamble thematically, it aesthetically 
offers something that the Constitution cannot: a tone of spirited urgency created by evocative 
images and an alliterative, rhyming rhythm evident in the Kinyarwanda original. The 
Kinyarwanda language is especially suited to oral poetry because its grammatical structure 
conjugates by sound: nouns are grouped by theme into different “classes” with distinct sounds 
while other parts of speech conjugate according to the noun class. This proliferates alliteration 
and rhyme, rendering even thematically simple stanzas mesmerizing in performance.  
Edouard makes the most of Kinyarwanda’s musicality; he chants quickly, emphasize 
on rhyme, voice raising and lowering, speeding and slowing. His passionate rhythm, volume, 
and body language contrast the quiet voices of the rest of the film. His tone matches an 
eruption in content, as he explicitly discusses the history and politics that have thus far been 
absent in the film or only whispered in the dark. As he stoops over in breathless incantation or 




breaks through what the film has thus far framed as possible for Rwanda’s development. As 
such, “Liberation is a Journey” not only promotes but amplifies the Constitution’s message, 
reifying the potency of artistic performance to further the modeling influence of political 
rhetoric, as such poems often do at Rwanda’s National Liberation Day ceremonies, much as 
the performances at the Kwibuka 20 commemoration ceremony, including Shadows of 
Memory, achieved. Edouard begins, in a loud, passionate voice: 
Let’s remember how liberation came 
Unleashing heavy burdens in my youth 
When I was young and just a child I played in mud and heard of hate 
Rwanda readied children for war 
Children chosen and armed against enemies 
I heard that Tutsis were roaches and should be stomped 
With tails like snakes, they should be killed 
We were given bows and spears 
And foreign countries gave us guns 
Really 
Darkness came to Rwanda, machetes in place of peace 
I saw people killed 
Muslims and Christians worked together 
Joined by machetes and their will to kill 
And our Rwanda burned 
Rivers flowed with bodies and corpses covered fields 
Rwanda’s youth led the battle, 
Don’t you know that this is injustice? 
 
Like the Preamble to the amended constitution, Edouard elides any reference to ethnicity. It is 
not the Hutu that are blamed, but, as the Preamble declares, the “unworthy leaders and other 
perpetrators that decimated more than a million sons and daughters of Rwanda.” In this way, 
the poem and the Preamble avoid perpetuating the type of blanket accusations that the 2001 
Law For the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and 
Sectarianism prohibits. The law defines discrimination as “any speech, writing, or actions 
based on ethnicity, region or country of origin, the colour of the skin, physical features, sex, 




and sectarianism as “any action or statement that “causes conflict that causes an uprising that 
may degenerate into strife among people.” This reflection on the power of language to incite 
hate or healing is similarly present in Edouard’s poem:  
  The RPF army I was taught to hate 
Decided that it was time to defend Rwanda… 
War began in Kinigi, in the heat 
Everyone was involved, so understand, my children 
It wasn’t about guns or weapons 
It was about a fight for truth 
I will thank them wherever I am 
Edouard thanks the RPF effusively for “liberating” Rwanda. But he then goes on to nuance 
the definition of liberation beyond military achievement to the forms of social and economic 
development, like those outlined in the Preamble, that have yet to be achieved. He calls on the 
RPF to do more, saying, “now that they have conquered, I ask of them/Free us from poverty 
and illiteracy since liberation is a journey.”  
 Given the lack of a free press in Rwanda, it may seem surprising that Edouard so 
openly makes demands on the RPF government. However, dissenting poetry actually holds a 
longstanding position in Rwanda. In the sixteenth century, the Queen Mother Nyirarumaga 
institutionalized oral poetry as a means to preserve the history of Rwandan monarchs. She 
created the first chair of poets to serve in the kingdom’s administration, essentially an 
equivalent to a seat in the contemporary parliament. This melding of government and oral 
poetry is particularly African; Peter Leman contends that in African society “orature is law”: 




(834). Significantly, the African artist can serve as a lawmaker on behalf of the state or in 
defiance of it. In Rwanda, royal poets were allowed to express criticism of the king’s 
decisions, resulting in an oral poetry tradition that was paradoxically institutionalized to 
preserve the monarchy and express dissenting views.25 Like the ancient poets in the service of 
kings, contemporary poets can also express dissatisfaction, even when performing on public 
platforms at national ceremonies.  
 In the Kinyarwanda language original of the poem, Edouard’s emphasis on what has 
yet to be achieved is even starker. For instance, in the film’s only explicit reference to 
Rwanda’s transitional justice courts Edouard says, Twibohoze m’ubutabera/Ukuri kuganze 
ikinyoma irwanda, which literally translates to, “Let’s liberate ourselves with justice so truth 
prevails over lies in Rwanda.” The subtitles instead give a more passive translation: “Let 
justice liberate/Let truth replace lies in Rwanda.” While the subtitle translation asks for justice 
to liberate as though justice itself were the agent, in Kinyarwanda the agent is the first person 
plural, cementing a sense of collective responsibility. This was equally true of the lived 
experience of Rwanda’s transitional justice courts, where were no prosecutors or legally 
schooled judges, as not enough legal personnel had survived the genocide. Instead, defendants 
were tried by their peers in a truth commission style court run by a committee of locally 
elected judges. All Rwandan adults were called upon to participate either as defendants, 
witnesses, or spectators, and over the course of a decade over 12,000 courts tried more than 
one million genocide cases. But as ambitious as this transitional justice system was, Edouard 
cautions that it alone is not enough. He warns that 
Our future is already failing 
                                                 




Unless we begin our journey well 
Helping widows and orphans 
And food for the man in ruins with nothing 
What is left is to share everything 
As we battle against hate 
The initial verb tense in the English subtitles—“our future is already failing/unless”—
converges the future into the present with a charged caution against complacency: action must 
be taken now to protect a future that will otherwise immediately fail. The Kinyarwanda is 
similarly urgent but contains a more specific assessment of what must be done to avoid 
failure. Its first two lines are, “Twegupfunyika ubupfura/Ngo ejo dupfundikire ubupfapfa.” 
The key term here is ubupfura, which denotes a combination of qualities that is difficult to 
translate into a single English word. Roughly, these first two lines translate to, “Let’s foster 
morality/integrity/humanity lest we unleash the opposite tomorrow.” This journey towards 
ubupfura is emphatically collective: all that is left, Edouard cries, “is to share everything/As 
we battle against hate.”  
 “Liberation is a Journey” is in itself an act of sharing in the battle against hate. But it is 
self-referentially aware that one performance will not be sufficient to change the course of 
history or to alter Ngabo’s quest. Edouard concludes,  
I wish you all the best 
And so I close here 
I, a poet will speak again 
Peace to you in Rwanda, peace everywhere. 




journey that must be continuously, perhaps infinitely, practiced. This evidences the reality that 
a poem’s effect is difficult to measure, particularly because the impact may not be 
immediately felt. Indeed, it at first appears that Ngabo remains utterly unaffected by the 
poem.  
Like the traditional epic hero, Ngabo continues on to his final task alone. As Dean 
Miller notes in The Epic Hero, the hero is frequently “accompanied but alone”; his partner or 
companions are “important, but the final test must be passed or failed by the solitary hero” 
(Melia qtd in Miller 102). Such solitude reinforces the sense of epic hero’s individual agency 
above and beyond what the nation can offer to support him on his nationally significant quest. 
This is especially evident in how Ngabo makes his final decision. Possessing absolutely 
nothing—no money, no home, no family, no support from the legal system or government, 
and no more poet-guide or best friend—Ngabo is left with nothing but his self and the 
machete when he arrives at his father’s killer’s house.  
 
Warriorship Redefined: Munyurangabo’s Renaming 
Following Edouard’s performance, the subsequent scene opens with Ngabo standing outside 
his father’s killer’s house, machete in hand. He enters and finds the killer lying on a straw mat 
upon the dirt floor, covered up to his chin with a grey blanket. A single square of white light 
falls upon his back from the lone window like the iconic chink of light in a prison cell, 
representing the constraints of poverty, disease, and perhaps guilt that render his home a 
prison even though he was not imprisoned by the transitional justice courts. “What happened 
to you?” Ngabo asks, and the man, seemingly unsurprised to see him, answers, “It is AIDS. 




sound like a command in the English subtitles registers as a plea in the original. His plea calls 
upon Ngabo to take pity on his bodily vulnerability, to obey a Levinasian ethics of 
responsibility to the precarious face of the other. In Ngabo’s context, however, the Levinasian 
edict not to be an accomplice in the other’s death is also, literally, a demand not to murder. 
The face of Ngabo’s other is not only the precarious visage of a man dying of AIDS, but that 
of the killer who hacked Ngabo’s father to death without mercy for his plea. The killer’s plea 
sets the ethical command not to kill against the ancient desire to avenge the death of a family 
member, and it is this plea that inspires the one and only image the film provides of Ngabo’s 
father.  
 Ngabo leaves the killer’s house and daydreams that his father is sitting beside him in 
the field outside. The sky streaks with red, the light turning brighter until it is clear that Ngabo 
is inhabiting a dream space. The visual and tonal capacity of the filmic form is able to depict 
the dead father the way he was before he died at the same time as signaling with the 
dreamlike lighting that he no longer exists outside Ngabo’s psyche. As such, the film 
represents the painful double-time experienced by survivors in remembering the dead while 
knowing that they are no longer there. And while Ngabo’s mission to avenge his father’s 
death has determined his entire journey, his father’s words—scripted through Ngabo’s 
daydream—express an ambiguous perspective on how he wants his son to respond to his 
death. He says: 
Do you know why I gave you the name Munyurangabo? Long ago, in old 
Rwandan culture, Munyurangabo was a mighty warrior. He would fight ahead 
of others. He would conquer, and clear the path. And that is why I gave you the 




By explicitly asking Ngabo what his battle is, the father throws into question the definition of 
warriorship. If the definition of a conquering warrior were stable, Ngabo’s battle would be 
obvious: to take revenge. Instead, the daydream leaves Ngabo uncertain as to what constitutes 
warriorship in post-genocide Rwanda: do the warriors battle for violence or for peace?  
 Once again, the film reiterates the individual responsibility and agency within the 
collective culture of reconciliation: not even Ngabo’s own father can give Ngabo an answer as 
to what he should do. Ngabo falls asleep and dreams of Sangwa in the friendship they enjoyed 
before their journey. He awakes with rain and tears streaming down his face, signaling that 
the loss of Sangwa, even more than the death of his father, pains him most. The sequence of 
these two dreams suggests that not only will revenge fail to remedy his father’s death, but that 
the revenge quest has also lost him his best friend. As the camera focuses in on his wet face 
huddled beneath banana leaves, the scene draws a parallel between Ngabo, lying alone on the 
ground with nothing but the barest of materials to shelter him, and the killer who not far away 
lies alone and dying beneath a thin blanket.  
Perhaps it is this sense of mutual vulnerability that determines Ngabo’s course of 
action. Or perhaps it is a sense of justice that the killer has been punished for his sins by 
AIDS, which may have been contracted during the genocide if he participated in widespread 
rape as did many perpetrators. Alternatively, Ngabo may be influenced by his dream of his 
father and of Sangwa. Or he could instead be affected by the memory of Edouard’s poem.  
The film refuses to illuminate the rationale behind Ngabo’s next decision, instead 
suggesting that it is the accretive, accumulative effects of all the encounters that influence 
him. When Ngabo enters the killer’s house once again, leaving behind the backpack with the 




leads into a dark hallway, revealing nothing. No conversation is heard between Ngabo and the 
killer, intimating that there are literally no words to convey the transformation that occurs 
between arriving to kill a man and departing instead to fetch him water. By refusing to show 
what occurs in the house, the film resists pinpointing that scene as a key transformative 
moment, thereby maintaining its emphasis on the accumulative evolution of Ngabo’s journey.  
As Ngabo gathers water for his father’s killer, the river brings with it the religious 
connotations of baptism, purity, cleansing, and benediction. But these symbolic meanings 
significantly merge with the material reality of desperate thirst. While material vulnerability 
can be used to encourage violence, as with the lead up to the genocide when the Tutsi were 
scapegoated for Rwanda’s economic woes,26 vulnerability can also be framed as a reason to 
reconcile. The Preamble to the amended constitution draws a direct link between 
reconciliation and economic development, stating, “peace and unity of Rwandans constitute 
the essential basis for national economic development and social progress.” Edouard echoes 
this sentiment in the conclusion to “Liberation is a Journey” when he declares that providing 
“food for the man in ruins with nothing” is what will prevent the liberation journey from 
failing. In post-genocide Rwanda, where blaming another group for one’s own poverty would 
be considered a crime of divisionism, it becomes materially expedient to collaborate in the 
strenuous work of surviving poverty.  
However, sharing the water does not save either man from the challenges of life faced 
by the poor. As the camera focuses in on the river, it becomes apparent that the water is 
cloudy, not clear. Its impurity denotes the widespread lack of access to clean drinking water in 
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Rwanda, but also connotes the taint of the genocide, which infamously filled the rivers with 
corpses until water taps ran red with blood. Neither poverty nor genocide has been cleansed 
from the water. But despite its impurity, despite the meagerness of dirty water to sustain a 
man dying of AIDS, Ngabo gathers it anyway because it is all he has to offer. In the context 
of great poverty, sparing the killer’s life is simultaneously an impossibly heroic ethical act and 
an intensely humble material one. The coexistence of these qualities is a paradox if they are 
perceived as working in spite of one another. But they can also be viewed as working because 
of each other: when there is so little materially available to stay alive, and when it is 
prohibited to kill one another, what choice do people have but to work together to sustain 
themselves? Munyurangabo exposes the extent to which nourishing the other in dire 
circumstances is a material as well as an ethical act. That the two are inseparable helps 
explain why reconciliation in poverty-stricken Rwanda is framed as literally the stuff of life. 
While the Preamble to the amended constitution harkens back to precolonial unity, 
referencing “a common language, a common culture and a long shared history which ought to 
lead to a common vision of our destiny,” the metaphor of the river emphasizes futurity: it 
flows on and on. In reality there is no returning to a mythical precolonial past; there is only 
life in the tainted aftermath of the genocide. The physical movement of a running river 
emphasizes the longevity of reconciliation’s journey. Unlike revenge, which can be 
accomplished in the swift slice of the machete, reconciliation is, like the river, a process with 
no end in sight. Furthermore, Ngabo experiences reconciliation not at the official space of the 
transitional justice courts that took place on the grass, but at the alternative site of the river. 
Although rivers run throughout Rwanda and are universally experienced by the many people 




metaphor for reconciliation, it importantly takes place outside a collective space, highlighting 
the extent to which reconciliation is experienced individually, through an individual’s own 
volition and courage, even if it is also happening elsewhere, at other sites along the 
metaphorical river.  
Most extraordinarily, the final scene reveals that the reconciliation between survivor 
and perpetrator repairs other social relations. When Ngabo stands up from the river, Sangwa 
appears on the riverbank. Whether he is actually there or remains a figment of Ngabo’s 
imagination remains ambiguous. What matters is that both boys want him to be there: 
although they are facing away from each other, their eyes and mouths are upturned into the 
beginnings of a smile, signaling a reunion to come. If the camera had stayed for just one 
moment longer before switching to the stark black screen of the credits, they might have 
turned to each other with the same quiet affection they shared at the beginning of their 
journey. 
 There is no epilogue to show what happens to Ngabo and Sangwa, nor a textual 
passage to match the initial epigraph from Isaiah 51. It is perhaps fitting of such an enigmatic 
film that there is no corresponding end to square off the beginning frame. But the curious 
viewer who reads a little further in Isaiah 51 will find that the verse which begins as a paean 
to revenge ends up condemning it. The next few lines of Isaiah 51 read: 
Therefore hear this, you afflicted one, 
Made drunk, but not with wine. 
This is what your Sovereign Lord says, 
Your God, who defends his people: 
“See, I have taken out of your hand 
The cup that made you stagger; 
From that cup, the goblet of my wrath, 
You will never drink again. 
I will put it into the hands of your tormentors, 




‘Fall prostrate that we may walk on you.’ 
And you made your back like the ground, 
Like a street to be walked on (New International Version, Isaiah 51). 
 
Whereas in the earlier lines of the verse, wrath was a quality of the lord, here God takes it 
from the hands of his people and give it to their tormenters. These lines mirror what Ngabo’s 
story becomes over the course of the narrative: a rejoinder to the revenge impulse that 
initiated his journey. By excluding the latter part of the verse, the film leaves Ngabo’s fate in 
question. His actions appear to have transitioned from revenge to reconciliation, but we have 
no dialogue or voiceover to access his emotions. We are left unsure as to whether Ngabo is 
still filled with wrath or if he believes that vengeance will make his “back like the 
ground/Like a street to be walked on.” Chung once described the film as a “prayer” for what 
Rwanda’s reconciliation process “could be” (Nyarugenge). Accordingly, the story ends with a 
courageous and hopeful act that has no guarantee of success. This aspirational yet uncertain 
condition of ongoing trial and tribulation is, Munyurangabo demonstrates, not a failure but 








Chapter Four: Reconciliation as Memorialization 
Perhaps the most famous image in Plato’s Republic behind that of the cave is Leonitus 
struggling and failing to avert his eyes from the corpses outside the North Wall:  
The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the 
Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying 
on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a 
dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, 
but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up 
to the dead bodies, crying, ‘There you are, curse you, feast yourselves on this 
lovely sight!’  
This image, which Susan Sontag describes as “the very first acknowledgment (as far as I am 
aware) of the attraction of mutilated bodies,” maintains purchase in contemporary accounts of 
human rights violations (264). Sontag quotes the above passage in her famous discussion of 
war photography, “On Photography;” Philip Gourevitch uses it as the epigraph to his famous 
memoir of the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow 
We will be Killed with Our Families. These canonical, contemporary authors call upon Plato’s 
image to convey the timeless ethical quagmire posed by the sight of the violated dead, which 
occurs, Sontag emphasizes, “in a description of mental conflict…while Plato is developing his 
tripartite theory of mental functioning, consisting of reason, anger or indignation, and appetite 
or desire” (264). The sight of the corpses, in Sontag’s reading, creates mental conflict because 
it sets reason and desire against each other.  
 But if reason and desire are pitted against each other, it might then be more accurate to 




the embodied experience that surpasses cognitive reasoning and linguistic articulation. This 
ontological conflict is already evident in Plato’s theory of the tripartite division of the self, 
wherein Leonitus addresses his own eyes as though they are separate from him: ‘There you 
are, curse you, feast yourselves on this lovely sight!’ It is not the rational part of the soul 
addressing the desirous here; if it were, his speech might reason with his desire. Instead, 
reason pushes Leonitus to avert his eyes and walk by, but desire wins out. The desire splits 
not just his mind but his body: his eyes are no longer his own; they are called away from him 
by the appalling lure of the corpses. And yet, once Leonitus’s eyes open to see the mutilated 
bodies, they are of course still his own; what they have seen is now a part of him. To 
acknowledge this is to acknowledge complicity with a spectacle of violence. 
The nature of complicity in relation to images of violence like Plato’s bodies on the 
wall has been richly theorized by scholarship on human rights. Some view complicity as 
actual culpability: that looking at images of violence may encourage the performance of 
violence; something that Thomas Keenan describes in a horrific description of killers waving 
at the camera in Kosovo (446). A more banal and universal genre of complicity is that images 
of violence may numb the viewer, “creating a culture of callousness” (Sontag, 265). Or 
images intended to shock and upset may instead titillate the viewer, rendering her complicit in 
the production of violence for spectacle. And once a particular type of body, like that of the 
enslaved African, has been displayed over and over again in what Saidiya Hartman calls 
“scenes of subjection,” the very concept of that identity risks becoming synonymous with 
subjugation. To look at images of violent death, then, is to risk complicity, of some sort or 




Other scholars, however, theorize complicity more as a state of ethical responsibility 
to the other. Such a Levinasian approach posits that we are called to the other through his 
precarity, which, significantly, is manifested in the image of his “face.” This face may be the 
literal face, but it is primarily the mark of the other’s vulnerability, however that may be 
conveyed in his bodily form. Levinas writes that “the face is the other who asks me not to let 
him die alone, as if to do so were to become an accomplice in his death” (24). And yet, in 
Judith Butler’s reading of Levinas, she recognizes that “the ‘face’ of the other cannot be read 
for a secret meaning, and the imperative it delivers is not immediately translatable into a 
prescription that might be linguistically formulated and followed” (131). Thus, the face’s 
imperative—to not be accomplice in the other’s death—is not so clearly articulated after all, 
for the face by definition signifies outside language. Encountering the face of the other is a 
demand to “read” that which cannot literally be read.  
This sense of engaging the other outside the realm of the semantic emerges over and 
over again in theories of complicity. In Naomi Mandel’s book Against the Unspeakable: 
Complicity, The Holocaust, and Slavery in America, accepting complicity is one way out of 
the ethical impasse of the concept of the “unspeakable” that continues to dominate certain 
strands of genocide studies. Mandel criticizes the notion that “the unspeakable,” or 
“indescribable” is a stable entity that we can gesture to in the Holocaust, or slavery, or any 
other horror “out there” (4). Rather, the unspeakable, she explains, is a “discursive production 
that is re-created and reinforced whenever the limits of language, of comprehension, and of 
thought are evoked” (4). The unspeakable is thus not “the impossibility of expression” but 
“the expression of impossibility” (3). Once we recognize this, we are able to look behind the 




purposes. At this point “her corporeality moves to center stage” (12, emphasis in original). 
Mandel sets an unusual emphasis on the corporeality of the critic. She does this to foreground 
her point that someone—a person with a body—has to speak about the “unspeakable” for it to 
exist, but that in evoking the unspeakable, that person removes herself to a safe distance from 
the events that she terms unspeakable. The “attraction of the unspeakable,” Mandel argues, 
“lies in the seeming separation it performs between the literary writer or the critic on the one 
hand and the moral problematics of her subject on the other” (23). That separation is 
corporeal in two senses. First, that the critic is a corporeal being involved in constructing a 
discourse; second, that the “subject” deemed unspeakable is almost always a form of violence 
against the physical body.  
For Mandel, the fundamental problem with the unspeakable is its evasion of a 
productive complicity with corporeality. She advocates for authors and critics alike “to 
abandon the lure of the [unspeakable’s] moral high ground” by recognizing that we are all the 
“producers and the products of our cultures and hence always already complicit in the ugliest 
aspects of our histories” (24). We should do this, Mandel writes, because “the affirmation of 
complicity is also and equally an affirmation of presence: there is something to be gained by 
relinquishing the unspeakable, and that something is nothing less than our own fragile 
corporeality and a constructive engagement with the fragile corporeality of others” (24). 
Hence, the corporeality of the reader, writer, or critic, and the corporeality of their subject, are 
both to be seen and engaged. This ethical imperative takes a Levinasian approach to self and 
other at once: in abandoning the unspeakable, we are forced to see our own “face” and the 




The route by which we engage this practice is, for Mandel, through a method of 
reading literature and watching film. She demonstrates through an analysis of films and texts 
on the Holocaust and slavery that the aesthetic can engage the audience’s complicity through 
images of the other’s corporeality. In this way, Mandel’s scholarship resonates with Mark 
Sanders’s work on complicity and the intellectual under apartheid that views literature as 
engaging the reader in a “mutual enfoldedness” with the other (6), and Elizabeth Anker’s 
reading of world literature as reinvigorating the human subject with an embodiment lacking in 
human rights law (8). Mandel, Sanders, and Anker all highlight the aesthetic strategies and 
discursive possibilities of mimetic representation to foreground corporeality and complicity. 
But if complicity is another way of describing our corporeal engagement with others, might it 
then be the case that sites like genocide memorials that constitute literal, rather than 
figurative, embodiment, invoke another degree of complicity with corporeality than mimetic 
representation? In the discussion that follows, I consider how theories of complicity, 
unspeakability, and reparative reading inform our understanding of Rwandan genocide 
memorials, and in turn how the memorials shed insight on these interpretive lenses.  
 
Rwandan Memorials: Complicity, Corporeality, and Reparation 
Memorial visitation belongs to a long lineage of “dark tourism” or “thanatourism,” the 
practice of witnessing sites of death and its aftermath. From the gladiator games to medieval 
public executions to contemporary pilgrimages to Ground Zero, humans have throughout 
history been drawn to contemplate death.27 This drive is evident in the longstanding tradition 
of literature and art seeking to commune with the dead. But visiting actual sites of death and 
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destruction has come to be seen as “the highest form of thanatopsis since it involve[s] 
physical presence at a setting of death, rather than its symbolic contemplation in books and 
images” (Seaton 236). Thanatourism has increased in the last two-hundred years not only 
because more people have died, and died in gruesome atrocities, but because the media has 
been able to broadcast to the public the specific locations of the dead (Seaton 242). Indeed, 
places like Rwanda have seen an increase in tourism thanks to their notoriety for previous 
disaster (Sharpley 6). Despite being far off the usual tourist circuits, Rwandan memorials 
attract thousands of tourists every year, many of whom remark in books, blogs, and Trip 
Advisor reviews upon the memorials’ stunningly grotesque displays of bodily remains.  
Famed for their macabre nature, genocide memorials in Rwanda minimize aesthetic 
mediation. They represent the genocide as if in its immediate aftermath. Take for instance 
Ntarama Memorial, one of the many former churches that turned into a killing site during the 
genocide. A guide leads visitors through the church grounds, pointing out the material 
wreckage: a bulldozed wall, a burned door, a splash of blood on stone, victims’ cooking pots 
and mattresses, racks of bloodied clothes, shelves stacked with skulls, piles of machetes, and 
coffins full of bones. As is typical of Rwandan memorials, the objects on display are not 
symbols, but artefacts. To curate genocide’s aftermath with minimal mediation—to leave the 
weapons and building and bodies similar to the way they were found—is to suggest that 
genocide is best represented by its own detritus, that art is incapable of capturing the enormity 
of the event.  
But what appears to be unmediated at Rwandan memorials is actually part of a large 
production process, visible when viewed over the long term. In a visit to Ntarama Memorial 




where a few years before had only been grass. This, the memorial guide explained, was to be 
a mass grave for many of the bodily remains currently on display in the church.  
 
Mass grave being dug at Ntarama Memorial.28 Above it is a ‘lighthouse’ with a 
lamp to keep the flame of memory alive, although the flame is only lit during 
the commemorative month of April to save limited resources. 
 
According to the guide, survivor groups had lobbied the government for years to allow these 
remains to finally be laid to rest. The government had recently agreed with the caveat that a 
few stay on display to counteract genocide denial. But as the workers dug, they kept finding 
new bodies in the ground. One such body was in the burlap sack that stood by the church 
door, waiting to be cleaned by a professional and then reburied in the mass grave during 
commemoration ceremonies. The body in the sack disrupted the cycle of burial that 
symbolically posits a laying to rest of the past. Its emergence from the mass grave that had 
been dug to bury, not exhume, the dead, demonstrated that the living do not know where all 
the dead are buried and thus cannot fully control the burial cycle.  
 Importantly, the body in the sack foregrounds the fact that genocide memorials are not 
                                                 




simply ridden with the rhetorical fissures of representing unspeakable trauma—as is 
literature—but also quite simply that memorials which include bodily remains are pressured 
by the embodiment that is their purpose. As bodily remains decompose, re-emerge, fracture, 
and smell, they force the living to contend with the continuing material life of the dead. Much 
of the memorials’ affective force stems from the sense—in all meanings of that word—that 
the bodies continue to enact a material as well as an emotive power. This complicates all of 
the purposes of the memorials—burial, preservation, education, documentation, and 
memorialization. The work of this chapter is to consider what reparative and paranoid reading 
practices look like at sites that attempt reparations through embodied forms. 
The exhumation, display, and reburial of genocide victims are conducted for multiple, 
overlapping, and sometimes contradictory methods of reparation: the political, to signify how 
terrible the genocide was and by extension to legitimize the current government that ended the 
genocide; the familial, to identify remains and bury them with respect; the educational, to 
document the dead and their manner of death for posterity; and the material, to remove bodily 
remains from unmarked sites to be buried in memorial graves where they can be properly 
commemorated and will not disturb the ongoing private, public, and commercial life of the 
country. The memorials’ original and primary purpose was not for thanatourism, but to aid in 
the recovery, identification, reburial, and commemoration of victims’ bodily remain. These 
processes are considered so important as to be valued not only at the memorials, but under 
Rwandan and international law as well. The Gacaca courts reduced sentences in return for 
information on the location of missing bodies. The United Nations Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation (Basic Principles) defines the recovery of the dead as a form of reparation after 




Principles posits the recovery of bodily remains as independently sufficient for reparation; 
both recognize the pressing needs of living victims, including justice, public apology by the 
perpetrators, and fiscal, medical, and psychological support for survivors. Nonetheless, the 
proper care of bodily remains is deemed reparative by law. But the practice of finding, 
identifying, and burying bodies after an event as chaotic and bloody as the Rwandan genocide 
is difficult, gruesome, and unending, as evidenced by the body in the sack at Ntarama. As 
such, the extent to which memorials provide “reparation” of the type enshrined in the Basic 
Principles may be interpreted not as reparative at all, but as traumatizing.  
 Existing scholarship on Rwanda contends that the sensory impact of memorials is so 
traumatizing as to shock visitors into silence. Some critics claim that as visitors are rendered 
speechless by the memorial, they lose their ability to speak critically about the RPF 
(Meierhenrich 288). Others argue that the RPF uses the memory of genocide to legitimize its 
rule with impunity and to crack down on any dissenting speech (Ibreck 59, citing Mamdani; 
Reyntjens; Pottier; Longman and Rutagengwa). The memorials, some suggest, function as 
instruments of repression by producing a ‘traumatic silence’ that emulates and supplements 
the RPF’s repression of speech (Guyer 161-2; Meierhenrich 288). However, these viewpoints 
assume that all visitors will react the same way. Visitor testimonies, documentaries, and my 
own observations over the last decade indicate that memorials actually elicit diverse 
responses. Even the scholars who claim that the memorials produce only traumatized silence 
ironically demonstrate with their own writing that visitors can respond with critical, 
verbalized thought. 
But although visitor response cannot be reduced to silence, there are distinct patterns 




material forms. Affordance, parsed by Caroline Levine as the “potential uses or actions latent 
in materials and designs,” has received new interest in literary studies thanks to Levine’s 
adaptation of the concept from design theory to study the aesthetic and political forms of 
wholes, rhythms, hierarchies, and networks (Levine 6). I reclaim the original design theory 
definition to study what the memorials’ material forms afford. What does a charred building, 
old cooking pans, a killing tool, or a preserved corpse call forth in a visitor? And what 
happens to the lens of literary analysis when we move from written thanatopsis where the text 
communes with the dead through language, to sensory thanatopsis where the memorials 
commune through touch, smell, sight, and hearing?  
It is my contention that the memorials demand a new grammar to describe thanatopsis 
that enlists embodied response in addition to language. If grammar is a way of putting things 
together in language, what might grammar look like if we are to describe responses outside 
language? The memorials affect visitors at multiple and simultaneous vectors of experience—
touch, smell, sight, and hearing—producing what we might call a sensory grammar. This 
sensory grammar is distinct from our usual experience of multiple senses because it is 
afforded by extreme, ghastly materials. The visceral, embodied forms of the memorials can 
afford a correspondingly visceral response. This is seen in the common visitor reactions of 
fainting, weeping, screaming, or nausea. Interpreting the memorials requires ‘reading’ these 
non-linguistic responses in addition to the semantic options of spoken response and 
speechlessness. To do so, I walk my reader through five genocide memorials that I researched 
in personal fieldwork—at Murambi, Bisesero, Ntarama, Nyamata, and Nyarubuye—to 




I concentrate on the five national memorials—Murambi, Bisesero, Ntarama, Nyamata, 
and Nyarubuye—rather than district level memorials or the Kigali memorial for several 
reasons. First, the focus of this chapter is the affective impact of multiple senses engaged by 
the concurrent presence of bodily remains and a living guide. District level memorials house 
bodily remains but do not employ guides full time due to district funding constraints. The 
Kigali genocide memorial displays bodily remains, but only behind glass, and employs audio 
guides rather than living guides. Second, the national memorials are (besides Kigali 
memorial) the most frequently visited and are thus the most commented upon in existing 
scholarship. Third, considering all five national memorials at once enables a comparative 
analysis of different aesthetic strategies taking place within the same funding and jurisdiction 
structure.29 
 
Sensory Thanatopsis: Sight, Sound, Smell, and Touch 
The sense of touch engaged at genocide memorials distinguishes the embodied experience of 
memorial visitation from that of reading or viewing images. An oft-quoted paragraph from 
Philip Gourevitch’s We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with our 
Families: Stories from Rwanda testifies to this: 
There was another room [at Nyarubuye] and another and another and another. 
They were all full of bodies, and more bodies were scattered in the grass, and 
there were stray skulls in the grass, which was thick and wonderfully green. 
Standing outside, I heard a crunch. The old Canadian colonel stumbled in front 
of me, and I saw, though he did not notice, that his foot had rolled on a skull 
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and broken it. For the first time at Nyarubuye my feelings focused, and what I 
felt was a small but keen anger at this man. Then I heard another crunch, and 
felt a vibration underfoot. I had stepped on one, too (19-20).  
The crunch of the skull renders Gourevitch complicit in the very desecration of the dead that 
angers him in his fellow visitor. The complicity, Gourevitch’s account implies, is physically 
inevitable. There are so many skulls on the grass that simply stepping means crushing the 
dead. To be at the site of aftermath as a corporeal being, capable of movement, is to be 
complicit in disturbing the corporeal state of those who died there. 
Complicity is no longer as physically obvious at genocide memorials. Gourevitch’s 
description is set in 1995, less than a year after the genocide. Since then, memorials have kept 
bodily remains indoors in configurations that signify a sense of order and agency over the 
macabre aftermath. Professionals have cleaned, processed, and organized the skulls for the 
purpose of viewing; they can no longer be touched by accident. To touch a skull at Nyarubuye 
or any other national memorial would require a conscious, or impulsive, but not accidental, 
movement. Although the memorial guides ask visitors not to take photographs of the remains, 
they do not say anything about touching them. This may be due to a difference in policy, but 
it is more likely that the guides do not ask visitors to avoid touch because they do not need to; 
I have never witnessed or read an account of anyone touching bodily remains at a memorial 
by choice. I have never asked a guide about this for fear of indicating a desire that I not only 
do not feel, but also sense is too sacrilegious to name. There is, it would seem, an interdiction 
against touching dead bodies that visitors understand without instruction.  
Even if visitors resist touching the bodily remains, however, they cannot avoid contact 




sites. They stand on top of crypts and former mass graves. They lean against brick walls 
riddled with bullet holes. They shake hands with the guide whose same hands hold aloft skulls 
to point out wound markings. To simply be at a memorial is to touch, if not the dead 
themselves, the ground upon which they were killed, and the flesh of their caretakers, the 
guides. Additionally, walking through the memorial is to follow the path of the genocide’s 
enactment, from the victims’ hiding places, to the killing grounds, to the mass graves, to the 
new burial sites. The sense of complicity activated at the memorials is not so much about 
culpability for the genocide having happened and the international community’s lack of 
response—although this is evoked in descriptions of, for example, the mass grave upon which 
the French army allegedly built a volleyball pitch during the genocide—but rather complicity 
for the very fact of being alive while the dead there are not. Moreover, the distinction between 
the visitors and the bodily remains is not only that of the living and the dead, but that of the 
living and the victims of an obscene form of death. Stepping through a memorial means 
awakening to the precarity and privilege of one’s own existence in contrast to the death 
sentence of genocide’s logic and execution, which together render resistance nearly 
impossible.  
Indeed, the physical structure and artefacts of resistance’s aftermath are very different 
than those associated with massacre. Bisesero memorial, also called ‘The Resistance 
Memorial,’ is the one national memorial in Rwanda that focuses on a resistance effort. The 
geographic setting afforded the resistance strategy: a village elder instructed all the Tutsi to 
gather at the top of the highest hill from which they could see over the surrounding landscape. 
They fought off the militia with stones and spears and employed a language of drum signals 




call in reinforcements from the cities. These reinforcements brought guns and grenades; of the 
approximately 50,000 people who fought in the resistance, 1,500 survived. 
Bisesero memorial’s setting and structure emulate that of the resistance. To reach the 
memorial, visitors must take the route of those who fled there and the militia who followed 
them, up hill after hill whose steep slopes, even when traveled by car, testify to the arduous 
journey they endured. Just inside the entryway of the memorial is a large stone surrounded by 
spears, evoking the weapons used by the Tutsi. A cement path then zigzags up the hill, 
passing through three buildings with three rooms each of skulls and bones, representing the 
nine neighbouring districts that victims fled from to join the resistance. After exiting these 
buildings, the path’s surface changes from smooth concrete to stones of diverse shapes and 
sizes. Smaller stones jut out of the steps far enough to make the passage difficult—one must 
pay attention not to trip—but they are not numerous or large enough to block one’s way. 
These, the guide explains, denote the stones that the resistance used to fight with, while the 
large, upright stones that impede the middle of the path symbolize the drums that the 
resistance used to communicate. On the sides of the path encroach enormous craggy boulders 
of black stone unlike any in the area, emblematizing the militia with its superior weapons and 
dark intent. Made as they are of earthly material, they naturalize their dominance. But they are 
not there naturally, just as the militia that ended the resistance was not. There are no other 
dark boulders on the hillside. They, like the militia, were imported for this purpose. They have 





     Stone path at Bisesero Memorial 
The resistance memorial is also a memorial for genocide. Positioned just before the top of the 
hill, the boulders convey how close the Tutsi were to freedom before they were killed; the 
Bisesero resistance ended just a few days before the RPF officially ended the genocide.30 
Accordingly, the pinnacle of the memorial is a mausoleum at the top of the hill holding the 
bodies of the resistance leader and his son along with thousands of other victims. From there, 
visitors can see through the trees to an even higher hill, which was the actual resistance site 
too steep for the memorial to be built there. This further contributes to the sense that Bisesero 
is, more than the other national memorials, crafted.  
Whereas the other memorials are situated inside the actual buildings of former killing 
sites, Bisesero was built anew; designed by a former resident of Bisesero whose entire family 
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was killed.31 Building the memorial with the weapons of resistance honors the agency of the 
Tutsi who fought not to die. It also signifies the agency of survivors to mediate the genocide 
with art, to make something out of atrocity’s materials beyond representing them as if in 
genocide’s immediate aftermath as do the other national memorials. The agentive nature of 
the resistance at Bisesero made appropriate an agentive memorial, whereas the helpless nature 
of the deaths at other sites demanded memorial materials that look helplessly destroyed. 
Nonetheless, all the memorials are mediated to a certain degree. The constructed nature of 
Bisesero memorial and its distance from the actual resistance site highlights something that is 
equally true of the other memorials but perhaps less clear: that visitors can never touch or 
smell or see or hear the actual event of genocide; it is always beyond their physical and 
cognitive grasp.  
The incomprehensibility of the genocide is often evoked in descriptions of the 
memorials’ smell. The New York Times reporter Andrew Blum’s account is typical; he writes 
of the underground crypts at Nyamata memorial that ‘[t]he odour exempted us from the need 
for imagination. It relieved us of the need for understanding’ (1). While the olfactory sense is 
thought to be highly emotive due to its link to memory, Rwandan genocide memorials are 
emotive for the opposite reason: the smell of bones, corpses, and dried blood is not linked to 
memory because it is unlike any other smell. This incomparability leads to indescribability; 
Blum does not describe the smell itself, but rather its effects upon him. It is the 
indescribability of the odour that ‘relieved [him] of the need for understanding’ (1). The smell 
that is unlike any other smell rescues the desire for cognition by signalling that this place, like 
this odour, cannot be understood: it is beyond understanding, it is indescribable.  
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Scent conveys the indescribability of the genocide by presenting the visitor with an 
odour that is not only unlike any others, but cannot be replicated in mimetic representation. 
Unlike sight and sound that can be conveyed in text, image, video, and audio, the smell of a 
Rwandan genocide memorial cannot travel by way of aesthetic mediation. The only way to 
experience its smell somewhere else is to visit a site that also contains uncovered skulls, 
bones, preserved corpses, bloodied clothes; in other words, to find another place that 
documents the unspeakable with embodied forms. In this sense—the sense of an indescribable 
smell—multiple sites of memory and atrocity can be linked across time and space. This link 
can work both competitively and multidirectionally, to use Michael Rothberg’s terms. A 
competitive view sets one horror as the most unspeakable atrocity in human history against 
which all others must be measured for their incomprehensibility. Contrastingly, a 
multidirectional view sees unspeakability as a common thread that connects atrocities, 
understanding one through another.32 Whether the odour of death is described as competitive 
or multidirectional, the fact remains that it is both unique and common: its status depends on 
the visitors’ exposure to other sites that exude the same smell.  
For the uninitiated visitor, the smell is unlike anything else. For the visitor who has 
smelled that type of death elsewhere, the olfaction links the two sites. I put emphasis on the 
type of death because one of the most complex components of atrocity memorials is how they 
engage the visitors’ sense of their own corporeal vulnerability—that the visitors too will one 
day become ash or bone—while at the same time distinguishing the type of bodily remains 
generated through genocide from that created by death that strikes the individual. The smell of 
genocide—either in its enactment or aftermath—is characterized by massive proportions that 
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elude the capacity to control its smell as do morgues, cemeteries, and crematoriums that 
process corpses in less catastrophic numbers. If this sounds too ghoulish, too grotesque to 
theorize, it is meant to be. It is part of what genocide memorials attempt to signify: how 
bodily remains not only morally overwhelm a culture but also materially overwhelm its space.  
Visitors may attempt to escape the smell—the video documentary Keepers of Memory 
depicts visitors at Murambi memorial covering their noses with clothing—but the sense of 
smell affords no escape: covering the nose cannot keep out smell entirely, and one can only 
hold one’s breath for so long. Unlike sight and hearing that can be blocked more fully and 
immediately, smell infiltrates the body. It is with this language of contamination that the 
Ivorian writer Veronique Tadjo writes of her visit to Nyamata: 
The bones of the skeleton-corpses are disintegrating before our very eyes. The 
stench infects our nostrils and settles inside our lungs, contaminates our flesh, 
infiltrates our brains. Even later on, far away, this smell will linger in our 
bodies and our minds (12).  
The smell of the dead infects, contaminates, infiltrates, and lingers; Tadjo defines it by the 
effects upon the body, not by its innate qualities. The indescribable odour can only be 
described by the visitors’ embodied responses that register disruption and disturbance. These 
responses are both useful and antithetical to the memorials’ official purposes, as seen with the 
Murambi Memorial’s developing stance on displays of odorous, preserved corpses.  
Murambi memorial, which is famous for displaying preserved corpses, not just bones 
like the other memorials, has recently purchased twenty specialized coffins that will trap the 
smell of the corpses. According to the Murambi guide in January 2017, the memorial will 




corpses, because ‘it is important for the world to learn from what happened in Rwanda’ 
(Murambi guide). It remains ambiguous from the guide’s explanation whether the new coffins 
will be made of transparent material to keep the corpses visible33 or if they will protect 
visitors from sight in addition to smell. Either way, the guide’s statement indicates that 
learning about genocide requires sensing its aftermath, and that smell is an important 
component of that sensory experience.   
Equally important, however, are the ghastly sights at Murambi. The guide leads 
visitors into room after room filled with stacks of corpses that are appalling both in their 
number and in their visual signs of violent death and disposal. The corpses at Murambi were 
initially preserved from decomposition during the genocide from the heat of the mass grave; 
afterwards they were exhumed and preserved for posterity in Lyme powder. Now stacked side 
by side on display at the memorial, they are bright white from the Lyme powder and shrunken 
from the decomposition of flesh and muscle. Many were positioned with arms covering the 
face, marking their last attempt to shield themselves from slaughter. Others cradled smaller 
corpses in their arms; the bodies of children. Dozens of rooms at Murambi hold the same 
macabre display.  
But the mass number of corpses is not the only corporeal evidence to signify that acts 
of genocide took place at Murambi. For many events of mass violence, the resulting bodily 
remains are visually distinguishable from those of a natural death by their quantity and 
markings of trauma. This is emphatically true of Rwandan genocide memorials, where bodily 
remains are displayed in the tens of thousands and many skulls exhibit the holes or slashes 
indicative of death by bullet, club, or machete. The trauma and number of the bodily remains 
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mutually reinforce each other’s signifying power: the wounds signify violent death and the 
number of bones signifies mass death. Displayed together, they signify mass violence. 
Through this process of signification, each memorial evidences genocide on its own. But each 
memorial concomitantly operates within a network of other memorials. This means that any 
given memorial simultaneously signifies genocide as a whole and signifies as a synecdoche 
for genocide as a broader totality. In other words, the memorials signify the mass nature of the 
genocide by constructing synecdoches that are themselves composed of massive proportions.  
This is a very different strategy of signification than that deployed in literature of 
genocide that often narrates one person’s life and death as a synecdoche for the many.  
Literature is capable of affecting through a synecdoche of singular proportion because it can 
infuse the individual with personhood that makes the individual matter, at which point her 
suffering or death carries sufficient affective force to convey or at least point to the tale of 
collective suffering. In contrast, the sight of one skull does not convey genocide, nor does it 
necessarily afford affective impact. Without the signifying capacities of narrative, the bodily 
remains require mass collectivity and evidence of violence. 
The scholar Sara Guyer writes of her visits to Rwandan memorials that the 
“nonanthropomorphizing style of commemoration” that “recover[s] neither individual persons 
nor proper names” collapses the distinction between the dead of genocide and the dead in 
general (163). But it is precisely that nonanthropomorphizing, or, rather, nonpersonifying, 
style of commemoration that distinguishes a genocide memorial from a cemetery. The lack of 
individual identification and naming of corpses is due to the material challenges that faced 
Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the genocide. While survivor groups and RPF soldiers 




display at the memorials, they did so under severe constraints. First, many victims were 
exterminated along with all their family members and friends, leaving no one except the 
perpetrators to identify them, which they did not have incentive to do until years later under 
the transitional justice courts. Second, many bodies, especially those discovered years after 
the genocide, were too decomposed or disfigured to identify. Third, in the aftermath of the 
genocide, Rwanda had to contend with a million corpses, a traumatized population, an exodus 
of refugees mixed with genocide perpetrators into neighbouring countries, and the rebuilding 
of a nation with essentially no infrastructure. Thus, while displaying anonymous corpses and 
bones at the memorials is an aesthetic choice, their existence is not. Their anonymity is the 
result of the depersonalizing nature of genocide that survivor groups and the RPF had limited 
capacity to undo. Further, it is important to note that not all of the corpses and bones at 
memorials are anonymous. The national memorials host coffins with bodily remains that have 
been identified either with an individual name or the name of a particular place where they 
were recovered.  
The processes of reburial and of commemoration with names and tokens may be read 
as a “reparative impulse” of the type that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick recommends, “the often 
very fragile concern to provide the self with pleasure and nourishment in an environment that 
is perceived as not particularly offering them” (137). It is impossible to imagine the 
memorials as providing pleasure—except for the most spurious, voyeuristic gaze—but it is 
possible to see them as offering care and nourishment in an inhospitable environment. This is 
apparent in the memorials’ effort to both identify the bodies that can be identified—thereby 
undoing the depersonalization of genocide—and to do justice to representing genocide in the 




identifying the dead and displaying the dead’s depersonalization. The former manifests in the 
intimate gestures of commemoration with material tokens of love and remembrance. That 
only a few coffins are marked with flowers and notes of love in comparison to the rows of 
unadorned coffins and the stacks of unnamed skulls is not evidence of a lack of care but 
instead indicates what Sedgwick calls the ‘fragility of concern.’ That any effort at care is 
made in such a fragile context demonstrates courage: the courage to commemorate despite 
existing within a context so horrific that it all but validates a ‘paranoid’ perspective.  
The paranoid position, in Sedgwick’s words, anticipates the negative and puts its faith 
in exposure to avoid bad surprises (130). The majority of Rwanda scholars approach the 
memorials through a paranoid perspective: they anticipate that the memorials traumatize 
visitors, that the trauma results in silence, and that silence leads to an uncritical embrace of 
the RPF’s repression of free speech and by extension all of the RPF’s policies. Their 
scholarship actively resists complicity with the RPF’s self-legitimizing narratives. Filip 
Reyntjens perceives the RPF as ‘astutely exploiting the ‘genocide credit’’ to ‘maintain victim 
status’ while ‘enjoying total impunity’ (qtd in Ibreck 58). Similarly, Nicolas Pottier criticizes 
the RPF for wielding ‘international feelings of guilt’ to ensure ‘moral superiority,’ while 
Mahmood Mamdani argues that the government’s ‘founding ideology’ is ‘the memory of the 
genocide and the moral compulsion never to let it happen again’ (qtd. in Ibreck 58). Longman 
and Rutagengwa concur that the RPF ‘kept the memory of the genocide prominent in public 
discourse and imagination in order to emphasise its claim that as the group that stopped the 
slaughter and brought peace to Rwanda, it had the moral right to rule’ (qtd. In Ibreck 59). 
Meierhenrich and Guyer draw a link between the general critique of the RPF and the 




the memorials is that they are unfairly dominated by RPF policy and attitudes towards 
memorialization (Ibreck 81). 
However, the RPF’s views on memorial displays and burial are not stable, nor do they 
act outside the influence of other parties. It is not actually clear if the RPF were the first to 
begin exhuming, reburying, and displaying bodies at memorials in the chaos of the immediate 
aftermath of genocide. The practice may initially have started with survivors searching for 
murdered family members. And while the memorials have for many years functioned as sites 
to educate Rwandans and foreigners alike about the genocide—and in doing so may indeed 
shore up the RPF’s moral legitimacy as the party that ended the genocide—government 
attitudes towards the memorials vary widely. Rachel Ibreck’s careful research of Rwandan 
memorial practices and government policy demonstrates that “in contrast with the view that 
“Tutsi fundamentalists” (Prunier, 2009: 3-4) are behind official commemorations, it is notable 
that Hutus have had key roles in memory policy” (81). Furthermore, “not all members of 
government support memorialisation,” as some prefer to “try and eliminate fear” (81). The 
RPF administration adopted a “decentralized approach” to memorialization as it has done 
with many policy issues, meaning that district officials are in charge of local memorials, and 
sometimes disagree with national policies (81).  
In addition to the State’s role in memorialization practices are the work of survivors 
and other relatives of the dead, the largest groups of contributors to memorials. A 2008 census 
estimated that there were a total of 309,368 genocide survivors living in Rwanda, and 400,000 
or more Tutsi returnees from the diaspora, many of whom lost family members during the 
genocide (Ibreck 85). These two groups formed associations to address social and economic 




remembrance sites and practices (85). There are many such groups, some of which are housed 
within Ibuka (Remember), the national collective of survivors’ associations, and others that 
operate independently. Disagreements occur among groups, especially between educated 
elites connected to more cosmopolitan theories of memorialization, and rural groups focused 
on local custom (86). Susan Cook, an American anthropologist, wrote in her ethnographic 
research of Rwandan memorial sites in 2000 that there are three “distinct, but related 
activities” at work with the memorials: “1) preservation and restoration of human and 
structural remains, 2) memorialization and commemoration of the victims, and 3) 
documentation and research of the events” (284). While Cook noted that genocide sites 
resonate differently among different groups in Rwanda, she found a common denominator 
that memorialization and documentation were seen to supersede the importance of 
preservation for forensic purposes (290-1).  
This is unsurprising for several reasons. Most major memorials house thousands—
sometimes hundreds of thousands—of the dead. The walls of names beside the tombs fall 
woefully short of accounting for all these victims; there are only a few hundred names etched 
at any given memorial despite ongoing efforts to gather information from local people, 
survivors, and perpetrators about the whereabouts of the specific dead. This speaks to the 
multiple challenges facing processes of identification. The conditions of the dead vary, 
making it difficult (and gruesome) even if there are survivors who could identify them 
available. Further, because entire families and neighborhoods were often wiped out in the 
genocide, there is sometimes no one left who can identify the dead, unless the perpetrators are 
willing to confess and are able to provide accurate information. Meanwhile, forensic science 




the least important of the memorials’ functions, as memorialization and documentation take 
precedent. 
Regardless of this historical background, the prevalent critique of the memorials is that 
they function to legitimize the RPF. Whether that critique is accurate or misguided is not my 
primary concern here. What I am interested in is how this critique is mobilized to reduce the 
memorials to a singular, monolithic, and negative purpose. For a paranoid interpretation of the 
memorials is not the only productive means to engage with them. Take for instance this scene 
at Nyarubuye Memorial, in which a guide provides a narrative explanation for several unusual 
artefacts sitting on the floor next to the more typical stacks of machetes and skulls. The simple 
list of torture and killing practices calls into question what form of response can possibly be 
‘good’ in the terms of either paranoid or reparative reading. The guide said: 
The wooden canoe was where the militia mashed up bodies. 
The drinking gourd was where they drank their victims’ blood. 
The oven outside was where they baked the limbs and ate them. 
The mortar and pestle was where they ground chilli peppers into powder so 
strong it makes you sneeze. The militia threw the powder over the piles of 
bodies so that if anyone were still alive and playing dead, they would sneeze 
(Nyarubuye Guide).  
In some ways, the gothic horror of the list demands a paranoid interpretation that questions its 
empirical value: was there really cannibalism and blood drinking rituals at Nyarubuye during 
the genocide? If not, that must mean that the government organization now funding the 
memorial decided to falsify genocide testimony, to make the event even more ghoulish so as 




that the narrative is based on fact. Indeed, it may make little difference whether or not the 
narrative is true. If true, we know that the genocide was horrific; but we already knew that. If 
false, we know that the RPF exploits genocide memory to legitimate itself; but we already 
knew that as well. While empirical reality is crucial for historical, political, and legal activists 
and scholars, my interest from a literary perspective is what the narrative affords, whether or 
not it is true.  
A scene like the one at Nyarubuye can inspire language—in conversation with the 
guide or a fellow visitor, or in writing or speech after the visit is finished—but it can also 
induce speechlessness and embodied responses that do not express in language. The dominant 
criticism of speechlessness as reproducing the “unspeakable” inherently privileges the 
semantic as the most valid form of expression. But lack of speech also signifies. What is 
unspoken is not necessarily “unspeakable” in the tradition of trauma studies that Mandel 
critiques, nor is it one uniform, agentless opposite to the spoken. In fact, such responses may 
mark an experience of engagement with the wounded other so overwhelming in its affective 
force that language is superseded by more emotive, and less cognitive, forms of expression. 
To weep or to faint in the face of horror is not necessarily to concede that the horror is 
unspeakable, but to experience a response that is, at that moment, ‘spoken’ in a ‘language’ of 
embodiment.  
This embodied language—of crying, screaming, fainting, and nausea—is not typically 
thought of as generative, as it stops the individual in her tracks and renders her 
incommunicative. But such responses can in fact bring people together. When I, for instance, 
told the memorial guide at Nyarubuye that I felt too sick to continue the tour, he accompanied 




church that was still active despite it having been a major killing site, the Catholic authority’s 
anemic apology for its role in the genocide, the plans to survey neighboring communities to 
glean more information about the bodies found at Nyarubuye, and about the guide’s own 
interest in the history of the Holocaust. It did not strike me until later that the richest 
conversation I had at Nyarubuye took place not in the official space of the memorial, but 
outside it, sitting on what Toni Morrison calls a “bench on the side of the road,” a 
commemorative space that is significant because it is so commonplace. The bench is also a 
productive figure for commemoration because it is made to seat more than one person. Its 
physical form structurally promotes discourse. 
Thus, expressing pain and vulnerability at memorials does not only reify the 
“unspeakable.” It can instead elicit physical and verbal contact with others. At the memorials, 
complicity literally makes sense through multiple senses. To simultaneously see, smell, touch, 
and hear about the dead is to sense on multiple vectors of experience one’s own corporeality 
coming into contact with that of the massacred other, and with the body of the memorial 
guide, the guardian of the dead. Perceived this way, responses to memorials that manifest 
outside of language are not inherently evasions of complicity. 
These differing approaches to the narrative at Nyarubuye offer a model for how 
paranoid and reparative readings both illuminate something about the memorials. This is in 
keeping with Heather Love’s position that Sedgwick’s work presents ‘the impossibility of 
choosing between’ the paranoid and reparative positions (239). As Love writes, ‘Sedgwick 
taught me to let the affect in, but it’s clear that by doing so I won’t only be letting the 




means accepting pain. And it is in the affective experience of this pain that feelings of 
empathy and productive complicity may occur.  
At the same time, however, it is important not to overemphasize the power of 
embodied experience to the point of embracing unspeakability and cutting off 
communication.  Indeed, part of what makes the memorials such complex sites is that they 
generate embodied response, speechlessness, and conversation. Critics who are dissatisfied 
with the memorials tend to overlook the multiplenar possibilities for communication there. 
The structural dynamic of memorial visitation actually encourages conversation by pairing 
visitors with a guide and asking visitors to record their thoughts in writing in the memorial 
guestbook or on pieces of paper to be hung on a bulletin board.  
 
A poster at Murambi Memorial asking visitors to share their thoughts 
in writing 
 
Of course, conversation, like speechlessness, is not uniform; it is a live experienced 
affected by the infinitely varying relations between visitors and guide. Because of the varying 
nature of conversation at memorials, I find it helpful here to analyse the evolution of my own 




impact the presence of speech or speechlessness at a memorial: previous exposure, affective 
reaction, and language of discussion. 
The first time I visited Nyamata Memorial in 2008, I had not seen any national 
memorials before. The guide did not speak English—this was before Rwanda switched from 
French to English as the official second language—and so I translated her French for my 
fellow American visitors. The three sentences I remember give an idea of what her narrative 
was like. ‘Over here they threw babies against the wall. Down there they raped the women. 
With sticks!’ (Nyamata Guide). We were shocked, horrified, and speechless; we said nothing 
to each other or to the guide. She in turn respected our silence, and did not ask us to speak. 
When I returned to Nyamata several years later, I had by then learned Kiswahili. There was a 
Kenyan visiting the memorial that day, as well as several European tourists. I joined the 
Kenyan’s Kiswahili conversation with the guide and found that it was entirely different than 
what the guide was telling the other visitors in English. It was not that he was revealing new 
information about the genocide. Rather, he was not speaking about the genocide at all. 
Kiswahili opened a narrative outside the occupation of genocide tourism. When the Kenyan 
told a joke, the guide reciprocated, and the three of us laughed. Meanwhile, the European 
tourists looked on in horror.  
I do not remember the joke or anything else that we talked about because it was 
simply too quotidian to find noteworthy. But that in and of itself is important, as it marks the 
possibility of the quotidian at a site that seems to enable only the extraordinary. Laughing on 
top of a tomb is disrespectful if the memorial is perceived to allow only the languages of 
shock and grief. But in a country where graves are ubiquitous, where the signs designating a 




everywhere if it were not to overlap with spaces of terrible memory. The guide’s laughter 
spoke of a desire to communicate outside the designated speech boundaries of mourning; it 
manifested his right to a life undefined by tragedy.34  
From that point on, I was less interested in hearing what guides said about the 
genocide than what they chose to say about anything else. On a subsequent research trip to 
Rwanda in January 2017, having learned basic Kinyarwanda, I asked the guides to speak in 
Kinyarwanda instead of English or French, even if I didn’t understand everything. In addition 
to the official narrative that explains the national and local history of the genocide, the guides 
told personal stories and jokes; they shared something outside the grammar of thanatourism. 
The conversations external to thanatourism are as important as those that directly illuminate 
information about the memorials, because they reaffirm the lived reality of memorial sites as 
integrated into the practice of daily life in Rwanda. Some of these conversations capture the 
bizarre cognitive dissonance of speaking about genocide to reaffirm its profound significance, 
and in the next moment speaking as though genocide does not matter. This is part of the 
irreconcilable logic of reconciliation that is easier to convey through narrative like the 
following than through analysis. 
At Bisesero Memorial I walked down the zigzagging stone path behind the guide. He 
moved slowly, with a limp, and his eyes when he spoke about the genocide had a far away 
look that made me wonder if he was a survivor from the area. But in 2017, unlike in the early 
2000’s when Susan Cook conducted her ethnographic study of the memorials, guides do not 
self-identify according to their subject position within the genocide. As is the case everywhere 
in Rwanda now, if someone does not volunteer his subject position freely, it is inappropriate 
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to ask. But to avoid speaking about the past makes many quotidian topics in the present 
difficult, because where one lives, what languages one speaks, and where one is from, all 
contain markers of one’s politicized subject position.  
And so instead of making conversation that might touch upon any of these sensitive subjects, 
I spoke as we wound our way over the stones symbolizing the dead as I would in the most 
quotidian, unsacred, and unexceptional spaces: I asked about the weather. Gesturing to the 
sun over the hills, I inquired in Kinyarwanda if the afternoons there were always so beautiful. 
The guide replied that the Kinyarwanda word for that time of day is ‘kiberinka,’ the 
time of the cows, named for those two hours of perfect afternoon temperature when the cows 
like to stroll about. I asked if he typically went home at the kiberinka, or if he had to work 
until evening at the memorial. He said that he lived close enough nearby that he could stay 
home whenever he wished, only walking up the road to the memorial if he saw a car in the 
distance. I knew without him having to explain that in such a rural area, the only cars to take 
that road would be visitors for the memorial. From miles away he would have seen my car 
and known that I was a thanatourist. He would have known before I had even stepped out of 
the car that I was there not to see actual, live people in the area, but to visit the dead. My car, 
and of course my white skin, marked me as someone more interested in the dead than the 
living. But in our conversation that followed—again, too quotidian to recall—it appeared to 
me that in speaking East African languages, I had demonstrated interest in hearing more than 
the typical narrative about dead bodies. I was no longer only a tourist or scholar there for my 
piece of the genocide’s story, although I was of course also that. This liminal space allowed 
me to recognize that my fellow Western scholars had posited a particular dynamic between 




When scholars like Meierenhreich and Guyer criticize the silence that results at a 
memorial, they imagine that the guide imparts an official script and the visitor takes it in 
uncritically and unresponsively. This is sometimes, but not inevitably, true. The structure of 
the guide-visitor relation affords both silence and conversation. Guides allow visitors to 
respond in silence or dynamic, embodied modes like weeping or screaming. They also 
respond to visitor questions and comments, ask visitors if they have questions, and request 
that visitors leave written reflections in a guestbook. The interactions between guide and 
visitor are unpredictable and myriad. To define the guide-visitor relationship as merely 
constituting the rehearsal of a state-legitimizing script and its passive reception is to elide the 
potential for conversation inherent to the structure of the lived dynamic, especially when that 
dynamic includes the sharing of language(s) that demonstrate the visitor’s engagement with 
Rwandan narratives beyond those shaped for thanatourism.  What might a theoretical model 
look like to recognize what is reparative or healing at a sight of horror and death? Another 
way of phrasing this is to ask whether it is possible to perform a paranoid and a reparative 
reading of the same embodied form. 
A model for this type of analysis is to be found in Saidiya Hartman’s work on “roots 
tourism” at former slave trade sites in West Africa. Hartman’s essay “The Time of Slavery” 
straddles paranoid and reparative modes of reading. It narrates the experience of visiting Cape 
Coast Castle and Elmina Castle in Ghana and La Maison de Escalves in Senegal with other 
African American tourists. At first, Hartman views the experience with a paranoid lens. The 
call for kinship between Africans and African American tourists is a “placebo, a pretend cure 
for an irreparable injury” and a “currency” that circulates as its own kind of trade (762). The 




Hartman then notes that her paranoid “self-fashioning as an ‘anti-tourist’” is equally 
problematic: “cynical, adolescent, and ultimately a failure to grapple with the messy 
entanglements of memory and commodification and terror and tourism” (769). The paranoid 
perspective is useful insofar as it illuminates the defects of the tour, but it does not extend 
further. Turning to a reparative reading, Hartman finds that her fellow tourists’ grief creates 
“an opening for counterhistory, a story written against the narrative of progress” (769). She 
locates the reparative potential of slave trade tourism in the narrative these sites make clear. In 
doing so, Hartman replicates the tour’s reparative possibility in her own writing. The essay, 
transportable beyond the materially-situated slave site, offers reparative meaning to its 
readers, particularly those living within North America’s “social foreclosure of grief and 
bereavement as a response to the limits and failures of political transformation” (760). In the 
slave trade dungeons, Hartman writes, “[o]ne need not strain to hear the voice of our 
complaint still resounding” (775). While the essay rigorously examines the harmful 
deficiencies of the tourist sites, it also attends to what the sites enable.  
Sedgwick explains that critics avoid reparative reading because its vocabulary “has 
long been so sappy, aestheticizing, defensive, anti-intellectual, or reactionary” (150). None of 
these criticisms could be levied against Hartman’s essay; her analysis is too keen and specific. 
Hartman does not universalize her findings in West Africa, nor does she redeem the bad with 
the good. As such, she offers a compelling model for how to analyze the particularities of 
specific sites with a critical, reparative gaze. The cascade of questions that her visit to the 
slave sites provokes can transfer “multidirectionally” to Rwanda: “does mourning necessarily 
entail the obliteration of the other through identification?…to what end do we conjure up the 




site-specific. Hartman writes from the position of an African American for whom the former 
slave trade sites are integrally bound up with North America’s “broken promises of freedom” 
(760). So too do many Jewish North Americans tour Europe’s concentration camps with an 
eye to their lost ancestors and the continuing violence of anti-Semitism.35 But the descendants 
of the murdered and enslaved are not the only visitors to sites of death and destruction, nor do 
all visitors suffer echoes of an original violence. What then constitutes the nature of 
complicity for those thanatourists who do not originate from an identity position related to 
those being memorialized?  
The first and most obvious answer is that spaces like Rwandan memorials offer a 
training in complicity as culpability in that they show visitors the cost of the international 
community’s refusal to intervene in the genocide. That training is easily accomplished, 
making it too easy for visitors to self congratulate that they understand and regret their 
culpability. But to consider that type of complicity as the end goal of memorial visitation is a 
luxury, because it imagines that the mental, emotional, and embodied work demanded by the 
memorials is fulfilled by recognizing a flaw in the past that is too late to be rectified, and that 
therefore demands no further thought or action.  
The second, and also obvious answer is that genocide memorials prompt visitors to 
recognize their complicity in current atrocities. This is seen not only at the Rwandan 
memorials’ discussions and exhibits about other genocides worldwide, but also at other 
memorials across the globe. One of the starkest illustrations of this phenomenon is the 
exhibition “The Art of Memory: Holocaust Memorials in History” at The Jewish Museum in 
New York City that ran from March 13-July 31, 1994, dates that encompassed the entirety of 
                                                 




the Rwandan genocide. With tragic irony, its introductory material reads that “the art of 
memory remains incomplete, an empty exercise, until visitors have grasped—and then 
responded to—current suffering in the world in light of a remembered past” (Young 38). The 
exhibition’s failure to mention Rwanda—the paradigmatic global event of “current suffering” 
in those months of 1994—should come as no surprise. This is not simply because African 
news is underrepresented in the West.36 The Holocaust was not widely discussed or 
commemorated for twenty years after the event. Suppression of speech about the Cambodian 
genocide still plagues Cambodia today. Turkey continues to deny the Armenian genocide. It 
was not until 2016 that the United States installed an African American history museum that 
commemorates slavery. Acknowledging and memorializing atrocity evidently takes time, so 
much time that the Jewish Museum’s call for Holocaust memorials to catalyze response to 
current violence seems idealistic at best and denialist at worst. This leads to a question at the 
heart of Memory Studies: do representations of atrocity, whether past or present, help to 
educate, mitigate, or prevent atrocities of the present or future? If not, should memorials give 
up on “Never Again” and rest content with “Never Forget?” Which version of complicity is 
worth engaging?  
When disaggregated from “Never Again,” the imperative to “Never Forget” assumes 
that the dead deserve to be commemorated whether or not they draw attention to current 
victims. This is particularly important when we consider that genocide victims are not war 
                                                 
36 As Alisa Solomon notes in “Who Gets to be Human on the Evening News,” mainstream American 
media prioritizes human interest stories over coverage of global events—she begins with the striking 
example that in 2005 the genocide in Darfur received fifteen news stories on CBS, NBC, and ABC 
combined, while Tom Cruise’s engagement to Katie Holmes garnered 863. The heart of Solomon’s 
essay, however, is to argue that increased quantity of coverage is insufficient to mobilize action, a 
point that Thomas Keenan takes up in “Mobilizing Shame” to contend that increased visibility does 
nothing to halt violence if the perpetrators cannot be shamed. Solomon concludes that the quality, 
rather than quantity, of journalism must change; she advocates for journalists to abandon their ethic of 




heroes or martyrs who choose to die for a cause, conscious of the utility or lesson of their 
death. Genocide memorials commemorate not to honor the event but to abhor it and mourn its 
victims.37 The two purposes of “Never Forget”—to abhor and to mourn—are weighty enough 
without the cause of “Never Again.” At the same time, however, the painful affective 
experience of mourning and abhorring can compel visitors to wish that such an awful event 
will not happen again, either out of empathy for the wounded other or simply so that they 
need not feel those negative emotions again. The question then becomes how to translate the 
desire for prevention into action. Translating desire to action is typically seen to require a 
switch of methodologies from memory studies to presentist modes of response such as human 
rights activism, policy change, judicial work, and military or peacekeeping intervention. And 
yet we should not assume that these other modes are without faults similar to those of the 
memory industry. Military and peacekeeping interventions have fallen woefully short in their 
responses, from the belated liberation of Hitler’s camps after eleven million victims had 
already been slaughtered to the withdrawal of United Nations troops during the Rwandan 
genocide. So too have legal landmarks; the United States’ Voting Rights Act of 1965 and 
South Africa’s Interim Constitution of 1994 legislated racial voting equality, but decades later 
equality among the different races is far from realized. Neither the memory industry nor the 
presentist modes of response are unmarred by belatedness and structural shortcomings. But 
should these inadequacies excuse a cynical perspective that excuses inaction?  
After the Holocaust, Hannah Arendt philosophized that even flawed dissents against 
                                                 
37 The distinctions between war and genocide memorials are significant. After the First World War, 
concrete sculptures were erected in all the nations that had fought. While the sculptures varied 
according to cultural and political differences, all conveyed the heroism of the soldiers and a 
romanticized sense of war (Williams 3-4). Genocide memorials differ from this traditional 
“legitimizing, identity-nurturing monument;” they are, as Andreas Huyssen describes Holocaust 




atrocity are worthwhile. In Eichmann in Jerusalem she critiques the logic of a German citizen 
who claimed that protesting the Nazis would have been “practically useless” because the state 
would have martyred dissenters in “silent anonymity” (232). Arendt counters that there is no 
such thing as a perfect oblivion into which all deeds, both the heroic protests and the gassing 
of victims, can disappear. “One man will always be left alive to tell the story,” she writes. 
“Hence, nothing can ever be ‘practically useless,’ at least, not in the long run” (232). Arendt’s 
capitulation to “the long run” urges evaluation of actions not only for their effect on the 
present moment—where they may seem to fail—but also for a future that affords hindsight. 
Indeed, Germany’s national identity after the war would, Arendt notes, have benefited had 
more Germans challenged Hitler in ways that may have seemed practically useless at the time 
(232). Arendt’s philosophy considers the value of dissent under circumstances of mortal risk. 
Genocide memorials often recognize these heroic dissenters, but they focus the imperative of 
“Never Again” on those privileged enough to work against genocide from a safe distance. 
And yet, for all the memorials’ insistence on ending current or future genocides, are they 
really what motivate people to engage in activism? Can we credit genocide memorials for that 
kind of commitment, and if not memorials in particular, memory studies, training in the 
humanities, or even education in general?  
Carl Wilkens, the only American to remain in Rwanda during the genocide, saved 
hundreds of lives and now speaks at schools and universities across the world. His 
organization, “World Outside My Shoes,” affirms his commitment to “inspiring and 
equipping people to enter the world of ‘The Other’…and to stand up against genocide, racism, 
and intolerance” (Wilkens). Like the Holocaust memorial exhibit at the Jewish Museum, 




other forms of intolerance. This is a “multidirectional” approach, to use Michael Rothberg’s 
term that claims we can learn about different painful events through each other rather than 
setting them in competition with one another as though memory were a zero-sum game (17). 
Some memorials actively foster multidirectional thinking, as with the ongoing exhibit at the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum that displays information about current 
genocides, or the exhibits at the Kigali Genocide Memorial of the Armenian, Cambodian, and 
Nazi genocides. However, even in settings where multidirectional thinking and feeling are 
structurally encouraged, what is it that enables a leap to action? Do Carl Wilkens’s classes or 
genocide memorials accomplish anything other than force the audience to think about terrible 
tragedies and feel wretched as a result? As Paul Williams writes in his study of memorial 
museums around the globe: “all manner of post-Holocaust events cited in this book were not 
prevented by the formative memory practices associated with that event. What is it that now 
encourages us to surmise that a slew of new institutions might overturn this inauspicious 
legacy of repeating the past?” (155). 
One way of responding to this question is to analyze why we ask it in the first place. 
Why do we expect memorials to announce that representations of the past will prevent society 
from repeating atrocity? When posed this way, we can recognize that this perennial question 
that haunts memory and human rights studies is also a question about genre. Why is it that 
memorializing sites are, perhaps more than any other aesthetic production, expected to gesture 
outside their own temporal and historical context to ongoing atrocities elsewhere? It has to do, 
I suggest, with the fact that memorials force visitors to confront the dead and primarily the 
dead. By many definitions, the dead are beyond repair. Their cause is lost. And so in order for 




arises the impulse to look towards those who might still be saved, wherever and whomever 
they may be.  
But if we take a comparative reading of different types of memorial sites, even just 
within Rwanda, it is clear that the impulse to link these dead with others’ suffering is a 
cosmopolitan model that does not often operate in rural and insular contexts. The Kigali 
genocide memorial, funded and designed by the groups that did the Holocaust Memorial 
Museum in Washington D.C., engages a multidirectional approach with a library room full of 
books and an entire second floor of the museum devoted to exhibits on other genocides 
throughout history. The national memorials studied in this chapter—at Bisesero, Nyarubuye, 
Ntarama, Nyamata, and Murambi—are operated by the national organization of Ibuka, which 
receives some funding from international sources. The guides’ narratives at these memorials 
sometimes, although not always, mention the importance of remembering Rwanda so that 
“Rwanda” does not happen again elsewhere. But the local memorials scattered across the 
country, those run by district officials or survivor organizations, do not present themselves as 
an education or a warning for other parts of the world. Many of them are comprised simply of 
a statue and some graves, or a small mausoleum with a plaque. Few have guides onsite to lead 
a visitor through. They are memorials in the most fundamental definition of that term: they 
mark the memory of those who died there. In this sense, they are more like cemeteries.  
The generic difference between cemetery and memorial is that cemeteries lack 
narrative production; their forms do not afford rhetorical principles and figures of speech. 
Narrative is what allows the memorials to speak to and about other atrocities, to frame the 
bodily remains onsite as meaning something more than themselves. And because narrative 




they be put to good use? But perhaps the most important story to be told by the bodies is 
simply that they are there. I mean this not only because bodily remains like those at the 
national memorials document that genocide happened simply by their being there. I am 
referring to the even more basic sense that if a body is at a memorial, it is not somewhere else; 
not in a mass grave, a latrine, a river, a pit, an unknown patch of hill or forest. It has not been 
eaten by the dogs that consumed corpses in the chaos and hunger of genocide.  
At Nyarubuye memorial, the guide spoke of a Rwandan woman, a survivor, who had 
screamed at him for an entire hour asking that he open the hundreds of coffins in the crypt to 
find the body of her missing mother among the thousands of anonymous remains. This 
woman was not screaming for her mother to return to life. She was crying only for her bones.  
The woman’s desperate grief to find and dignify the body of her mother is a universal 
and timeless one, echoed throughout survivor narratives worldwide. Her agony, articulated in 
the most basic and painfilled of sounds—the scream—evokes what the great classic tragedy 
of Antigone depicts in language. In a tirade against Creon’s refusal to bury his disloyal son, 
the seer Tiresias figures burial as a rite so sacred that Creon will be punished by both gods 
and men for preventing it.  
you’ve robbed the gods below the earth, 
keeping a dead body here in the bright air, 
unburied, unsung, unhallowed by the rites. 
…And so the avengers, the dark destroyers late 
but true to the mark, now lie in wait for you, 
 




cities in tumult, all whose mutilated sons 
the dogs have graced with burial, or the wild beasts 
or a wheeling crow that wings the ungodly stench of carrion 
back to the city, each warrior’s hearth and home (47-8). 
The viscerally grotesque sensory imagery of Tiresias’s language is echoed in representations 
of the Rwandan genocide, be it in the stench of corpses and bloodied clothes at Murambi and 
Nyamata Memorials, or the trope throughout Rwandan literature and film of dogs eating the 
dead bodies. It is not simply the indignity of not being buried, but the indignity of what 
happens instead: the “wild beasts,” the “ungodly stench,” the “dead body here in the bright 
air,/unburied, unsung, unhallowed by the rites.” The searing desire to find and bury one’s 
dead with dignity is why the Basic Principles, Gacaca law, and transitional justice 
mechanisms worldwide, recognize in law the importance of recovering bodily remains after 
mass violence, so much so that perpetrators are often given reduced sentences in exchange for 
information about the whereabouts of bodies.   
This indicates that there is something universally reparative about locating, identifying, and 
reburying the dead, even though they are no longer sensate and cannot be resurrected, and 





Fig. 3. “Ntarama Church Genocide Memorial”   Dave Proffer 
Names of the identified dead etched into a wall at Ntarama Memorial. There 
are only a few hundred names, even though thousands are buried at Ntarama.  
 
It is imperative not to fetishize the reparative value of recovering bodily remains when 
there are many other modes of reparation to attend to. It is also important not to overvalue the 
signifying work of bones when they are equipped to convey the collective and dehumanizing 
nature of genocide but limited in their capacity to tell individual and rehumanizing stories. 
But at the same time, it is equally important not to overstate the bones’ function as 
instruments of a repressive, silencing trauma, as do many Rwanda scholars. Bodily remains 
afford multiple effects: they provoke silence and speech and embodied reaction. They produce 
the othering effect of violence and the enfolding effect of mutual corporeality. They repel and 
attract with their smell, touch, and sight; they refuse and demand identification. The 
memorials cannot be reduced to instruments of repression or recuperation: their structures 
afford both. Visitors, including scholars, have agency in determining which possibility they 




The physical encounter between visitor and guide, and visitor and the dead, teaches us 
that recognizing our complicity as visitors, viewers, or readers of memorializing aesthetic 
forms is not the end step of critical practice, but the beginning. Memorials make material and 
obvious our complicity. We step over the site of the French army’s volleyball pitch on top of 
a former mass grave at Murambi: of course we are complicit in the international community’s 
failure to intervene in the genocide. We stand in line to look at photographs of Hutus killing 
Tutsis: of course we are complicit in the reproduction of images of African suffering as a way 
to define the West against the chaos of others. We gape and hold our breath against the sight 
and stench of preserved corpses: of course we are complicit in desiring and fearing proximity 
with the mutilated other. The question is: what comes next if reparative or paranoid reading is 
to be not just an academic exercise but a practice that involves putting our bodies in relation 
to other bodies that matter? 
For Rwandans, what comes next is the work of continued rebuilding: of turning mass 
graves from signs of genocidal callousness to signs of honorific commemoration, of finding 
nourishment even in inhospitable environments. To do any of these things is to risk upsetting 
those with alternative opinions, to risk being complicit in actions that may be deemed “evil” 
by others. As embodied sites that put visitors into verbal and corporeal interaction with the 
remains of the dead and with a guide who lives within the complexities of employment by the 
RPF government, the genocide memorials make physical and therefore obvious the need to 
move scholarship from the ethical commitment of acknowledging one is complicit, to a state 
of being involved. This may take the form of activism, but it may also simply take the form of 
building a political community through encounters of civic friendship, of ongoing and 




The challenge is that this move risks becoming complicit in a way that one may not 
wish to be. But this is the one, inevitable component of world building in the aftermath of 
atrocity: a practice of never-ending risk. It is a risk that we should be afraid of, as the paranoid 
perspective teaches us, and that we should also embrace, as the reparative perspective teaches 
us. To be truly complicit with the art of reconciliation is to live within the seeming 
irreconcilability of these two perspectives, a state of being that contains within it the seeds of 
agonistic discourse that may nurture a political community, whether it be built in a national 





Coda: Beyond Transfiguration, Trial, and Memorialization 
 
If the genres of reconciliation are to mean anything beyond the geographical confines of 
Rwanda, they must also be present in other post-conflict sites. I believe that they are, and I 
have tried in this dissertation to show some of their importance to ancient European national 
and literary foundations. But it is perhaps more pressing to look forward instead of back, to 
consider contemporary sites where the art of reconciliation may still have a crucial role to 
play in political and social configurations to come. If Rwanda’s reconciliation process can be 
looked to as a lesson, if not necessarily a model, other sites must take into account two of 
Rwanda’s most unusual components: the ongoing proximity of survivors, perpetrators, and 
bystanders, and the strong arm of the State in normalizing the practice and ideology of 
reconciliation in all vectors of social and civic life. However, a new genre of reconciliation in 
Rwanda marks a departure from the State-led and funded art forms that dominate those 
studied in this dissertation. The new genre is that of romance.  
Unlike the genres of transfiguration, trial, and memorialization, reconciliation as 
romance does not foreground the individual-to-individual reconciling of personal differences. 
Rather, romance symbolizes or even secures reconciliation between the groups that the two 
partners represent. In recent years, Rwandan and international newspapers and magazines 
have published numerous stories about the marriages of Hutu and Tutsi couples who originate 
from families of perpetrators and survivors. The couples are not reconciling with each other. 
Their romances are evidence of reconciliation, rather than reconciliation itself. Rwandan 
stories of reconciliation through romance concentrate on transcendence of a different sort than 
transfiguration, trial, or memorialization: they rely on the romantic genre’s chief characteristic 




A recent Rwandan reality TV show in progress highlights the transcendent labor of 
romance. Single Rwandan Seeks Serious Relationship documents the relationships of young 
Rwandans seeking partners, and it centers upon a florist whose business caters to two major 
clientele, genocide memorials and romantic couples. These categories of the national 
(genocide memorials) and the individual (romantic couples) do not conflate. Although they 
function in parallel, the lovers and the memorials remain separate practices, storylines, and 
commodities. This distinguishes romance from the genres of transfiguration, trial, and 
memorialization, wherein collective groups, State institutions, and individual actors join 
together in the same artistic project. Romance across ethnic and political lines occurs outside 
of official State projects. 
But at the same time, Rwandan reconciliation narratives through romance showcase 
the significance of the State. For the State had to create a context in which it was possible for 
such desire to be acted upon, accepted, and legalized. The romance stories are thus personal 
manifestations of something the State essentially made possible. Love stories across 
politicized difference may well end in tragedy if the State has not set the stage for them to 
succeed. Romance that stays romance—that does not venture into tragedy like Romeo and 
Juliet—requires the intimacy of an interpersonal plot line, but also the structures created by a 
government. 
It is no coincidence that the genre of reconciliation as romance only became apparent 
recently, when conversations, news stories, and art works about marriage across political and 
ethnic lines burgeoned in Rwanda. Romance may prove to be a fitting genre to examine the 
ways in which individuals have incorporated, adopted, and embraced a political ideal as a 




process and that of other post-conflict sites worldwide, we should remain attentive to the 
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